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THE
POLITICAL
AND
COMMERCIAL WORKS

Of that celebrated Writer

CHARLES D'AVENANT, LL.D.

Relating to the
TRADE and REVENUE of ENGLAND,
The PLANTATION TRADE,
The EAST-INDIA TRADE,
And AFRICAN TRADE.

Collected and revised by
Sir CHARLES WHITWORTH,
Member of Parliament.

To which is annexed a copious INDEX.

IN FIVE VOLUMES.

VOLUME II.

L O N D O N;

Printed for R. HORSFIELD in Ludgate Street; T. BECKET
and P. A. DE HONDT, and T. CADELL in the Strand;
and T. EVANS in King Street, Covent Garden,
M DCC LXXI.

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W. Musgrave!



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DISCOURSES
ON THE
PUBLIC REVENUES,
AND ON
TRADE.

PART II.

H^o 1698

DISCOURSE III.

On the Plantation Trade.

HE that writes in order to recommend any matter to the public care, must begin with removing the objections to the thing itself; for it will be unnecessary to propose methods whereby the Plantations in America may be secured and improved, unless it can be first made appear that they are beneficial to the kingdom.

All trades have their rivals and concurrents in profit, who consequently are enemies; they have likewise their friends and supporters; but the diligence of one enemy is more prevailing and active, than the kindness of many friends: There

is also a third party, who, having not well considered and studied the concerns of Foreign Traffic, are neuters, being indeed not quite certain in their own opinion, whether it be good for England or not, and so become indifferent in any deliberations relating to it.

And the design of these papers being to incite the young gentlemen to bend their thoughts to matters of this nature, in the branches of trade which shall be here treated of, we shall endeavour to remove former prejudices; they who are adversaries to any particular traffic, for reasons respecting themselves, will not be altered: But we shall do our best to confirm the friends to trade in general; we shall try to bring over the neuter side; and to engage those who are the flying squadron in all such debates, by shewing them that their land-interest depends more on foreign commerce, than is commonly imagined.

The most material objections to our colonies in America are,

1st, That they drain this kingdom of people, the most important strength of any nation.

2dly, That they are a retreat to men of notions opposite to the religion of their country, and to persons disaffected to the government.

As to the first head, it is evident that since we had these Plantations, England has rather increased than diminished in people.

In the first Discourse we have sufficiently made it appear, that since the year 1600, the wealth of this kingdom is all manner of ways augmented; that our general rental is more; that the purchase of land is come from 12 to 18, and in some countries 24, 25, and 26; and that our stock of all kinds is greatly multiplied, as also the species of money. Now this accession of riches can
have

have noways proceeded but from our encreasing in the number of inhabitants.

For the collective body of a nation has but two courses of acquiring wealth, either by inroads and depredations upon its neighbours, or by the trade, labour, arts and manufactures of its people; and when it is not grown rich one way, we may presume that the hands are encreased which have multiplied its riches.

There are almost undeniable reasons to be drawn from Political Arithmetic, shewing that since the year 1600, we are encreased in number of inhabitants about 900,000, which could not be, if the Plantations were such a drain of the people as is injurious to the commonwealth.

We admit (over and above the accession of foreigners to us, and not reckoning what the West-Indies send to us again) that for 80 years last past, they may have carried away, communibus annis, about 1000 persons, and that is the most; but then it is generally of such sort of people, as their crimes and debaucheries would quickly destroy at home, or whom their wants would confine in prisons or force to beg, and so render them useless, and consequently a burthen to the public.

If the majority of those who are thus transported, or transport themselves, consists of such as would perish here or beg, it must certainly be advisable to transplant them to places, where they may be of more use, or grow better by removal.

Virginia and Barbadoes were at first peopled by such a race; it is true (as Sir Josiah Child has observed) that afterwards they came to have another sort of inhabitants, when the miseries of

the civil war had reduced many good families of the king's party to change climate.

And again, those two Plantations, Jamaica and other parts of America, had a new accession of people, when the restoration of King Charles II. had brought many persons discontented either in religious or state matters, to seek refuge in a distant country.

New-England had its original rise and planting, from the persecutions on account of conscience set afoot by the warm churchmen in the reigns of King James and King Charles I.

So that in a manner, several nations, which in time may grow considerable, have been formed out of what was here thought an excrescence in the body politic.

And it may not be unseasonable in this place, to offer to public consideration, whether it would not be more religious to transport many of those miserable wretches, who are frequently executed in this kingdom for small transgressions of the law? it being peradventure one of the faults of our constitution, that it makes so little difference between crimes; for experience tells us, that many malefactors have, by after industry and a reformation in manners, justified their wisdom, whose clemency sent them abroad.

It must undoubtedly be for the common good to preserve those abroad, whom their vice or necessities would destroy at home; but it may be a question, whether or no it is consistent with the welfare of a country, to allow to the malcontents in religious or state affairs, a retreat, and such a one, in which they may acquire both power and riches. The examination of this point will lead us to answer the objections made upon the second hand.

From

From the very beginning of the reformation, there have been differences in this kingdom, not truly in the essential, but ceremonial parts of religion; but the enemy of man (working on our ambition, pride, avarice, thirst of rule, and other our natural defects) has so improved those quarrels, as to make us contend, from time to time, about matters indifferent, as hotly as if the entire glory and power of God had been in question.

And to state things fairly, almost every religious faction that has chanced to get the sway, has thrown off the meekness that was first pretended, each shewing in its turn a persecuting spirit, which spirit is not of God.

Such therefore as found themselves disturbed and uneasy at home, if they could have found no other retreat, must have gone to the Hans towns, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, or Holland, (as many did before the Plantations flourished, to our great detriment) and they who had thus retired to the European countries, must have been for ever lost to England.

But providence, which contrives better for us than we can do for ourselves, has offered in the new world, a place of refuge for these, peradventure, mistaken and misled people, where (as shall be shewn by and by) their labour and industry is more useful to their mother kingdom, than if they had continued among us.

And as to malcontents in the state, perhaps it is for the public safety, that there should always be such an outlet or issue for the ill-humours which from time to time are engendered in the body politic. And the Romans, by such kind of colonies, did continually discharge their city of those turbulent spirits who disturbed their country's peace; and the senate thereby appeased the

tumults which did so frequently arise about the Agrarian law.

Desire of having more, and not the fear of losing what they possess, lies at the bottom of most disaffections to government; it is therefore safest to let such unquiet minds remove to places where their appetite after riches may be better satisfied.

Hardly any government can be so evenly managed, as to content all sorts of men; and the ministers are often a weight to some who reverence and love the Prince's person, and to such, a retreat is convenient, in which they may shun the private animosities and oppression of persons, perhaps too powerful to be complained of.

One of the worst circumstances in universal monarchy is, that the tyranny it introduces is no where to be avoided; so that he who was oppressed by a Roman emperor, could retire no where but into the arms of death, and this made so many great men kill themselves; whereas now, such as cannot be easy in one country, may remove and be at quiet in another.

In all likelihood, it would be very much for the good of human kind, and add extremely to the wealth and greatness of England, by new encouragements, wholesome laws, and a more easy naturalization, to make this kingdom the Asylum for all oppressed and afflicted persons who desire to shun that despotic power, which the neighbouring princes are every where setting up; and if we are made the general Asylum, our own malcontents may retire without any prejudice; for the recruits of people such a course might produce, would answer the annual evacuation occasioned by our West-India colonies.

Their Plantations have indeed ruined the Spaniards; but it is because there are many things
amiss

amiss in their present conduct. Their monasteries hinder marriage, the inquisition frights away strangers, and in general, there is no provision at all made to repair what their colonies carry out. But the Hollanders, who send out greater numbers every year than Spain, are not dispeopled by it, their constitution inviting more over to them than they send abroad.

Upon which account we cannot but wonder at their policy who were the first promoters of that law in 1695, which puts a difficulty upon, and restrains the sale of any Plantation or parcel of land in America to foreigners; whereas, indeed, we should invite and encourage aliens to plant in the West-Indies, whereby the crown gains subjects, and the nation gets wealth by the labour of others. This statute does peradventure want revising.

And countries that take no care to encourage an accession of strangers, in a course of time, will find Plantations of pernicious consequence. It may be computed that there have gone from England to the West-Indies, for many years, by a medium, about 1800 persons annually; but then there is reason to think, that for some time the persecutions abroad have brought over to us, by a medium, about 500 foreigners every year; and there are grounds to believe, that for these last 20 years, the West-Indies have sent us back annually, about 300 persons of their offspring, with this advantage, that the fathers went out poor, and the children came home rich.

But if such measures should hereafter be taken as will hinder the accession of strangers, or discourage the planters from returning back, then these colonies would drain us every year of 1800 persons.

However this can be no damage to the state, if they consist of men turbulent and unquiet at home, unless it can be made out, that they acquire abroad such riches, power and dominion, as may render them, in process of time, formidable to their mother country.

As the case now stands, we shall shew that they are a spring of wealth to this nation, that they work for us, that their treasure centers all here, and that the laws have tied them fast enough to us; so that it must be through our own fault and misgovernment, if they become independent of England.

It is true, if a breach of the navigation act be connived at, even our own Plantations may become more profitable to our neighbours than to us. Corrupt governors, by oppressing the inhabitants, may hereafter provoke them to withdraw their obedience, and by supine negligence, or upon mistaken measures, we may let them grow (more especially New-England) in naval strength and power, which, if suffered, we cannot expect to hold them long in our subjection. If, as some have proposed, we should think to build ships of war there, we may teach them an art which will cost us some blows to make them forget. Some such courses may indeed drive them, or put it into their heads to erect themselves into independent commonwealths.

But while we keep a strict eye upon their conduct, and chiefly watch their growth in shipping of strength and for war, whatever other encrease they make, either in wealth or in number of inhabitants, cannot be turned against us, and can never be detrimental to this nation.

While we are strong, and they weak at sea, they may be compelled to obey the laws of
England,

England, and not to trade directly, and upon their own account, with other countries, and they may be easily brought under, if evil-minded persons should think at any time to seduce them from their allegiance.

Of all the American Plantations, New-England (as Sir Josiah Child has observed) is the most proper for building ships and breeding seamen, and their soil affords plenty of cattle; besides which, they have good fisheries, so that if we should go to cultivate among them the art of navigation, and teach them to have a naval force, they may set up for themselves, and make the greatest part of our West-India Trade precarious. With their native product they can furnish Jamaica, Barbadoes and other parts, with most sort of provision, by which they may draw from thence sugar, tobacco and cotton; and if they have a strength of ships, to countenance the breach of their original charter, by which they are tied to observe the laws of England, they may carry the growth of our Plantations to foreign countries, and in exchange bring from thence such commodities and manufactures as they want, to the great hurt of the King's customs, and to the damage of the general trade of England.

From all which it appears, how much they may be mistaken in their politics, who, because we lose by the Baltic trade, propose to the government to build ships of war in this colony of America, not computing and weighing how prejudicial such a project may be upon other accounts; for, besides many other evils in encouraging them to do so, it would carry from hence a great number of artificers, which, in case of a war, would be wanting in England.

Colonies

Colonies are a strength to their mother kingdom, while they are under good discipline, while they are strictly made to observe the fundamental laws of their original country, and while they are kept dependent on it. But otherwise, they are worse than members lopped from the body politic, being indeed like offensive arms wrested from a nation, to be turned against it as occasion shall serve.

Not that we think the greatness these colonies may arrive at in a natural course, and in the progress of time, can be dangerous to England. To build ships in the way of trade, or for their own defence, can administer no true cause of jealousy. There is much difference between letting them be in a condition to defend themselves, and rendering them a kind of staple for naval stores, which can be hardly politic, and perhaps very bad husbandry; but to prove this last assertion would launch us out into an argument too tedious for this Discourse.

Wise countries never teach their colonies the art of war; if they need it not to oppose their neighbours, it is better they should be without it; and if it be necessary to them, they will learn it of themselves. When colonies are near, it is best they should be protected by the force and arms of their mother country; but when they are very remote, they may be allowed arms and shipping for their own protection.

And, generally speaking, our colonies while they have English blood in their veins, and have relations in England, and while they can get by trading with us, the stronger and greater they grow, the more this crown and kingdom will get by them; and nothing but such an arbitrary power

power as shall make them desperate, can bring them to rebel.

Having examined what is objected to Plantations in general, we shall proceed to shew the advantages and gain they brought to England when they were in a prosperous condition.

In the Essay on the East-India Trade (Vol. I. p. 94.) we did compute, that in the yearly encrease of the nation's general stock, amounting to 2 millions in the whole, 900,000*l.* was to be allowed for the annual profits made by our West-India Traffic, and there shall be by and by shewn the grounds we went upon in that computation, and though there may be some mistake in the repartition we then made, yet whoever considers the matter carefully, will find we were right in the main account.

But here Mr. Pollexfen will object, that there is no national gain but where there is a return made in gold or silver, which he thinks is the only balance whereby we can guess at loss and profit. He insinuates that no importation of commodities for home consumption is to be esteemed a gain, so that, by his way of arguing, the returns for what is exported to foreign parts, is only to be called profit, and that not unless it come in bullion.

Whoever follows him in this notion, will never judge rightly in any matter concerning trade, and though no merchant, from the light of common sense merely, we think ourselves able to make it appear he is mistaken.

We shall endeavour to shew, that, generally speaking, by whatever the returns are more worth than the commodity exported, the nation is by so much a gainer, let the goods imported be perishable or not.

But

But to understand this point clearly, we must look a little backwards into the manners and nature of our own people.

About 40 years after we had tasted the benefits of Foreign Traffic, we began to be infected with foreign luxury: In the beginning a stop might have been put to the progress of the evil, but there are grounds to apprehend it has now taken root too deeply, and is grown above the correction of wisdom and the laws.

Besides, for these 37 years last past, the duties on imported goods have been such a main branch of the crown-revenue, that, upon this score perhaps, our vanities were not so discountenanced as the public welfare might require.

But the people are now so accustomed to the use of foreign materials, that they can hardly subsist without them. However, this excess becomes less dangerous, when we can purchase them with the product of distant countries under our dominion, or with whom we deal, than if we were to buy them with money, or with things merely of our own growth.

For there is a limited stock of our own product to carry out, beyond which there is no passing: As for example, there is such a quantity of woollen manufacture, lead, tin, &c. which, over and above our own consumption, we can export abroad, and our soil as it is now peopled, will not yield much more; and there is likewise a limited quantity of these goods, which foreign consumption will not exceed: Now, if our expence of foreign materials be above this, and more than our own product will fetch, for the overplus we should be forced to go to market with money, which would quickly drain us, if we did not help ourselves other ways, which are either by exchanging our
Plantation

Plantation goods for their materials, or by bartering one foreign vanity for another; and this we are enabled to do with the assistance of our East-India Traffic. It is true, industry and frugality may encrease our exports, and so more of them will be consumed by foreigners.

The West and East-India Trades have so enlarged our stock, as to set the general balance for many years on our side, notwithstanding all our luxuries, which our home product could not so have answered, as to let the nation gather at the same time such a mass of wealth as the war has expended.

It is allowed that our home product, with the the profit we made by the Newfoundland Fishery, might fetch from the European markets, wine, oil, fruits, wrought silks, raw silk, linen, &c. and besides, bring a superlucration to this kingdom of about 500,000*l.* per ann. But having considered more maturely this point than we could do when the Essay on the East-India Trade was written, we are therefore to think that the profit arising from our European Trade was about 600,000*l.* per ann. added to the national stock, which, in 30 years, is 18 millions.

But 18 millions could by no means be a sufficient sum to answer the extraordinary expences, losses and accidents, by plague, fire and war, which did happen before the year 1688, and may be justly computed at 30 millions; and our consumption all the while considered, we must have been impoverished to the last degree, but for the forementioned helps.

The West and East-India commodities coming from distant parts, we make Europe pay us good freight, which is clear gain, and by their means
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we beat down the price of several wares, as wrought silks, raw silk, linen, sugar, &c. and by goods and drugs brought from thence, we dye and manufacture several of our own commodities at a cheaper rate; all which makes trade in general more beneficial to us.

In handling matters of this nature, something should be laid down to form an idea upon; whether it is quite right or no, the reader may judge, but if it comes near the fact, it will hold in proportion.

We have said in the Essay on the East-India Trade (Vol. I. p. 94.) that about ann. 1688, the encrease or addition to the general stock of England arising from Foreign Trade and home manufactures, was at least 2 millions yearly, and we made our repartition thus :

From our manufactures and home product sent to the Plantations, and from the returns thereof, exported to foreign parts, — —	l.
From our woollen manufacture, lead, tin, leather, and our other native product sent to France, Spain, Italy, Germany, &c. —	900,000
From the neat profit accruing by the East-India Trade, — —	500,000
	600,000
	— — —
Total,	2,000,000
	— — —

Whoever examines the custom-house books for six years, and rightly computes the drawbacks and exports, will find the first article not much mistaken; and we hope to prove the computation relating to the East-India Trade, in the next Discourse

course; but having granted that the returns for these goods are partly made to us in perishable commodities, we are to shew, that, notwithstanding this, these traffics did add to our national stock a very large sum.

To explain this, we must lay down, that according to the best enquiry we can possibly make, the imports and exports together in times of peace did make the bulk of this nation's trade amount to about 10,000,000*l.* per ann.

To gain yearly 2 millions, there must be 20 per cent. profit by trade in general, whereas the merchants think themselves happy, with a clear and constant gain of 12 per cent. But then we are to consider, that as in some cases the nation may lose where the merchant gets, so in the whole, the nation may well get 20, where the merchant gets but 12 per cent. and this distinction will lead us to comprehend the whole matter.

As for example: A parcel of goods sent from hence to Virginia may fetch 10 hogheads of tobacco, in which the merchant may gain at the rate only of 10 per cent. but when this tobacco is shipped again for Amsterdam, in the freight backward and forward, and outward again, and in the manufactory of the goods sent, when the last return comes to be made, all parties concerned will be found to have got among them 20 per cent. and much more, reckoning from the prime value of the commodity exported.

And the case of England seems to stand thus: We have variety of traffics, in some we doubled, in some trebled, and in some quadrupled the first cost; we had likewise dealings by which we gained 5, 8, 10, and 15 per cent. and by some

trades we lost; but throwing all together by a general medium, if, for some years past, we had not made 20 per cent. profit by the whole bulk of trade, and so laid up a great stock, we must probably have sunk under the burthen of this last war.

Nor could we have subsisted if this gain had not been over and above the perishable commodities, that is to say, our own product, joined with our business, did not only supply our present luxuries, but enabled us to lay up such a stock; however, merely with the help of our own product we should have encreased, but not in the same proportion; and the wealth thereby acquired could not have maintained the war so long.

To come at the right knowledge of what a people get by trade, it must be examined to what value they can naturally export of their own product, and to what value they can carry to market of the product of other parts; it must afterwards be computed what their own consumption is of foreign materials, by balancing this together; if there be an overplus, that overplus a nation may be said to get by traffic.

Nor is such a balance needful, as merchants make up every year, to know whether a country gets or loses by trade, for as we have said in the first of these Discourses, it will appear by many circumstances.

The arguments in the first Discourse have perhaps sufficiently proved, that the nation's general stock towards the year 1688, did begin to encrease annually about two millions.

We have an account from such as have formerly perused the custom-house books with great care, that from 1682 exclusive, to 1688 inclusive, the value of our exports to America
in

in provisions of all kinds, apparel and household furniture, might be, by a medium of six years, about 350,000 *l.* per ann.

That the value of our imports from the southward and northward parts of that country, for the same term of time, in tobacco, sugars, ginger, cotton-wool, fustic-wood, indico, cocoa, fish, pipe-staves, masts, furs, &c. and fish from Newfoundland, which is in the nature of a Plantation, might be about 950,000 *l.* per ann.

Returns,	—	—	—	950,000
Prime cost,	—	—	—	350,000
			Gained,	600,000

We take it, that the imports from the Plantations might be about 950,000 *l.* in times of peace, whereof 350,000 *l.* being consumed at home, is about equal to our exports thither, and the remainder, viz. 600,000 *l.* being re-exported, is the national gain by that trade.

To prove this computation yet farther, the writer of these papers has seen a representation to King Charles II. from the merchants interested in the American colonies, setting forth, that by a just medium, the labour of 100 Negroes is 1600 *l.* per ann. profit to this kingdom; and we have reasons to conclude, that there are in America 100,000 Negroes, and if so, the American colonies produce to England 1,600,000 *l.* per ann; but in all our calculations we choose rather to keep within a moderate compass.

We agree so far with Mr. Pollexfen, that when we speak of trade in general, the gain is so much only as the nation does not consume of the imports; but either lays up in commodities, in

specie, or converts into money, or some such adequate treasure.

And the 600,000*l.* so re-exported to the European markets, producing, in all probability, 720,000*l.* leaves a gain of 120,000*l.* to the trade of Europe.

And upon a better view of the East-India Trade than we were able to make when the Essay was written, we find that the exports to India in bullion and wares, might be about 500,000*l.* per ann. of which the returns might be about 1,800,000*l.* whereof might be consumed at home to the value of 1,300,000*l.* when it comes into the 2d, 3d, and 4th hand, as shall be explained hereafter, and re-exported to Europe at least 500,000*l.* which 500,000*l.* may be stated as the clear gain by that trade; and the said 500,000*l.* exported to Europe, producing 680,000*l.* leaves a gain of 180,000*l.* to the trade of Europe.

So that to make up the two millions national profit by trade,

	<i>l.</i>
The Plantation Trade may bring in	600,000
The East-India Trade may bring in	500,000
The European, African and Levant Trade, by our own product, may bring in	600,000
Ditto, by re-exports of Plantation goods,	120,000
Ditto, by re-exports of East-India goods,	180,000
In all,	2,000,000

And according to the best enquiry we are able to make, and from a general view of the numbers of

of the people, the stock of all kinds that was in this nation, and the consumption both of our own product and of foreign materials, we have many reasons to believe that this was the genuine state and true posture of Trade in 1688.

And as we have laid down in the first discourse, we take it that these two millions did every year turn into national stock of different kinds, which was visible in the increase of the species of money, of shipping, in the improvements of land, in our magnificent buildings, in our quantity of plate, jewels, sumptuous apparel, and rich furniture, and in the vast stores that were lying by us, both of our home product and foreign commodities, which were our principal strength and support while the war lasted.

Besides the two millions encrease by Trade, if it imported our present matter, we could show that there was a great encrease every year by the inland business of the nation; and these additions to the kingdom's stock has enabled us to manage a nine years war, and to set out such fleets and armies as were never heard of among our ancestors.

But we are very far from dogmatizing upon this subject, for as we have said, Discourse 1st, Vol. I. "p. 388. Whoever will categorically pronounce "in points so difficult, must look into a great "many things."

The Writer never pretended any more than to show probable conjectures for other persons to reason upon. His first account of our general trade, published in the Essay on the East-India Trade, Vol. I. p. 94. may have some error in the repartition of it; and the scheme now offered may be liable to exception, but it is framed from the best enquiry he is able to make, and hereafter he will be very

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willing

willing to correct any mistake or ill-grounded notion, upon better lights and farther information.

The novelty of these calculations will make them at first be much disputed by many persons; but if we had leisure to shew the medium we go by in every particular, (which would require much a larger volume than is here intended) most people would agree we come very near the truth, and that is as much as can be expected in so dark and intricate a subject, and in an art so little cultivated, as that of reasoning upon things by figures.

If the profit from the Plantations be such as is here taken notice of, or something near it, we have not any reason to complain of wanting these inhabitants, because the superlucration from the labour of the same number of men, over and above their own nourishment, could no manner of ways have been so beneficial to the kingdom.

For admit the American colonies to contain not quite 200,000 persons of English parentage, which perhaps is pretty near the truth, the labour of such a number of men reckoned in the mass, could by no means bring to the nation 720,000*l.* per ann. clear profit.

But in the Southward parts, cultivating a plentiful soil, productive of commodities not to be had elsewhere, and every head in the islands employing, peradventure, six others of negroe slaves and European strangers, they bring it to pass, that one head there is as profitable as seven heads would be in England.

For though the labour in some whole manufactures may bring a superlucration to the public of above 1*l.* yearly per head, yet the mass of mankind reckoned together, it is sufficient profit, and will very much enrich a country, if one head with another brings to the public 6*s.* 8*d.* per ann. or
7*s.* gain,

7 s. gain, over and above his nourishment, whereas these planters, as the foregoing account shews, bring much a larger profit to this nation.

But here it may be objected, that the northward parts have drained us most of people, and yet yield commodities of little value; the fact is so, but if it were otherwise, the Plantation Trade could not perhaps be carried on.

For those soils which produce the richer goods, are not proper to cultivate for the nourishment of life, and to yield corn, beef, pork, pease, flour, &c. so that the southern parts, especially in a time of war, would be destitute of necessaries, were it not for the industry of the more northern climates.

It is true, these provisions might be furnished from England, but at such a rate as would peradventure much discourage the southern planters. And the northern planters, viz. the people of New-England, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Carolina, &c. though they furnish the product of the earth to the southern colonies, yet they fetch from this kingdom variety of manufactures, all sorts of clothes and household furniture, much oftner renewed, and thrice as good, as the same number of people could afford to have at home; so that the question whether the northern colonies are good for England or no, will depend upon making a right balance between the commodities we send thither, and the provisions we might send to the southward plantations, if they were not supplied from New-England, &c. but we are inclined to think the present course most advantageous to this kingdom, and for this reason the provisions we might send to Barbadoes, Jamaica, &c. would be the unimproved product of the earth, as grain of all kind, or such product where there is little

got by the improvement, as malt, salt beef, and pork; indeed, the exportation of salt fish thither would be more advantageous; but the goods which we send to the northern colonies are such whose improvements may be justly said, one with another, to be near $\frac{4}{5}$ ths of the value of the whole commodity, as apparel, household furniture, and many other things.

It is true, if in New-England, or in other parts there, they should pretend to set up manufactures, and to clothe, as well as feed their neighbours, their nearness and low price would give them such advantages over this nation, as might prove of pernicious consequence; but this fear seems very remote, because new inhabitants, especially in a large extent of country, find their account better in rearing cattle, tilling the earth, clearing it of woods, making fences, and by erecting necessary buildings, than in setting up of manufactures, which is the last work of a people settled 3 or 400 years, growing numerous, and wanting territory.

And, as the case stands, it seems reasonable to think, that the northern colonies are a help to the southward planters, as their frugality and temperance of living, is a counterpoise to the excess and luxury with which a rich soil, easy acquisition of wealth, and a warm climate, has infected the southern inhabitants.

Though every English head in the southward plantations, when they flourished, did employ about 6 others, yet, reckoning the whole colonies together, our people could not be but about double the number of the negroes and European strangers; so that our dominions there might contain about 300,000 persons,

And

And it is matter of great admiration, how, in the space of so few years, such a number of men should be got together in a country for the most part so wild and uncultivated.

There are very near $\frac{1}{6}$ th as many people there, as in all likelihood England did contain about the time of the Norman conquest.

And such a large encrease, with so swift a progress, is no where to be met with but among the Israelites and the Turks; in the Turkish dominions, where Ertrogul, a Prince of the Oguzian tribe, planting himself with 400 families at the village Saguta, by the mountain Tmolus, about the year 1235, laid the foundation of the Ottoman empire, which, in 215 years after, came to subdue a great part of Asia, and to get a considerable footing in Europe.

It is true, they more enlarged their dominions by conquest than by any arts of peace; however, those numbers which their wars continually wasted, could never have been supplied, if they had not been a sober and temperate people, whereby they became long-lived, and fitter for propagation.

And to the sobriety and temperate way of living, practised by the dissenters retired to America, we may justly attribute the encrease they have made there of inhabitants, which is beyond the usual proportion to be any where else observed.

The supplies from hence do by no means answer their present numbers; it must then follow that their thrift, and regular manner of living, inclines them more to marry, and makes them more healthful for generation, and affords them better means of having the necessaries to sustain life, as wholesome food, and cleanly dwelling, and apparel, the want of which, in other countries, is a high article in the burials of the common people.

We do not pretend here to excuse the heterodox opinions these dissenters from our church may have conceived about religious matters, nor to justify their schism, but it must be owned that the sobriety, which at least they profess outwardly, is beneficial both in practice and example.

For where riot and luxuries are not discountenanced, the inferior rank of men become presently infected, and grow lazy, effeminate, impatient of labour, and expensive, and consequently cannot thrive by trade and tillage; so that when we contemplate the great increase and improvements which have been made in New-England, Carolina, and Pensylvania, we cannot but think it injustice not to say, that a large share of this general good to those parts is owing to the education of their planters, which, if not entirely virtuous, has a show of virtue; and if this were only an appearance, it is yet better for a people that are to subsist in a new country by traffic and industry, than the open profession and practice of lewdness, which is always attended with national decay and poverty.

By what has been said in this discourse, we hope it is sufficiently proved, that the Plantations are advantageous to England, and that the southward and northward colonies, having such a mutual dependance upon each other, all circumstances considered, are almost equally important.

And to make these distant colonies a lasting benefit to this nation, must take its rise from the wisdom which shall be shown from time to time in their general conduct and government.

The principal care will always be to keep them dependent upon their mother country, and not to suffer those laws, upon any account, to be loosened, whereby they are tied to it, for otherwise
they

they will become more profitable to our neighbours than to us.

The late ill order in our affairs, which perhaps was unavoidable in so big a war, does sufficiently evince what a mutual dependence the southern and northern colonies have one upon another; for so little care was taken for the convoys that were to protect the supplies of provisions for our islands, that though all necessaries might have been as well (though not quite so cheap) sent from Ireland as from the northern plantations, yet it is apparent that many times the southern parts must have perished for want, if they had not been supplied by the northern colonies.

But however useful they may have been to his Majesty's islands during the late war, yet perhaps it will concern the public to look a little into the posture of affairs upon the continent.

And there are some general points, which per-adventure may deserve consideration, when it shall be thought convenient to put our business in America under such a form and settlement as may be safe and lasting, and they are as follows:

1st, Without doubt the negligence of former times has suffered a greater number of Plantations upon the continent, than do well consist with the navigation and other interests of their mother country.

2dly, It cannot be for the public good of a kingdom to furnish colonies out of it with people, when the product of such colonies is the same with the kingdom's, and so rivals the kingdom both in its navigation and its product, at the markets where such product is vended.

3dly, It can hardly be the interest of a country to suffer its people to make settlements of several Plantations, that yield one and the same commodity.

dity. For inhabitants thus dispersed, are neither so useful to each other in time of peace, nor strong enough to defend themselves in times of war: So that their mother kingdom is usually at a great charge for their defence; whereas, if they lay in a more compact and less extended territory, they could be more ready to give each other mutual help, and not be exposed, as they are, to every little strength and insult of an invader.

4thly, As many empires have been ruined by too much enlarging their dominions, and by grasping at too great an extent of territory, so our interest in America may decay, by aiming at more provinces, and a greater tract of land than we can either cultivate or defend. Upon which account, it may perhaps be some time or other worth the consideration of the state, whether a way might not be proposed of collecting within a narrower compass the scattered inhabitants of the continent, by inviting some to cultivate the islands where their labour is certainly most profitable to this kingdom, and by drawing the rest, if possible, to four or five of the provinces best situate and most productive of commodities not to be had in Europe. But this is to be done with great deliberation, with a due regard to property, by degrees, and by good encouragement.

5thly, Former times have not only been faulty in suffering too many provinces to be erected; but in the repartition of the land taken in, there are corruptions connived at very prejudicial to the Plantation Trade, and to the King's customs from thence arising. As for example, it is much wondered at, that Virginia, the first English settlement upon the continent, made about 80 years ago, should have thriven no better; some attribute it to the badness of the climate, but other reasons may

may be plainly assigned for its ill success, which perhaps are as follow :

The planters and inhabitants have been, and at this time are discouraged from planting tobacco in that colony, and servants are not so willing to go thither as formerly, because the members of the council, and others, who make an interest in the government there, have, from time to time, procured grants of very large tracts of land, so that there has not, for many years, been any waste grounds left to be cultivated by those who bring with them servants, or by such servants as have served their time faithfully with their masters, it being all taken up and engrossed before-hand, whereby they are forced to pay a yearly rent for this ground, or to go to the utmost bounds of the colony for land to improve, by which means they are exposed to danger, and this often furnishes matter for war or quarrels with the Indians.

The manner of taking up land in Virginia is thus: Every adventurer or planter has, upon his arrival, a right to 50 acres of land in the colony : If he intends to take up any, he is first to make oath before the governor or council, or at a county court, of the number of persons he designs to import, and they of course grant him a certificate thereupon, which is entered in the secretary's office, and is then produced by him to the surveyor of the county where the land lies waste, who makes a survey, allowing 50 acres, according to the number of his rights, i. e. persons imported, which with the rights, is carried to the secretary's office, on which a patent is made out, and signed by the governor in council, who causes the seal of the colony to be affixed to it, which gives the claimer an estate in fee-simple; but upon the following conditions: 1st, To pay the King 1s. per annum quit-

quit-rent for every 50 acres. 2dly, To seat such land within three years (otherwise it is presumed to be deserted). By seating land is meant that they build a house, and put some stock of cattle upon it. 3dly, To keep four able men armed upon the new plantation, if it lie far up in the country.

These are the terms upon which the land is granted, but they are seldom observed. The quit-rent is rarely paid. Instead of building and stocking, they fell a few trees, and throw up a little hut covered with bark, and put three or four hogs into the woods: No servants are left, either to defend or cultivate the ground, but in this fallacious way they are suffered to keep up their claim, and to maintain possession.

And these grants being procured upon such easy terms, and very often upon wrong suggestions and false certificates, it comes to pass, that many hold 20 or 30,000 acres of land apiece, and that largely surveyed; some patents including double the quantity of land that was intended to be granted: And from hence it proceeds that many hundred thousand acres are, as they call it, taken up, but not planted, which practice drives away the inhabitants and servants bred up only to planting, and forces them into colonies where their labour is not so profitable either to the crown or to the people of this kingdom, as it would be in a province not producing commodities that are of English growth. And these practices are without doubt a chief cause that our colony in Virginia has had no better success.

We have dwelt the longer in representing this matter of fact, concerning which we have certain information, only to show of what ill consequence it is to grasp at an extended but a barren dominion. And this consideration perhaps will lead the

the public some time or other to make provision :

1st, Hereafter to hinder any new Plantation, especially on a soil producing what may be had from the soil of England or Ireland.

2dly, To endeavour the rendering this territory less extensive, but better peopled, and consequently in a readier condition to improve and defend itself.

3dly, To establish something like an agrarian law, by which we would not be understood to propose a levelling the property and rightful possession of the inhabitants, but only to restrain such a fraudulent taking up of land (to use their own term) as is a bar to the industry of others.

Our interest in America, generally speaking, may bring an immense profit to this kingdom, if it is well looked after by the government here, but otherwise in all likelihood it will either decline, or come to be a strength that may be turned against us.

If such a scheme of a council of trade as we have proposed in the second discourse, be not thought advisable, it is submitted to public consideration, whether the Plantations are not of importance enough to deserve a particular council to be established by the King, for the inspection of affairs thereunto relating, in the following, or some such like method.

1st, That the care of America be made the province of a select number of lords and gentlemen of reputation, both for parts and fortune, and in such a number as will admit of two committees, that so business may be better dispatched.

2dly, That they be authorized under the great seal of England, by the name and stile of Lords Commissioners for the English Plantations in America,

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2dly, That they be authorized under the great seal of England, by the name and stile of Lords Commissioners for the English Plantations in America,

rica, to consider and inspect all affairs relating to the Government, Trade, Revenues, Plantations, and further improvement of those countries.

3dly, And no business being well done in this kingdom, where attendance is not recompenced with some advantage, that every commissioner have a salary of 1000*l.* per ann.

4thly, That the respective colonies be required to send a true state of their case to these Lords; as for example, of their situation, extent of territory, numbers of people, produce, revenue, civil policy, with proposals which way to improve every country, to their own and this nation's profit; and all to be registered in the Plantation Office.

This, compared with what enquiries the Lords may themselves make, and informations they may receive at home, may give them such an idea and knowledge of all affairs in America, as it will not be difficult for them to put things into a form and order of government that shall always preserve those countries in their obedience to the crown, and dependence upon this kingdom; and probably, if they are thus made the peculiar care of some body of men, they will be a lasting revenue to the king, an inexhaustible mine of treasure to England in general, and a great means to multiply seamen and encrease our navigation.

Such a constitution will be something like what we call the Council of the Indies in Spain; but here it may be objected, that the Spaniards are not very good patterns to follow in any model or scheme of government; to which it may be answered, that whoever considers the laws, and politic institutions of Spain, will find them as well formed, and contrived with as much skill and wisdom, as in any country perhaps in the world: So that the errors that people is observed to commit
from

from time to time, do not proceed from a wrong and ill projection, but from the negligent, loose, and unsteady executions of their councils.

Xenophon, in that Tract which is published at the end of the First Part of these Discourses, says, "That governments resemble their governors." This maxim of his is certainly right; and from thence it follows, that the welfare of the American colonies will very much depend upon the conduct and behaviour of such as are sent to reside and govern there by the King's authority.

In former times, this part of policy has without doubt been very much neglected, there having generally been put at the head of these affairs abroad, indigent, ignorant, or extravagant persons, of which one sort made a prey, and the others, by their examples, corrupted the manners of the people.

A good general, by the very march and demeanour of a regiment, can make a near guess at the understanding and abilities of the colonel, if he be unskilful and without discipline, every private centinel shall carry the marks of it about him.

The same holds, and much more strongly, in the government of higher matters: It must therefore be of great importance to the state, that he who is to command a country containing many thousand families, should be a man of abilities, experience, dexterity, courage, temper, and virtue; he ought to be endowed with such a general knowledge as may comprehend the nature of the soil where he is, what improvements it is capable of, and what trades will be most advantageous to it. He should be able likewise to look into the genius of the people he is to govern: He should be a man of discipline, sobriety, and justice, for he that is not so in his own person, can never expect

pect order, nor compel others to obey the laws. A people to whom riches and plenty furnish matter for vice and luxury, should be governed by a strict and skilful hand, which may reform their manners, and at the same time both promote and direct their industry.

In all appearance, hardly any thing would more conduce to the good government of these places, than to follow one course which the King of France observes strictly in his Plantations, and it is to give very large appointments to the governors out of his own coffers, not allowing them any perquisites, or to draw any advantages or profit from the inhabitants.

And as care should be taken to keep them obedient to the laws of England, and dependent upon their mother country, so those conditions, privileges, terms, and charters, should be kept sacred and inviolate, by which they were first encouraged, at their great expence, and with the hazard of their lives, to discover, cultivate, and plant remote places, where in truth they labour as well for us as for themselves, for here at last their treasure centers.

The northern colonies are not upon the same foot as those of the south; and having a worse soil to improve, they must find their recompence some other way, which only can be in property and dominion: Upon which score, any innovations in the form of government there, should be cautiously examined, for fear of entering upon measures by which the industry of the inhabitants may be quite discouraged.

It is always unfortunate for a people, either by consent or upon compulsion, to depart from their primitive institutions, and those fundamentals by which they were first united together: Liberty,
choice

choice of their own chief magistrates and officers, was the part constituent of the principal societies that have succeeded so well in the northward regions; to appoint them governors from hence, will certainly be for the good of the courtiers here, but whether this course in the event will be advantageous for those Plantations, is not so easy to determine.

But without doubt it must be very prejudicial both to the southward and northern colonies, that many offices and places of trust there should be granted by patent to persons in England, with liberty to execute such employments by deputies, by which means they are generally farmed out to indigent persons, who grind and fleece the people: So that the inhabitants, though many of them are rich, sober, and judicious men, yet they are excluded from offices of trust, except such as are chargeable in the execution, which is inconsistent with all the rules of well governing a country.

They who have visited the north tract of America, and who have observed the several ways and degrees of cultivation, with respect to the quality and quantity of their produce, the œconomy of the people, and the administration of the respective governments, cannot better express the disproportion throughout, between place and place, than by comparing them with the many principalities and states of Germany, where the Protestant countries are for the most part better peopled, and their towns better kept, than those under Catholic governments: And so it fares with the hans or free towns, as they are called, above those under absolute and arbitrary princes: Where the constitution is freer, and the magistracy more sober, the people are more industrious, and the country improves in proportion.

And had it not been for provinces begun and carried on by people of sobriety, the English empire abroad would be much weaker than it is at present; it having been the unhappiness of some to take their original from another race of planters, vicious, needy, or criminal, who, though a profit to the kingdom by being there, yet by no means in proportion with the other sort. And as licentiousness breaks out much more apparently in such places, so that is not all, for governors (as is said) are too apt to make their advantages of it, who, by indulging such extravagancies, find their own accounts the better; it being plain that the common people are but too ready to exchange their liberties for licentiousness, and to wink at those who will connive at them.

If ever any thing great or good be done for our English colonies, industry must have its due recompence, and that cannot be without encouragement to it, which perhaps is only to be brought about by confirming their liberties, and establishing good discipline among them: That as they see they are a free people in point of government, so they may by discipline be kept free of the mischiefs that follow vice and idleness.

And as great care should be taken in this respect, so without doubt it is advisable that no little emulations or private interests of neighbour governors, nor that the petitions of hungry courtiers at home, should prevail to discourage those particular colonies, who in a few years have raised themselves by their own charge, prudence, and industry, to the wealth and greatness they are now arrived at, without expence to the crown: Upon which account any innovations or breach of their original charters (besides that it seems a breach of

the public faith) may peradventure not tend to the King's profit.

In those colonies, which by charter are not governed from hence, as to all dues belonging to the crown revenue, the King has as an immediate influence, by having an officer of his own upon the spot, as in other places.

And the dues of the crown arising from the improvements of the soil, it seems more probable that such improvement should be made by those who have an interest and property in the country, and who work for themselves, than by governors sent from hence, whose most common aim is to grow rich by fleecing the inhabitants; and this property is without doubt the best caution and pledge for their good behaviour, both to the King and to his subjects in those remote parts, who, as it is said, in former times, have been severely handled by transient governors.

The welfare of all countries whatsoever depends upon good government, and without doubt these colonies will flourish, if they are intrusted to honest, discreet, and skilful hands, who will let them perceive they enjoy the rights and liberties of Englishmen, though not in England.

Industry has its first foundation in liberty: They who either are slaves, or who believe their freedoms precarious, can neither succeed in trade nor meliorate a country. We shall not pretend to determine whether the people in the Plantations have a right to all the privileges of English subjects; but the contrary notion is perhaps too much entertained and practised in places which happen to be distant from St. Stephen's chappel. Upon which account it will peradventure be a great security and encouragement to these industrious people, if a declaratory law were made, that English-

men have right to all the laws of England, while they remain in countries subject to the dominion of this kingdom. But as the arbitrary proceedings and mal-administration of governors should be severely animadverted upon, so frivolous and wrong complaints should be as much discouraged.

And in this place we think ourselves obliged to take notice, that public enquiry ought to be made into the oppressive and scandalous behaviour of some merchants towards the sugar and tobacco planters.

When the matters of America shall come under such a consideration as may produce a settlement, the parties concerned in trade, property, and interest, will be able to instance many particular regulations that may improve the country, and render the traffic more profitable. In the mean while we have offered what has occurred to our observation, to which we shall add some few remarks relating to the trade, government, and civil policy of those countries which are.

1st, That no province should obstruct or clog the passage of any ship, or goods coming from England through it, with any custom or duty; for that it plainly incommodes and discourages the King's subjects, and puts them upon making shift without the use of those goods, and so far hinders the consumption of our English product and manufacture, and thereby hurts trade and navigation; besides, it is unwarrantable by the laws of England.

2dly, That where the navigation act forbids it not, a coast trade from province to province should be allowed there, as it is here from county to county; by which means sloth will be punished with want, as it should always be, and industry will receive its just reward.

3dly, That

3dly, That one province should not protect the fugitives of another for crimes or debts, but that justice should be done according to the constitution of the several provinces.

4thly, It seems necessary to put Newfoundland, now growing considerable, under some government or other regulation as the Plantations are.

5thly, It may be worth the consideration of the state, whether this present peace may not be a proper season to build forts and citadels for security of the principal islands, in case of a future war.

6thly, Care should undoubtedly be taken, not to lay such heavy duties upon the West-India commodities, as may discourage industry, dispeople the islands, and, in process of time, perhaps, make the planters desperate. And here it may not be improper to take notice particularly of the high imposition laid upon refined sugars, imported hither upon a wrong notion of advancing our manufactures, whereas, in truth, it only turns to the account of about 50 families, (for the refiners of England are no more) and is greatly prejudicial, and a bar to the industry of at least 14,000 persons, which are about the number of those who inhabit our islands producing sugar.

7thly, It would very much conduce to the support and prosperity of the Sugar and Tobacco Plantations, to put the African Trade into some better order. So great a part of our foreign business arising from these colonies, they ought undoubtedly to have all due encouragement, and to be plentifully supplied, and at reasonable rates, with Negroes to meliorate and cultivate the land. The labour of these slaves is the principal foundation of our riches there; upon which account,

we should take all probable measures to bring them to us at easy terms.

There are three ways of managing the African Trade; by a joint stock, by an open traffic, or by a regulated company; which of these will be the best is not very easy to determine; but in matters of this nature, experience is the surest guide we can have to follow.

And experience has taught us, that this trade has not been governed with good success, by a company with a joint stock. For it is alleged that they have not supplied the planters with such a plenty of Negroes as was requisite; that they forced them to accept of such a sort as they thought fit to bring; that the usual and fair rate should be, one head with another, from 16*l.* to 20*l.* per head, which, by ill supplying the market, they brought to 40*l.* and 45*l.* per head. That in their dealings they took bond and judgment of the planters, with an interest of 10*l.* per cent. executing their securities upon non-payment, by seizing the Plantations with the utmost rigour. And that these courses have almost depopulated the Southern Islands.

It must certainly be prudent in any trade, manufacture or business, to render the first material as cheap as possible; slaves are the first and most necessary material for planting; from whence follows, that all measures should be taken that may produce such a plenty of them, as may be an encouragement to the industrious planter.

For these reasons, it is submitted to better judgments, whether it may not be for the interest of England to manage the African Trade, as that to Turkey is carried on by a regulated company. By which we mean, that it should be free for any merchant to deal to Africa, and from thence

thence to the islands, and from the islands to the other colonies, paying so much per pound, as may be thought needful to bear the common expences of the trade, and to maintain forts and garrisons upon the coast, if they are thought necessary.

In the regulations of our Foreign Traffic, the nature of the trade itself, and the manners of the people with whom we deal, are to be considered; but experience is chiefly to be consulted.

The course of many years, and the practice of all our neighbours, seem to approve of a joint stock, as the best course of managing the East-India Trade; and we shall endeavour to shew in the next Discourse, that it is not well to be supported any other way.

But we are inclined to think, that to lay the African Trade a little more open, and to put it under a regulated company, is more consistent with the interest of our Plantations.

The circumstances of the African and East-India Trade differ extremely: In the Indies we have powerful concurrents, who, in process of time, may be able to supplant us, against whom united wisdom, stock and councils, are of absolute necessity; but we are not under apprehensions of rivals upon the coast of Afric.

The stock of the East-India Trade was 1,574,608*l.* and the trade will bear a stock of two millions, which is too a great a sum, and too considerable a national concern, to be trusted to the disorderly measures of an unskilful number of traders; whereas experienced planters will be the chief dealers to Africa; and the stock needful (as far as is yet known) for the African Trade does not exceed 200,000*l.* and the stock employed

ployed by the late company, as we are informed, did not amount to above 75,000*l*.

The Writer of these papers has seen a scheme for the general government of the Northward Plantations, which seems contrived with very good judgment; upon which account, he thought it not unseasonable to offer the heads of it here to public consideration.

1. That the colonies of Boston, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, both the New Jerseys, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia and Carolina, may be authorised to meet once a year, and oftner if need require, by their stated and appointed deputies, to debate and resolve of such measures as shall be most advisable, at any time, to take, for their public tranquillity and safety.

2. That in order to it, two persons well qualified for understanding, sobriety and substance, be appointed by each province, as their representatives or deputies, which, in the whole, will make the congress to consist of 20 persons.

3. That the King's commissioner for that purpose especially to be appointed, should have the chair, and preside in the said congress.

4. That they should meet as near as conveniently may be to the most central colony, for the ease of the deputies.

5. Since that may, in all probability, be in New York, both because it is near the centre of the colonies, and for that it is a frontier, and the governor in the King's nomination; that governor to be likewise the King's high commissioner during the session, after the manner of Scotland.

6. That their business should be to hear and adjust all matters of complaint or difference between province and province: As 1st, Where persons quit their own province and go to another
that

that they may avoid their just debts, though able to pay them. 2dly, Where offenders fly justice, or justice cannot well be had upon such offenders in the provinces that entertain them. 3dly, To prevent or redress injuries in point of commerce. 4thly, To consider of Ways and Means to support the union and safety of these provinces, against their common enemies: In which congress, the quotas of men and charges will be much easier and more equally allotted and proportioned, than it is possible for any establishment made here to do; for the provinces knowing their own condition and one another's, can debate that matter with more freedom and satisfaction, and better adjust and balance their affairs in all respects for their common safety.

7. That in times of war the King's high commissioner should be general or chief commander of the several quotas, upon service against the common enemy, as shall be thought advisable for the good and benefit of the whole.

This constitution has some resemblance with the court of the Amphictiones, which was a kind of council where the general affairs of Greece were debated; which if they could have preserved in its original purity, and to the first design of it, that country had not been so easy a conquest to the Romans.

The welfare of all countries in the world depends upon the morals of their people.

For though a nation may gather riches by trade, thrift, industry, and from the benefit of its soil and situation; and though a people may attain to great wealth and power, either by force of arms, or by the sagacity of their councils; yet, when their manners are depraved, they will decline

cline insensibly, and at last come to utter destruction.

When a country is grown vicious, industry decays, the people become effeminate and unfit for labour. To maintain luxury, the great ones must oppress the meaner sort; and to avoid this oppression, the meaner sort are often compelled to seditious tumults, or open rebellion.

Such therefore who have modelled governments for any duration, have endeavoured to propose methods by which the riotous appetites, the lusts, avarice, revenge, ambition, and other disorderly passions of the people might be bounded.

And to preserve societies of men from that perpetual war with which the state of nature must be attended, and to restrain that discord which must for ever embroil those who only follow the wild dictates of ungoverned nature, the founders of cities, states and empires, have set afoot forms of religious worship to awe their minds, and devised wholesome laws to keep within bounds the persons of the people.

It has been set forth in the series of this Discourse, of what profit the American Plantations have been to England; and it may not be improper before we conclude, to add something concerning their future polity and government, and to shew what methods, in all likelihood, may preserve their being in that remote region, give them stability and a firm existence, and so render them a lasting mine of riches, and a perpetual advantage to this kingdom.

And as a foundation, we think it necessary to lay down, that those countries cannot subsist long in a flourishing condition, and in their obedience to this crown, unless care be taken to cultivate morality and virtue among them, to promote religion,

religion, and to establish sound laws, by which they may be well and wisely governed.

But here it may be objected, 1st, What form of religion shall be set up among a people, who, many of them, have left their native soil, chiefly to enjoy a more ample liberty in religious matters? 2dly, How can virtuous principles be instilled into men, the badness of whose lives and manners have compelled most of them to seek another habitation?

To the first objection we answer, That the same liberty of conscience ought to be permitted there as here; but that the governors and magistrates should take care to keep the people to the observation of some religion or other; and now more especially, since the laws have in a manner allowed every man to chuse which sect he pleases.

To the second objection we say, That the Roman nation was first composed of thieves, vagabonds, fugitive slaves, indebted persons and outlaws; and yet, by a good constitution and wholesome laws, they became and continued for some ages, the most virtuous people that was ever known; so that as loose administration corrupts any society of men, so a wise, steady and strict government will in time reform a country, let its manners have been never so depraved.

And the same good government would undoubtedly reclaim those vices which some of our American planters may have carried thither.

Whenever a country loses that reverence that is due to religion and the laws, we may safely pronounce, that its ruin is not very distant.

And as contempt of religion and the laws is a sure mark of a declining nation; so new colonies and societies of men must soon fall to pieces and dwindle to nothing, unless their governors and magistrates

magistrates interpose, to season betimes the minds of such a new people with a sense of religion, and with good and virtuous principles.

Themistocles did once say, that of a small city he could make a great people. This he spake from the right sense he had of his own abilities and skill. Governors and magistrates that are the reverse of him, and who rule weakly, can render a potent country in a short time poor, despised, and miserable.

Such to whom the government of these colonies is intrusted, should endeavour to hinder the growth of all kind of vices, as intemperance and luxury; for luxury is the parent of want, and want begets in the minds of men disobedience and desire of change.

To see that impiety be not countenanced, nor books exposed to the vulgar, which tend to the overthrow or weakening of the general notions of religion, should be no less their care.

It is no less their duty to promote virtue, and to encourage merit of any kind, and to give it their helping hand: Such as have been counted great and able statesmen in all countries, have so done; and judged that to propagate what was good, and to suppress vice, was the most material part of government.

They should discountenance immoralities of all sorts; they should see them exposed in public; they should cause the pulpits to declaim against them; they should make them a bar to preferment, and the laws should be all pointed against them.

Such a conduct, with encouragements to learning and learned men, a careful education of their prime youth, in seasoning of them betimes with the sense of honour, and a love to their mother country

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country, will go very far towards correcting the manners of these new planted and licentious people.

They will reap this fruit by cultivating letters and learning, that the wise precepts and great examples which are to be met with in ancient histories, will inflame the minds of their young men with a desire of the renown and glory with which good actions are attended; and from thence they will learn to subdue those passions and appetites that otherwise may lead them into warm, foolish, and destructive counsels.

But this is not a diet for the vulgar; philosophy and moral rules will prevail very little with the common people, and but few understandings are capable of the benefits which may be received from thence; wise lawgivers have therefore endeavoured to keep the inferior rank of men within bounds, by a sense of religion, and a fear of offending that power by which they were created.

And because the capacities of men were at first very gross, requiring gross objects, the divine rights instituted in the beginning had not their foundation in the mind, but consisted in bodily worship, ceremonies and sacrifice: It is true, the wiser sort had generally one religion for themselves, and another for the vulgar.

However, they governed and kept the common people in awe with those holy mysteries, and that kind of worship that was in practice by the laws and custom of their country, never disturbing them with any nicer speculations.

A few of the sublimer understandings might adore God, because he is the most perfect being; love virtue for its own sake; and, upon the same score, revere justice; but these principles were not sufficient to keep a giddy multitude in order; therefore,

therefore, in all civilized countries, a form of divine worship has been settled.

And here we cannot help taking notice, that if philosophy will not suffice to bind the common people to their duty, what must be said of some modern politicians, who shew no desire of setting up morality, and yet are pulling down revealed religion?

Statesmen have been accused of being uncertain themselves in religious points; but till lately they were never seen to countenance in others such a looseness, and till of late years, it was never known a recommendation to preferment.

Would it any thing avail the public to have the settled opinions concerning divine matters quite altered by the law? If not, Why do such as propose innovations in revealed religion, find so many open advocates, and those of the highest rank? On the contrary, must it not much distract the state, to set the minds of men once more afloat in these mysterious points, which are now believed, and cannot perhaps be examined with any safety to the public? How comes it to pass that the majority suffer themselves to be guided, and often with hard reins, by a small number? Can it be imagined this is brought about by a right disposition of power, whereby the weak come to hold the strong in their dominion? Or can it be thought that laws are sufficient to subject the bodies of men to government, unless something else did constrain their conscience and their minds?

It is hardly to be doubted, but that if the common people are once induced to lay aside religion, they will quickly cast off all fear of their rulers. But such as object against the revealed religion, as it is now transmitted to us, have they
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another scheme ready? When they have pulled down the old frame, can they set up a better in its room? Most certainly by their own lives, either in private, or in relation to the public, they seem very unfit apostles to propagate a new belief.

When the common people all of a sudden become corrupt, and by quicker steps than was ever known; when they do not revere the laws; when there is no mutual justice among them; when they defraud the prince; when they prostitute their voices in elections, it may be certainly concluded, that such a country is by the artifice of some, and the negligence of others, set loose in the principles of religion.

Nothing therefore can more conduce to correcting the manners of a depraved people, than a due care of religious matters; a right devotion to God will beget patience in national calamities, submission to the laws, obedience to the prince, love to one another, and a hatred to faction; and it will produce in the minds of all the different ranks of men, true zeal and affection to their country's welfare.

For these reasons, if it should be thought convenient to settle a council of trade by authority of parliament, as has been proposed in the second of these Discourses, or such a council for the Indies, as is mentioned in this tract, the legislative power may, from time to time, recommend to either of these establishments the care of inspecting the state of religion in our American colonies; and they may enjoin the governors who shall be sent to reside there,

1. To look into the lives and manners of the present clergy.

2. To see that no doctrines are published, destructive to the very fundamentals of religion itself.

3. Not

3. Not to inflame, but rather to reconcile those differences, which of necessity must arise among people of such different persuasions.

4. To cultivate into the minds of the inhabitants, sober living, friendship, general observance of the devotion each professes, charity, meekness and piety, especially among those who are trusted to guide the consciences of others.

5. To season betimes the young men of better rank and fortune with a love to England their original country, that when they return hither with the riches the industry of their parents has acquired, they may become good patriots here, and useful members of the commonwealth.

In order to protection, they ought to believe England their native soil; and in order to preserve them in their obedience, we ought to imprint this notion in their minds as much as possible.

Few crimes either private or relating to the public, can be committed by those whose minds are early seasoned with the principle of loving and promoting the welfare of their native country. For, generally speaking, all our vices whatsoever turn to her prejudice; and if we were convinced of this betimes, and if from our very youth we were seasoned with this notion, we should of course be virtuous, and our country would prosper and flourish, in proportion to this amendment of our manners.

Wherever private men can be brought to make all their actions and counsels, thoughts and designments, to center in the common good, that nation will soon gather such strength as shall resist any home-bred mischief or outward accident.

No great thing was ever done, but by such as have preferred the love of their country to all other considerations; and wherever this public spirit reigns, and where this zeal for the common

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good governs in the minds of men, that state will flourish and encrease in riches and power; and wherever it declines or is set at nought, weakness, disorder and poverty, must be expected.

This love to their native soil, where it has been deeply rooted, and where it could be preserved, has made little cities famous and invincible, as Sparta, Corinth, Thebes and Athens, and from thence all the Roman greatness took its rise. But where they are wretchedly contriving their own ends, without any care of their country's profit, or trafficking its wealth and liberties for rewards, preferments and titles; where every one is scratching all he can from the prince; and where there is a general neglect of national interest, they grow luxurious, proud, false and effeminate; and a people so depraved, is commonly the prey of some neighbour seasoned with more wise and better principles.

In a kingdom but too near us, we may see all sorts of men labouring the public welfare, and every one as vigilant in his post, as if the success of the whole empire depended on his single care and diligence; so that to the shame of another place, they seem more intent upon the prosperity and honour of their country, under a hard and oppressive tyranny, than they are in some free nations, where the people have an interest in the laws, and are a part of the constitution.

Homer in his two poems seems to intend but two morals. In the *Iliads* to set out how fatal discord among the great ones is to states and armies. And in his *Odysseys* to shew, that the love of our own country ought to be stronger than any other passion; for he makes Ulysses quit the nymph Calypso with all her pleasures, and

the immortality she had promised him, to return to Ithica, a rocky and barren island.

The affairs of a country relating either to civil government, war, the revenues or trade, can never be well and prosperously conducted, unless the men of principal rank and figure divest themselves of their passions, self-interest, overweening opinion of their own merits, their flattery, false arts, mean ambition, and irregular appetites and pursuits after wealth and greatness.

No people did ever become famous and powerful but by temperance, fortitude, justice, reverence to the laws, and piety to their country; and when any empire is destined to be undone, or to lose its freedom, the seeds of this ruin are to be first seen in the corruption of its manners. In vicious governments all care of the public is laid aside, and every one is plundering for himself, as if the commonwealth were adrift, or had suffered shipwreck; and where a people is thus depraved, their national assemblies have the first open marks of the infection upon them, from whence spring all disorders in the state whatsoever. For then such as have most eloquence, valour, skill in business, and most interest in their country, throw off the mask of popularity which they had put on for a time, and in the face of the world desire wealth, honours and greatness upon any terms; and this ambition leads them to corrupt others, that their own natural vices may be the less observed; so that in a constitution ripe for change, those who are best esteemed and most trusted begin to buy the people's voices, and afterwards expose to sale their own suffrages; which practice is always attended with utter destruction, or the loss of liberty.

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This error in the first concoction does presently deprave the whole mass; for then the dignities of the commonwealth are made the reward of fraud and vice, and not the recompence of merit. All is bought and sold, and the worst men who can afford to bid highest, are accepted; and where the management is once got into such hands, factions are suffered to grow, rash counsels are embraced, and wholesome advices rejected; every one is busy for himself, and careless of the common interest; treachery is winked at, and private persons are allowed to become wealthy by the public spoils: All which is followed with the loss of reputation abroad and poverty at home.

It is hoped the reader will not think this short digression about moral virtue unseasonable, when he considers how much the wealth and prosperity of these colonies, whom we would here recommend to public care, depends upon the manners of their people.

Societies of men are held together by the bands of religion and laws; and having said something upon the first of these heads, we shall now proceed to handle the second.

It will without doubt greatly conduce to the welfare of the Plantations, if their laws and politic institutions were revised and considered by disinterested persons, who should have no concern but to form them a constitution by which they may be well and wisely governed.

In order to this, it is submitted to better judgments, Whether a council of trade, or a council of the Indies, or some such like authority to be appointed especially for this purpose, should not inspect all the present laws and politic institutions of these countries, to the end that a true state of

this affair may, at a convenient season, be laid before the parliament of England.

And we are humbly of opinion, that if such laws as may be thought prejudicial to them, or hurtful to this kingdom, were abrogated here; and if such of their old laws as shall be judged sound and wholesome; and if such new institutions as may be esteemed necessary for those parts, did receive some sanction from the legislative power of this kingdom, it would make our whole business in America more consistent, and fasten with surer ties those colonies to this nation.

What we propose is thus: That their first model of future government should be framed here; that afterwards they may have power to make for themselves such laws as they shall think needful for their better polity; and these laws thus enacted among them, not to be rescinded but by authority of parliament in England.

And this seems the more necessary, because heretofore many good laws formed there have been abrogated here, upon the false and corrupt suggestions of interested persons; besides, nothing can be more pernicious to a people, than levity in making and rescinding laws.

A model has been offered, in this Discourse, to public consideration, for erecting the 10 provinces or places that lie Northward, into one national assembly, where all things relating to their better government may be transacted.

And it is submitted to better judgments, Whether it would not greatly tend to the welfare and safety of those places, that laws not contrary to the law of England, enacted in such an assembly, should remain in force, till altered by the legislative power of this kingdom.

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Without doubt, it would be a great incitement to their industry, and render them more pertinacious in their defence, upon any invasion which may happen, to find themselves a free people and governed by constitutions of their own making.

All governments have lasted according to the strength and vigour of mind with which they were at first begotten, and as their founders have been skilful; and as weak, crazy and diseased parents engender sickly, short-lived and ricketty children; so impotent statesmen frame politic institutions not durable, easily overthrown, and unable to resist accidents.

But peradventure governments are by no kind of wisdom to be rendered immortal; at least those which in appearance were formed with the greatest skill, have been subject to frequent changes, and are most of them buried in the ruins of time.

For as we are said to bring with us into the world those diseases by which our decay and death is to be wrought; so governments, in their primitive institutions, have within them the very seeds of destruction by which at last they are to be subverted.

In the framing of absolute monarchies, that power which is given to a single person for the safeguard of the people, does always turn to such excess and tyranny, as in conclusion proves destructive to the whole: In the forming of commonwealths, that division of power which is made between the many and the few, gives rise to that discord and those civil wars, which, in process of time, either destroy or quite alter the constitution.

Mixed governments seem contrived for the longest duration; but the division of power which is likewise in such forms, and was intended for

their preservation, must in time prove their ruin, unless faction can be avoided, which is the bane of all politic institutions; some tyrants indeed are wise enough to make it now and then subservient to their designs, but in mixed governments it is equally pernicious to prince and people.

For which reasons, if it should be thought convenient to set afoot the national assembly here proposed for the northern colonies, early care must be taken to put a stop to the growth of faction; for if that be suffered to reign, it will, in process of time, render what was intended for their good, a burthen to the country.

With good government it is not improbable but that these colonies may become hereafter great nations; upon which account it seems of importance to give them, in their infancy, such politic institutions as may preserve them for many ages in wealth, peace and safety; and in order to this, the nearer they are brought to the model of the English government, will undoubtedly be the better.

And if they have governors from hence, or to be approved of here, or of their own electing (according to their several charters) and if they are allowed a national assembly, it would give them the perfect enjoyment of our liberties and constitution.

The original institutions and laws of most countries are sound and good; but as vice prevails, they become obsolete and are forgotten; from whence grow those diseases in the body politic that require the ablest physicians.

By how much a government swerves from its first institution, by so much it has a wrong bent; it should therefore be the care of those to whom the rule and direction of these places is committed,

ted, to keep them as much as possible to their original institution.

In the model here proposed, the governors will of course be vested with all the powers necessary for the safety and protection of the whole; and those assemblies may have certain rights which will be as well an ease and safeguard to the governors, as beneficial to the people; but if either part invades the other, it must throw the public into dangerous convulsions.

That government is happy where the bounds between the chief power and the people are so wisely laid out and fixed, that no encroachments can be easily apprehended; for the disputes and quarrels concerning these bounds and limits have always been the chief gain and harvest of bad and designing men, and the field in which they exercise those wicked arts that so often embroil a country.

To make this national assembly a lasting benefit to the colonies, such as are sent to govern those parts should take all possible care to cure the present vices, and prevent the future corruption of the people.

The natural steps to ruin in politic institutions, that have a mixture in them of popular government, seem to be in this manner: 1st, Extended dominion, power atchieved by arms, or riches flowing in by trade, beget effeminacy, pride, ambition and luxuries of all kind; these vices, as they obtain strength and growth, produce quickly private poverty, and then public want; private poverty puts ill men upon wicked arts to get wealth, and public want but too often makes those ill men necessary in a corrupted state.

Thus the Roman gentry were so debauched by their luxuries, and pressed with their wants, that

they assisted Cinna, Sylla, Marius, Cataline and Cæsar, to invade the commonwealth; till at last, Cæsar's tyranny became all the refuge which the public had in its disorders and calamities.

When the gentry for some time have been set loose in their principles, the common people begin to lay aside their worth and integrity, and the whole mass of blood in the body politic grows so corrupted, as not to be capable of those remedies which good lawgivers and wise statesmen would offer; so Augustus saw the Romans in that age, not fit for freedom, which probably hindered him from restoring liberty, and made him choose rather to continue the empire in the hands of a single person, and transmit it to Tiberius.

These national assemblies, the use of which are here recommended for our northern colonies, will be of little benefit, unless the people, by whose voices they must be chosen, can be kept from being corrupted in their elections; for otherwise they will prove but a false appearance of freedom, which is the worst kind of slavery.

And in some countries we have formerly seen liberty in danger, from that part of the constitution which should have been the guardians of it; and this has happened when princes (having either had favourites to support, or designs to promote opposite to the welfare of their subjects, or intending to grasp at more power than was given them by the laws) have secretly encouraged debauching the people in elections to make open sale of their voices.

In states where this is practised, intriguing persons full of wicked arts will get into possession of being constantly elected, who at first shall seem the best patriots, and most jealous of the nation's rights; but this lasts no longer, than til they

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they can bring to a good market that credit and fair repute they had gained before; when their price is offered and agreed upon, they desert their country's cause, and help on, or at least approve, of all that misgovernment which had been before the object of their popular speeches and venial eloquence.

Nor could it be difficult for former princes to corrupt both the electors and the elected; for in most kingdoms the court has been a shop with wares in it to fit all kind of customers; there is hope for some which feeds many at a small expence; there are titles for the ambitious; pleasures for the young and wanton; places for the busy; and bribes to be closely conveyed for such as desire to maintain an appearance of honesty, and to betray their trust but now and then in important matters. With these baits and allurements, Princes might easily draw into their nets the unthinking gentry of their land, and thereby poison the fountain head of the laws, and sap the very foundations of the politic institution.

The common people are the first to complain of misgovernment, and the first who feel the bad effects of it; long wars are carried on at the expence of their blood; heavy taxes pinch them most; revenues are mismanaged at their cost; they soonest feel decay of trade and the nation's poverty, and yet generally it is their fault if things are ill-administered, or at least if they are suffered to continue long under an ill administration; they are the corrupted matter for false and designing statesmen to work upon; they fight the quarrels of turbulent and ambitious spirits; they are the first that follow seditious orators. In the Roman commonwealth they first debauched the state, by making sale of their voices in election
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of magistrates; and in other constitutions they send up to national assemblies the men whose mercenary eloquence is so fatal to the public.

When those who have a right of election in mixed governments shall have been in this manner corrupted, they will send up to their national assemblies persons by whom in all senses they shall be truly represented; and when this happens to a people, they will soon be rent asunder by factions; public zeal shall be made ridiculous, and often dangerous to its professors; treachery shall have a stated price, and the shame of doing ill shall be quite extinguished: And in a country where the prime youth have been thus bred in a vicious school, and received early a bad tincture, how can there be found hands with which the duties and offices of state can be well and wisely guided?

And when it happens in such forms of government that the spring head shall be tainted, from whence are to be drawn the men of experience, action and counsel; busy persons by different arts, some by abject flattery, others by perplexing matters to be bought off, will soon prevail to be let into many of the chief offices and dignities of the state, which they will so pollute with their foul dealings, and weaken and make contemptible by their ignorance, that cleaner and abler hands will afterwards be hardly invited in to restore things, and give them a better complexion.

And in such times, the worst of men, who insinuate best, and are ever the most active, will get into many posts of trust and importance; and endeavour, if possible, to engross the whole commonwealth to themselves, and invade all her parts, where they will lie strongly intrenched, and watchful to oppress virtue and merit of any kind,

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with which they are at open war; for if endowments of the mind, love to the nation, integrity, experience, conduct and solid wisdom, should once obtain, get ground, and be taken notice of, they who shine and are recommended by no such qualities, must quit their holds and withdraw, or remain the universal contempt of that people whose affairs they are so little able to administer.

Princes well inclined and disposed to govern rightly, are very unfortunate when their lot is to reign in a country so corrupted. The sun, though it be the element of light and heat, cannot shine out to cheer and comfort nature in places where there are always rising from the earth, damps, fogs, and unwholesome vapours; in the same manner, when ill men are got into a court, they hang like so many dark clouds before the throne, obscuring the prince's glory, hindering him from exerting half his native worth, and rendering his warmth and good influence less beneficial to the people.

And though such a nation should have on the regal seat, a prince formed after the model of their own wishes, brave in the field, and wise in council; those bad men, whom bad and corrupted times must of necessity bring about him, will endeavour, as much as in them lies, to make all his noble qualities and virtues as useless to the world as possible; with their weak and pernicious counsels casting a mist before his wisdom; and by their ill conduct of the nation's strength and wealth, putting a stop to the progress of his valour.

To preserve these assemblies which are here proposed for the northern colonies, it will not only be necessary to take care of the manners of
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the people, but likewise to provide that the assembly itself be not corrupted.

The ancient custom in the mixed governments formed in these northern countries (which will be the best model for them to follow) was, that national assemblies should be frequently called and sent home, as soon as the nation's business was dispatched. The wisdom of elder times did never think it convenient, that one and the same assembly should sit many years brooding of faction; for it is in those continued sessions, where the skill is learnt of guiding, and being guided where the youth is depraved, and elder sinners hardened; where those parties are formed that give the cunning speakers so much weight and value, and where they can bring their subtilty and eloquence to market.

And in former reigns, the departing from a principle so essential in its constitution, had like to have changed the whole face of the English government; for leeches and other blood-sucking worms are ingendered in standing pools, but flowing waters do not corrupt or breed so many insects; the keeping a national assembly long sitting debauches the gentry of a kingdom, and opens a way to offices of trust, not known among their ancestors; but when such assemblies are called together to consult upon the difficulties of state, and are dissolved as soon as the public business is dispatched, the measures of the false politicians become presently quite altered: They who design to rise, must mount by other steps than formerly; intriguing, heading parties, running into faction, and sudden changing of sides, will avail the busy men but little; a year or two is not sufficient to mould and fashion an assembly to their designs; every new sessions young gentlemen

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are sent up, whom it is not so easy to corrupt; they can fix nothing where there is a perpetual flux and reflux of matter, it is like building on a quicksand; when such as intend to advance themselves in the world see all this, and that those assemblies are no more the field in which they can exercise their wicked arts with any advantage, they naturally fall into other methods, and are honest of course, when it is no longer their interest to be otherwise.

In such a constitution there is no need to silence troublesome and perplexing rhetoric with some good office, nor to buy off and reconcile, at any rate, men of turbulent and ambitious spirits; and when it is not needful to hire people to save their own country, how much cheaper and more easy is government rendered to princes, who then have a free choice among their subjects to call whom they please into the service of the state? Whereas otherwise, their favours are confined to one narrow place; and as thereby their goodness is made more extensive, so the stations requiring abilities and experience must be better filled, when a court has not the necessity upon it to find out places for men, rather than men that are fit for the places.

In countries where this post, so essential to liberty, is thus preserved from corruption, all matters relating either to war or peace, public revenues or trade, will go on prosperously; and a national assembly so constituted will always produce wholesome laws, right administration, and a perpetual race of honest and able ministers.

What has been here said of great empires, will in some proportion hold in the direction of less matters, and in the rule of our northern colonies; but if the governors now there, or to be sent thither,

thither, find the chief magistrates and officers of the government, and the whole mass of the people already corrupted, they will be but ill received and listened to, in their endeavours to reform the general vices and immoralities of the country; for men, when they labour under any disease, are fond of consulting remedies; but it is not so with governments sickly and distempered, it being the interest of a great many, that the malady should be rather nourished, than any cure hearkened after and at such a season, they who would promote ethics, in all likelihood will meet but with a cold reception: For if in the respective colonies wicked and ambitious persons are got into power, they will find their account better in having flattery promoted than in hearing truth, since they would be undone, if the people should be wakened out of their present lethargy; they will not desire to have abuses corrected, as being their best foundation; they will be afraid of wholesome precepts and examples, as being so many reproaches to their conduct; they will not dare to be brought to the bar of right sense and reason, by which their actions are never squared; they will not desire to have morality advanced, as prejudicial to their designs; they will dread reformation of any sort, as knowing they must be laid aside with scorn, and return to their first obscurity whenever things are capable of being mended.

And let the governor be never so knowing and vigilant, either by the prevalency of their faction, or by being able to give opposition and to disturb his business, or by having learnt the ways of gaining such as are nearest his person, or by affecting high zeal to his service, they will creep into stations of the chiefest trust and importance, in which, when they are once planted, it will cost

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him more care and anxious thoughts to defend them, than to protect his country.

But they prevail most if he happens to be under any pressing wants, because it recommends their tricks and arts whereby this want is to be supplied; and often they will entangle his affairs, to render necessary their single skill, which is, how to deceive the people. At his first arrival they will never let him into a true knowledge of men, nor who are fittest for his service; for they openly say, there is no more requisite to the discharge of any trust than an interest to procure it; a right maxim for them to establish, who are the product of meer favour. They imagine all wisdom consists in sound flattery, and that he who approves the present does enough to secure the future. Men of deep reach they are afraid of, and with reason, for such look quite through their deeds, which bear no enquiry. Men of experience they count dangerous, and so they are to magistrates that want it. All-sufficient in their own thoughts, and clothed with presumption, they often take upon them to steer the commonwealth, whose utter ruin they madly venture every moment, being so far unable to sit at helm, that they are hardly fit to handle the very sails; when it looks smooth above, they believe all safe at bottom, never sounding any depths, as having no plummet, and when the ship goes right, it is chance only that brings it into harbour.

In forming that national assembly which is here proposed for the better government of the northern colonies, the principal matter to be recommended to the common people is to elect men of fortune, integrity, public spirit, and virtue; and, above all things, to avoid those pests of human kind, fine talkers and busy intriguing speakers, whom they anciently called orators.

It

It cannot indeed be properly said that eloquence is a plant of our soil, (for it really never grew any where but in a commonwealth) however we may have something like it; and in modern times there have been some who could speak with a dangerous degree of force; and grave actions, presidents, vehement figures, and popular arguments, can prevail very much in assemblies, where a great many are disposed before-hand to be persuaded.

This age must needs have something that at least resembles the former eloquence; for as in Greece and in Rome, so not long since there have been seen great speakers courted, and in the pay of foreign Kings and States, and bought up by their own Princes at any price. Whether or no we have reached the ancient strength of speaking, shall not be now decided; but this may be boldly pronounced, That, in former reigns, there have appeared men in this kingdom as ready to betray the people, as turbulent and contriving, and who have made as bad use of their faculties, and who have sold their words as dear as any of the Greek or Roman orators.

Whenever liberty is subverted, or a constitution changed, the mischief commonly proceeds from such persons as first speak well to gain a good opinion, and then do ill to get good places; never any private men, or collective body of a people, are betrayed but by those in whom they put a confidence: And hardly any have had the power to do much hurt, but we lifted them up with our own voices; they were first the nation's, and then the prince's favourites: And though the breach of the people's trust was their original rise, yet princes have formerly been unfortunate enough to believe they could be well and faithfully served by persons so loosely principled.

When

When we have heard men assert boldly our civil rights and the country's cause, and speak popularly, without sifting their designs or surveying their ambition, without examining their pretensions or looking into their discontents, we have surrendered ourselves blindly to their conduct, and gone along with them in all things, they have led and governed us; we have cried them up, extolled their capacities, and augmented their reputation; and all this has been but to make them worth the taking off, and but giving them something to betray, which they did with the first opportunity; and in the mean while many Princes have heretofore been unhappily persuaded by their bosom enemies, that these popular speakers were the only persons proper for their service.

It is true, in mixed governments, whoever will be considerable, must be well skilled in all matters relating to its national assembly; he must be master of its rules and orders; he must have some general knowledge in the laws; he must know how to appease and allay a heat, and be able to stir up and excite a little warmth upon occasions; and, to recommend what he says, he must speak well, which they commonly do who think distinctly.

But many have been possessed to a high degree of all these qualities, who yet have been utterly barren and destitute of all other worth and virtues; ignorant in men, without any knowledge of the true nature of their own government; strangers to past and present history; unknowing in the posture, interest, and power of foreign states; quite unskilful in the condition, strength, wealth, and trade of their native country; and, which is worst of all, without any public spirit or right zeal for the common good.

Both Prince and people are very unfortunate, who much depend upon those whose chief talent is the art of speaking. Oliver, Charles cardinal of Lorraine, Pompone de Believre, cardinal Ximenes, the duke of Sully, Woolsey, Sir Thomas More, the Cecils, treasurer Buckhurst, secretary Walsingham, the cardinals Richlieu and Mazarin, secretary Thurloe, Cornelius de Wit, and the treasurer Southampton, with several others who may be reckoned, were not recommended, and did not subsist by this single gift and faculty, but shined with many excellencies, and had variety of endowments which enabled them to handle wisely the affairs of state in their times, and rendered their ministry so successful.

Eloquence is without doubt an instrument very necessary in popular states, and it has introduced and brought upon the stage of the world many good and famous men; such as Pericles, Epaminondas, Aristides, Cimon, Xenophon, Thucydides, Æmilius Paulus, Cicero, and the Catos, who performed great things for the honour and advantage of their commonwealths. But if it happens to light into hands not entirely virtuous, it is a tool with which great mischiefs may be wrought; for thereby Sylla, Crassus, Pompey, and Cæsar, crept first into that power, which overthrew the Roman liberty.

The art of speaking yields good fruit to the commonwealth, when it is joined with courage and vigilance for the state, as in Pericles, with love to the public not to be shaken, as in the Scipios, and with integrity and justice, as in Aristides; but it does more hurt than good, when it is accompanied with unlawful ambition, as in Cæsar; with vanity and riots, as in Alcibiades; with cowardice, as in Demosthenes; and with corruption, as in Demades;

des; for nothing can sooner hasten the ruin of a country, than to have men lifted high in the opinions of the people, followed and trusted, in whom their vices are much more prevailing than their virtues.

Many have wondered how it came to pass that the model of a commonwealth, which Solon recommended to the Athenians, had no longer duration. He was a lawgiver reckoned inferior to none that ever pretended to guide a state, endowed with all noble faculties of the understanding, and born in an age when mankind had attained to the sublimest perfection of virtue and wisdom; yet he lived to see his scheme of a democracy overthrown, to make room for the tyranny of Pisistratus; and though 40 years after it was restored and mended by many excellent laws, that form of government was soon rent asunder, and in one century quite abolished.

But though he had fortified his constitution with all possible foresight and human prudence, yet there was something rooted in the very nature of the Athenians, that must eternally hinder them from remaining long under one sort of establishment; which was that in the most important junctures, and in the nicest business, they might at all times be blown any way by the breath of orators; and that in their councils they might be guided, ruled, and managed by eloquence: They seldom liked a man so much for doing well as for speaking finely, which is indeed the vice of most states whose affairs are chiefly governed by popular assemblies, and is, peradventure, the reason that governments, purely democratical, are not durable and perfect; for in mixed constitutions, such as was that of Sparta, the wisdom of a few, the Senate, and the authority of a single person, the

King, was some counterpoise to that dangerous interest and power which bad men will now and then obtain, by talking magnificently to the people: Whereas, in democratical institutions, and principally in Athens, orators have carried all things before them with a sway unlimited; and being first corrupted themselves with money, have afterwards, with false rhetoric, corrupted their cities to give unrighteous judgments, to banish and put to death their best citizens, and to make unreasonable leagues, and enter into destructive wars, with other the like measures, that were soon attended with ruin to the public.

Whoever looks over with care the history of those times, will plainly see that the liberty of Athens was subverted by their orators; they were the first promoters of those rash advices, that by degrees undermined the constitution; and they were the original movers of that war with Antipater, which ended in the Athenians being forced to receive a garrison in the very port of Munichia, and at last in the slavery of all Greece; and without seeking for other reasons, we may safely affirm, that the orators, with their corruption, violence, and fraud, pulled down and destroyed the democracy of Solon.

When men who have thus recommended themselves, by the art of speaking, to a good opinion in the world, have got into power, their first business is either to create or encourage faction; they devise or revive names of distinction to keep up discord; and from the different inclinations and sentiments we naturally have, as well in politic as in religious affairs, they find matter to raise and foment divisions, till at last they try to range the church, the people, and its national assembly, as it were, under two banners.

The

The corrupt part of these opposite sides, growing quickly too strong for such as mean their country well, produce what we call parties, which, in process of time, must be the ruin of mixed governments.

Rome, though a large empire, formed with great wisdom, and supported all along by men of the sublimest virtue, was, notwithstanding, destroyed at last by factions; much more then must they pull down nations depraved, weak within, and surrounded abroad by powerful enemies or false friends.

But they are yet more dangerous to states, where both parties have had the chief power committed to them, with this effect only, that each side in its turn has shown how little fit they were to be trusted with it.

Who would give up his name to a faction, and devote himself entirely to it, that has known grave republicans become supple flatterers, and old flatterers grow zealous patriots? And what Prince must not have a mean opinion of such parties, when he has seen neither of them at bottom better principled than the other, and both sides agreeing to rob him, to give up any thing when fairly invited to it, and ready to enrich themselves with the nation's treasure?

In former times, when by their fine talking, and by the strength of their parties, bad men had got into the management of public business, they presently introduced disorder, decay of trade, private misery, and national want; they were an equal weight upon King and people; by their errors they first embroiled the crown, and to maintain those errors, the crown was often put to hazard. No Prince could have so much the affection of his subjects, but by their conduct he was

in a way to lose it; the kingdom had not wealth enough for their negligence and profusion; they had neither skill to recover a misfortune, nor knew they how to make any right use of an advantage; giddy with success, and frightened by calamity, wise after danger, and distracted in it, they endeavoured to give the court a distinct interest from the people, and yet were always dividing among themselves, hating each other as much as good men hate them; they were without experience of their own, and yet despised the knowledge of others; arrogant and impatient of contradiction, though always in the wrong; they were rash in resolving points of the highest nature, but slow in the execution of the most trivial matters; and though they first recommended themselves by finding fault with former ministers, yet they justified the worst of them by their proceedings; they were eager and active enough, when the nation was to be fleeced, but supine and indifferent in what related to its preservation; growing rich, while their country became poor, and as careless of the public honour as of their own.

And it has been the general unhappiness of such corrupted countries, that the bad men are bold and enterprising, forward and active; whereas such as keep their integrity are unactive, cold, and lazy; contented with the barren praise of not being guilty themselves, they suffer others to invade so much power as that they can do hurt, and do it safely; and in a nation debauched in principles, many parts of the state may be filled by persons of high knowledge and virtue, but their love and zeal for the public, and their vigilance for its safety, their prudence, foresight, and caution, shall be all rendered ineffectual, by the overruling madness of others. The side which would tread

tread in the path of honesty and wisdom, shall be overborn and shoved out of the way, by the crowd and strong faction of those who find their account in promoting disorder and misgovernment. Such as maintain their understanding in this general frenzy, shall be admired, but not followed; esteemed, but not consulted; heard, but not regarded. Mend things they cannot; if they will be quietly wise and say nothing, they are endured; and if unactive, they are suffered; when their superior skill is forgiven and connived at; when such as have more than common endowments are allowed to subsist and preserve themselves, though they cannot save their country, it is thought a sufficient favour; but all the while they shall be made uneasy, pursued with malicious whispers, blackened as disaffected, and made obnoxious to the people, till at last they are forced either to retire, or let their brethren of the state ruin and betray the nation in quiet.

When a country thus generally depraved in its manners, comes to have upon the throne a virtuous Prince, with what difficulty must he labour for the public good, among a people fantastical, conceited, greedy, proud, designing, ambitious, and mercenary? Such a King, when he contemplates in his high wisdom, all their natural and acquired vices, must hardly think them worth the ruling.

Such a country may have a hero come over to secure their religion and civil rights, which were invaded, and to arm them against an enemy whose power threatened to enslave Europe; yet he may meet with but few to imitate and assist his virtues: And though his ends were the same with those of Dion, who came from Athens to restore the Sicilians to their freedom, yet like Dion, he

may find the leading men buried in their vices, fitter instruments of a tyranny than for the sway of a good Prince, not thankful for his benefits, nor capable of liberty.

If such men as are here described, and of this stamp and character, in former ages, by fine words, joined with wicked arts, have crept into stations of great trust, where they rend and gnaw the very bowels of the commonwealth, there is reason to caution those who would form a model for the better ordering of our West-India Colonies, to fortify their constitution, as much as possible, against the fraud and corruption of these busy talkers, which peradventure is to be brought about, if the governors to be sent thither take care to recommend to the people, to choose for the assemblies here proposed, persons in whom they shall always have observed public virtue, by which we mean a constant and perpetual will to do their country good.

Absolute monarchies, corrupted in their morals and discipline, impaired in their wealth, sunk in credit, and weakened by inbred disorders, do very rarely retrieve their condition; but mixed governments have an innate vigour and strength of constitution, which can throw off those diseases that seem to affect them, and whereby they can be recovered from that decay of health to which they have at any time been reduced by unskilful statemen.

Machiavel says, That to render a commonwealth long-lived, it is necessary to correct it often, and reduce it towards its first principles, which is to be done by punishments and examples. If the wild proceedings of rash and giddy ministers are now and then looked into, and animadverted upon, it creates fear and a reverence to the laws;

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laws; and in great men, strong examples of clean hands, self-denial, personal temperance, and care of the public treasure, do awaken the virtue of others, and revive those seeds of goodness which lie hid in the hearts of most people, and would spring out, but that they are choked up for a time by avarice and ambition.

And now (in a few words, to recapitulate the whole matter of this Discourse) we have set forth of what advantage the Plantations in America are to England; there has been proposed a model for their future government, in which, to manage their affairs by a national assembly, is chiefly recommended; we have shown the steps by which vice is first insinuated into a country; we have laid down, that when a people is corrupted, its national assembly grows soon debauched in principles; that when the vices of the age are gathered to a head, they produce a great ulcer called faction, which is a complication of bad humours, suffered to grow in the body politic, through the negligence and weakness of ill statesmen; we have set forth that corrupted times embolden bad men to thrust themselves into the affairs of state, who are always the authors of warm and bold councils, which (as * Livy says) are pleasant in their first appearance, but difficult to manage, and fatal in their event.

And all these points have been here handled, with a design to show, that if it should be thought expedient to regulate the constitutions of the Northern Colonies, and to give them power to govern their affairs by a national assembly; they who form a model of this kind, should take care

* Tit. Liv. Lib. 35. *Consilia calida & audacia, prima specie leta, tractatu dura, eventu tristia sunt.*

to propose methods of correcting the manners of the people, the mending of which has at all times, and in all free countries, produced wise and just National Assemblies, and in such there have been always reared up able ministers; and from statesmen of that kind there may continually be expected a steady and safe administration, wherein faction shall be rooted out; for the progress of the cure is by the same steps as the disease first grew upon the body politic.

To contrive for the public, and to promote the common good, ought not only to be their care to whom the administration of affairs is committed, but all private persons should bend their study the same way; and whoever has received any lights either from nature, education, or experience, is bound to produce them for the service of his country.

As he who has gathered any useful instructions, by contemplating the growth and fall of many monarchies and states, and by weighing the different events of wise and foolish councils, should communicate his observations for the benefit of others; so they, whose understandings move in a lower sphere, and who have employed their chief time and thoughts in considering the revenues, trade, and common business of a kingdom, if they have gained any knowledge, either by study or practice, should offer it to the world, since thereby at least they may furnish materials, and give some hints for abler heads to work upon, and improve for the nation's profit.

Many may imagine they owe no more to the commonwealth than to fight in its defence, to pay the Prince his dues, to be just to one another, and obedient to the laws: It is true, these are virtues with which, if a majority of the people be not

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seasoned, the government must run into immediate confusion: But a great deal more than all this is necessary to make a country flourish.

A government cannot be maintained without a sufficient fund of revenue; and a revenue is wildly given, where the people's strength that must grant it is not duly understood; taxes not contrived with skill are a present burthen, and yet answer so as to bring upon the kingdom a great future debt: When the nature of the commodities to be charged, and a true consumption of them are not rightly considered, funds given upon them prove defective, and such as destroy all credit; where it is not known how to manage and collect revenues, the people are disturbed and frightened with a variety of new impositions, and yet the public is no way eased nor relieved by what they bring in, but becomes still more and more necessitous.

But let the taxes be never so well contrived and ordered, if a nation be plunged in great debts which require large payments from the people, nothing can support such an expence but Foreign Trade; for all countries have a certain stock with which their tillage, labour, arts, and manufactures are carried on: And it is the radical moisture of the commonwealth, and if it be quite drawn away the body politic becomes consumptive, hectical, and dies at last (being subject to diseases and death itself, like human frames); and as human bodies are not to be kept alive but by receiving in of nourishment, to repair the hourly decays which time produces, so nations cannot subsist long unless they receive from time to time reliefs and refreshments from abroad, which are no way so well to be administered as by the help of a well governed and extended Traffic.

These

These considerations have induced the Writer of these Papers to communicate these schemes, and his notions concerning Credit, his observations relating to the Public Revenues and the Trade of this kingdom, and in this tract to give a short view of Practical Ethicks; which, perhaps, may be thought needless at present, and rather useful to posterity.

The morals here advanced are directed to, and intended for our Colonies abroad: But in succeeding times our manners may come to be depraved, and when this happens, all sort of miseries will invade us, the whole wealth of the kingdom will not be sufficient for its defence; Trade will forsake our shores, and go to some nation where the rules of virtue are better observed.

The preventing remedy against such distempers is to be had from the precepts of morality, which writers upon all sort of subjects should endeavour to inculcate; for the vices or virtues of a country influence very much in all its business; so that he who would propose methods by which the affairs of a kingdom may be any ways bettered, should, at the same time, consider the predominant passions, the morals, temper, and inclinations of the people: And so far as to the Plantation Trade.

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DISCOURSES
ON THE
PUBLIC REVENUES,
AND ON
TRADE.
PART II.

DISCOURSE IV.

On the East-India Trade.

THE Writer of these Papers did never imagine that the Essay on the East-India Trade, in a very few days, would engage him in so long a work as this is like to prove; but seeing his computations attacked, and finding many persons of excellent understanding misled by the authority of Mr. P——n, his chief answerer, he thought himself obliged in this, and in the foregoing Discourses, to show the foundation on which he builds his reasonings upon the Trade of England.

It is true, that delighted with his subject (and in some measure compelled to it by the great variety

riety of matter he handles) he has swelled this work much beyond his first intentions: However, if he can be clear, it may make some amends for that length which is indeed unavoidable in points so difficult; and at times of leisure and recess from public business, these tracts will, peradventure, be an entertainment to the country gentlemen, for whose service they were written.

The Author's aim is to deliver things plainly, without the disguise of hard words and terms; which rubbish being removed, the precious ore will sooner appear that is to be found in studies of this nature.

His ends are compassed if he can set out intricate matters in an easy manner, hoping thereby to induce the young nobility and gentry of the kingdom to take a pleasure in these sort of contemplations; and he wishes his present performance did in any degree answer the desire he has of serving the public.

It is a great delight to him to observe, that many of our young nobility and gentry have expressed an inclination to inform themselves of the state of England, and that learning begins to be more in fashion than of late years, people being not ashamed now of understanding Greek and Latin. Nothing did more help to advance the Roman greatness, than that their youth were bred up to an early knowledge of their country's business, to which they attained, by progressive steps through several offices of state, wherein they gained the experience that fitted them at last for the magistracies of chiefest trust and importance.

They qualified themselves for the public service, by seasoning betimes their understanding with the love of letters; for in those days, whoever pretended to intermeddle in matters of government,

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vernment, did first cultivate his mind with wisdom and the precepts of philosophy, by which afterwards he might steer his actions; giving to the search into useful arts of sublimer speculations, those hours which, in this age, are consumed in riots and vain pleasures.

The young nobility and gentry not yet tainted, are the best hopes of a diseased commonwealth: The warmth and spirit of such must assist their measures, who desire and are able to promote a right administration.

And in national assemblies it has been generally observed, that the young men are least infected with corruption; and that they would always follow truth, but for the false lights which crafty guides set up with a purpose to mislead them; for while we are young we are either ashamed, or have not leisure to play the knave, but we come to it as age and discretion grow upon us.

The Writer's aim is to stir up the youth of the kingdom to bend their thoughts to the study of Trade and the Public Revenues, that being masters of the general notions thereunto relating, they may not be misled by crafty and interested merchants, or by ambitious and designing politicians.

When the youth of a nation have well informed their own reason, they follow her dictates, deliberating well and wisely for their King and country, without being hurried to and fro by the whirlwind of a prevailing faction.

Revenues can never be well ordered; right ways and means of supplying the state cannot be entered upon, nor can true measures concerning Trade be taken in a factious and divided nation.

Where factions reign, how can there be any sound deliberations formed concerning Trade?

For many may be so servile as to promote a foreign interest, to the prejudice of their own country; and may weaken and undermine its Traffic, with design to give it to some other nation: Others may vex and distress particular societies of trading men, only to draw from them bribes and presents; and when these wicked spirits are at work, there needs no more than that four or five should privately give the word among their friends, pretend the government's service, be very loud and warm, and Trade itself may presently be rendered a party business.

In countries thus divided, and subject to such abuses, what true judgment can be made in any point relating to Foreign Traffic? And how can it be there well determined which branch is profitable, and which is hurtful to the nation?

And where general corruptions have taken deep root, they give growth and strength to faction, and those divisions which we affirm to be so prejudicial to a kingdom, and so much to influence in all affairs; upon which account it may not be unseasonable, in this place, to recommend to all degrees of men that concord which alone can preserve a nation, encrease its trade and wealth, and make the King safe and happy: And though this caution may be needless at present, peradventure it will be of use hereafter.

For suppose us now a virtuous and well-united people, that deliberate calmly, maturely, and wisely of all matters, that are not swayed by private interest, and who are full of public zeal; yet, in process of time, our manners may become depraved like other nations; and when this happens to us, we shall apparently find that it will affect all our councils, especially such as relate to

the Ways and Means of supplying the government, or to the trade of England.

When the young nobility and gentry employ their time and thoughts carefully to inspect and consider the kingdom's Foreign Traffic, they will evidently see how much their land interest depends upon it; they will find, that as Trade brought land from 12 to 25, and the general rental from 6 to 14 millions, and the kingdom's capital from 72 to 252 millions (reckoning lands, tenements, hereditaments and personal estates, 18 years purchase at a medium); so it may bring land from 25 to 50 years purchase; and lands, tenements, hereditaments, &c. from 18 to 36 years purchase; the general rental from 14 to 28 millions, and the kingdom's capital from 252 to above 1000 millions, if, by industry and prudent management, it can be rendered more extensive. But the mutual dependance between land and trade, we hope has been sufficiently made out in the series of these Discourses.

And in the foregoing tracts we have dwelt the longer upon that subject, because there have been notions exposed in print so directly opposite to the welfare of this country, with insinuations as if England did rather lose than get by trade; and delivered by one, whose reputation for skill in these matters, gravity and pretended experience, may misguide unthinking people.

The reader will best judge whether or no in Discourse I. we have refuted some of his general maxims; and we shall now proceed to examine some notions of his relating to the East-India Trade in particular, and to the balance of Trade in general, pronounced magisterially, but, as we hope to make appear, without any foundation in good sense and reason.

* This Author says, " That there hath been exported for India annually ever since 1673, when the trade in manufactured goods from thence begun first to encrease till ann. 1690, about 600,000*l.* per ann. in bullion, by the company, private traders or interlopers, from England or Spain; and that the goods bought from thence never brought back into England, nor saved the going out of 200,000*l.* per ann. in bullion. And therefore that this Trade, instead of being profitable to us, hath exhausted about 400,000*l.* per ann. of our treasure, &c."

" That nothing but bullion imported, can make amends for bullion exported, p. 19."

And in another book of his he lays down †, " That for these 40 years last past, all the gold and silver brought from the West-Indies and coast of Afric, never amounted to 2,500,000*l.* per ann. That of this we have not, and cannot well expect for our share, above 600,000*l.* per ann. in specie, p. 77."

" That there is consumed in silver	<i>l.</i> per ann.
" lace, wire, fringe, and for gilding about	— — 200,000
" That the northern Trades have ever since the fire of London carried	
" from us about	— — 200,000
	—————
Carry forward,	400,000

* Mr. Pollexfen: England and East-India inconsistent &c. p. 6.

† Mr. Pollexfen: A discourse of trade, coin, paper-credit, and of ways and means to gain and retain riches; written, as appears by the date, July 15, 1696.

" That

On the East-India Trade.

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	<i>l. per. ann.</i>
Brought forward,	400,000
" That the East-India Trade has ex- " ported about — —	600,000
" That the Trade of France did ex- " haust of our treasure about	1,000,000
Total,	2,000,000

Brought into England, as he says, of bullion, but — — —	600,000
Exhausted then from England, ac- cording to his computation —	1,400,000

Our luxury in lace, wire, fringe and
gilding, is at least 30 years old;
and if his computations hold right,
there has been consumed on the
first article, during that time — 6,000,000

If his computation in the second ar-
ticle is true, the northern trade
has carried out from 1666 to 1697, 6,200,000

If, as he computes, the East-India
Trade has carried out from 1670
to 1689, about 600,000*l.* per ann.
that trade has then exported in 19
years — — — 11,400,000

And if, as he seems to say p. 84. that
for 30 years successively, the wines,
brandies, silks, linens, and other
goods brought from France,
amounted to a million and a half,
and our commodities carried thi-
ther but to half a million, the
French Trade did then draw from
England in that time — — 30,000,000

And if his computations on all these articles hold right, England has been exhausted by these several trades, to the value of — 53,600,000 *l.* per ann.

And if, as he says, our proportion of the gold and silver brought from America amounts to but 600,000*l.* per ann. which in 30 years is — 18,000,000

These trades must have carried out in specie, or run England in debt abroad, in the 30 years — 35,600,000

There is nothing here strained; and what we have now laid down, is a natural and (as is humbly conceived) an undeniable conclusion from his own premises.

The Author of a book entitled *Britannia Linguens*, (p. 147.) has published an account (taken and printed in November 1675, for clearing a debate, then before a committee of parliament) of the gold and silver coined in 76 years, viz. from the 1st of October 1599, to November 1675, which amounted to 21,851,876*l.* 14*s.* 7½*d.*

And allowing for what was coined from 1675, to 1689, yet, if Mr. Pollexfen is a good computer, and if his schemes are right concerning the balance of Trade, his reader has reasons to conclude, not only that there was not a single shilling remaining in the kingdom in 1689, but that we stood likewise at that time very much indebted to the nations abroad; for either there must have been a very great debt, which some way or other would have appeared, or the species of money must have been drained entirely from us; it being an undoubted truth, that countries which cannot

cannot satisfy their balance with commodities, must do it with money or with bullion.

The Writer of these papers finds himself obliged to complain that he has been but very ill assisted in his endeavours to serve the public. If the accounts of the revenue had been open to him, as heretofore they were wont to be to such who were making enquiries of this nature, he had been in a capacity to prove, beyond all contradiction, several of his computations relating to the Trade of this kingdom. But as the case stands, he is many times forced to grope in the dark, the common lights being withheld from him; and he is often compelled to hunt after truth, merely by the strength of numbers; and though perhaps he finds her now and then, yet what he advances would be less subject to dispute, if he could have several matters of fact before him. But secrecy is the life of all councils; and from this maxim peradventure it proceeds, that some accounts of the public revenue seem as warily kept as were antiently the leaves of the Sybills, which could not be inspected but by such as had the secret, and who were of the college of Augurs.

There passed lately an act to repeal a statute of Henry VII. against multiplying gold and silver. So that the chemists have now a legal right to the philosophers stone, if their art can produce it.

It is to be apprehended, the necessities of state will be hardly supplied by so rich and great a discovery, as the Magisterium would prove; we ought therefore to bend our thoughts to attempts more possible, and, in all likelihood, to find out the true balance of Trade, in order to adapt thereunto our laws and form of living, which would bring as much wealth to this country as is requisite to render a nation safe and happy.

An exact balance between us and every distinct place, perhaps, cannot by any human skill be attained to; nor is it certain, whether a scrutiny so very nice would be of any use.

But, without doubt, a general state of this matter formed upon strict enquiry with deliberation and skill, and such a one as would carry with it a demonstration of being somewhat near the truth, must be a great help to the rulers and ministers of a country, and a good guide in many important counsels.

What we have proposed in the first Volume of these Discourses, will, peradventure, be a step towards knowing how this kingdom's business stood formerly with the several nations to which it deals; for when things past are set in a better light before us, it will be less difficult to form a judgment of future matters.

And though, as for example, it may be hard to find from the entries in the custom-house books, what was the true and exact value of the commodities imported from France into England, and of the goods exported from England thither; yet no wise man will deny, but that from a general state of the fact a judgment may be formed, which shall come a great deal nearer the truth, than the wild guesses of Mr. Pollexfen, and such like writers, who having imbibed in their youth prejudices, wrong opinions, and ill-grounded notions, deliver them afterwards in the world as the result of age, experience and wisdom.

There is reason to think, that some of the trades mentioned by this gentleman, have hurt England; but in the degree he talks of, no man in his right senses can imagine; and when we shall come by and by to shew how few traffics he reckons beneficial to us, it will appear, that if
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his computations were right, the whole island must have been pawned some years ago to foreign states, as history says it was one engaged to Seneca.

Mr. Fortrey, in a book published	l.
1663, * has said, that our imports	
from France amounted to upwards of	2,600,000
That our exports thither did not ex-	
ceed	— — — 1,000,000
Lost then in the balance,	1,600,000

It is to be wished this ingenious gentleman had been more particular in giving us an account upon what grounds he made his calculations. By what may be gathered from his paper, there was about that time a memorial laid before the French King, shewing what commodities were yearly sent from France; which Mr. Fortrey enumerates in 16 articles, some of which will appear plainly to any common reader, to be overrated; so that in all likelihood, either he had not a true copy of that memorial, or that the facts were falsely represented by the merchants of that kingdom; for the Author says, p. 25, the king of France had some thoughts at that time to forbid the trade with England.

But however it was upon this gentleman's authority, many people, and most of the Writers about Trade, have concluded that our dealings with the French turned every year to our prejudice at least a million.

But whoever looks into the nature of things, and contemplates our universal business abroad,

* England's Interest and Improvement, p. 22.

and considers the product and manufactures of this nation; and whoever takes a view of the coin we had in the kingdom before the war, with what may be now probably remaining, must be convinced, that by our consumption in silver lace, &c. by the northern Trade, East-India and French Trade, we could not be drained in 30 years, of such an immense sum as is 35 millions and upwards.

If the body politic had been exhausted by such large issues, as these are pretended to be, it must have expired long ago, unless the breaches had been repaired by some other means. We shall therefore examine those foreign traffics which Mr. Pollexfen allows England to be a gainer by; and perhaps from thence some light may be had to guide us in the search of that general balance which we are looking after.

As to the Trades we drive to Spain, Portugal and Italy, he says, * “ That the wines from the “ Canaries, and currants from Zant, which cost “ great sums annually, do abate much out of “ the balance of those trades; but that, upon “ casting up the total of our exportation and im- “ portation, will probably appear beneficial.”

As to the Turkey Trade he says, “ It may be “ reckoned as one of our best.”

As to the Plantation Trade, he admits we are gainers by it.

As to our Trade with Holland, he says, “ That to adjust how the balance of this Trade “ stands, will be more difficult than any other;” and adds afterwards, “ Which nation hath the “ advantage is uncertain.”

* Mr. Pollexfen: Discourse on Trade and Coin, p. 85, 86, &c.

As to the Trade with Ireland, he is so dark, we cannot find his meaning, but perhaps the reader may. He says, speaking of the Irish, "And
" unless some way can be found out to secure
" their entire dependence upon England, ground-
" ed as well on religion as laws, that England
" may be sure to reap a lasting advantage by the
" labours of the people there, and they can be
" brought to be more industrious; perpetual ob-
" structions will from such objections arise
" against endeavours to encrease riches in that
" kingdom, by improving it to the uttermost,
" which will be a continual prejudice to the
" English interest there." These are the Au-
thor's own words, which indeed seem not very intelligible; so that whether we get or lose by this trade, he leaves undetermined.

As to the Hamburgh Trade, by which great quantities of our cloth go to Germany by the rivers Elbe, Weser, and Eyder, he allows it to be great and beneficial.

As to the Newfoundland Trade, he says, "It
" is much diminished; and that our northern
" fishing trades are much disused." But we take it for granted, he means they were heretofore profitable to this kingdom.

We have here from his own words set down the map he has drawn of our Foreign Traffic, to shew what an ill-rising ground the city of Lisbon is to stand upon, for one who pretends to give a view of the whole commercial world.

If his computations are right, where had we the 30 millions, in which sum (as has been shewn Discourse I.) several accidents might impair our stock before the year 1688? And how came we by the 25 millions, or more, which have been actually levied during the late war? And where
had

had we the 35 millions that were exhausted from us by the several Trades he mentions? Could 600,000*l.* per ann. coming into us and no more, as he lays down, have supplied all those expences? Could such an immense sum have arisen from the Turkey and Hamburgh trades only? Without doubt not. And as to our other European business, he seems to make the balance but even.

But we can by no means allow his state of the general balance to be well grounded; and in the single article of France, if his computations were right, this kingdom long since must have been utterly impoverished and exhausted.

Men are ever inclined to think better of the past, than of the present times; and if every age had as much declined in morality and virtue, as is commonly imagined, we must have been now arrived to a degree of vice, that would be inconsistent with human fellowship. In the same manner, if we did as much impair in wealth from 1666, as some melancholy Writers have suggested, we could never have resisted so strongly the last war, and other calamities, with which, since that time, this nation has been afflicted.

Mr. Fortrey's book being out of print, we think it not improper here to insert verbatim the several commodities which he says were imported from France, with his valuation upon them: In order to this, that such merchants as shall peruse these papers, and who either from their memory, or by their accounts, can tell how Trade stood at that time, may judge whether our yearly consumption of the respective goods did answer his estimate.

There is transported out of France
annually into England, great
quantities of velvets, plain and

wrought;

On the East-India Trade.

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‘ wrought; satins plain and wrought;	l. sterl.
‘ cloth of gold and silver, armoy-	
‘ fins, and other merchandizes of	
‘ silk made at Lyons, to the value	
‘ of — — — — —	150,000
‘ In silks, stuffs, taffeties, paduasoyes,	
‘ armoyfins, cloths of gold and	
‘ silver, tabbies plain and wrought,	
‘ silk ribands, and other such like	
‘ silk stuffs as are made at Tours,	
‘ to the yearly value of above	300,000
‘ In silk ribands, galloons, laces and	
‘ buttons of silk, which are made	
‘ at Paris, Rouen, Chaimont, St.	
‘ Estiennes in Forrests, to the yearly	
‘ value of about — — —	150,000
‘ A great quantity of serges which	
‘ are made at Chalons, Chartres,	
‘ Estamines and Rhemes; and	
‘ great quantities of serges made	
‘ at Amiens, Crevecœur. Blicourt,	
‘ and other towns in Picardy, to	
‘ the yearly value of above —	150,000
‘ In beaver, demicastor and felt hats,	
‘ made in the city and suburbs of	
‘ Paris, besides many others made	
‘ at Rouen, Lyons, and other	
‘ places, to the yearly value of	
‘ about — — — — —	120,000
‘ In feathers, belts, girdles, hatbands,	
‘ fans, hoods, masks, gilt and	
‘ wrought looking-glasses, cabinets,	
‘ watches, pictures, cases, medals,	
‘ tables, bracelets, and other such	
‘ like mercery ware, to the yearly	
‘ value of above — — —	150,000
Carry over,	1,020,000
	‘ In

	l. sterl.
Brought over,	1,020,000
‘ In pins, needles, box combs, tortoise-shell combs, and such like, to the yearly value of about —	20,000
‘ In perfumed and trimmed gloves that are made at Paris, Rouen, Vendosme, Clermont, and other places, to the yearly value of	10,000
‘ In papers of all sorts, which are made at Auvergne, Poictou, Limosin, Champaign and Normandy, to the yearly value of above — — —	100,000
‘ In all sorts of ironmongers wares that are made at Forrests, Auvergne, and other places, to the yearly value of about —	40,000
‘ In linen cloth that is made in Brittany and Normandy, as well coarse as fine, to the yearly value of above — — —	400,000
‘ In household stuff, consisting of beds, matraffes, coverlids, hangings, fringes of silk, and other furniture, to the yearly value of above — — —	100,000
‘ In wines from Gascoigne, Nantois, and other places on the river Loire; and also from Bourdeaux, Rochelle, Nantz, Rouen, and other places, to the yearly value of above — — —	600,000
‘ In aqua vitæ, cyder, vinegar, verjuice, and such like, to the yearly value of about — — —	100,000
Carry forward,	2,390,000

l. sterl.

Brought forward,	2,390,000
‘ In saffron, castile soap, honey, almonds, olives, capers, prunes, and such like, to the yearly value of about	150,000
‘ Annual importation from France,	2,540,000

‘ Besides 5 or 600 vessels of salt loaden at Maron, Rochelle, Brouage, the isle of Oleron and isle of Rhée, transported into England and Holland, of a very great value. So as by this calculation it doth appear, that the yearly value of such commodities as are transported from France to England, amount to above 2,600,000*l.* And the commodities exported out of England into France, consisting chiefly of woollen cloths, serges, knit stockings, lead, pewter, allum, coals, and all else, do not amount to above a million per ann. By which it appears, that our Trade with France is at least 1,600,000*l.* a year clear lost to this kingdom.’

We have here inserted Mr. Fortrey’s words, upon which every reader may make his own comment.

To which we shall add a computation of Mr. Pollexfen’s* ; “ That the expences of our gen-try travelling into France, did drain us of near 200,000*l.* per ann.” Wherein, very probably, he reckons much at random.

So that these two calculations, if they are well grounded, put the balance against us 1,800,000*l.* per ann.

* *Essay on Trade and Coin*, p. 93.

Mr.

Mr. H. T. another Writer upon Trade, has quoted these valuations of Mr. Fortrey, upon which he says *; ‘ It is true, that since this, ‘ there was an estimate of the French over- ‘ balance taken in England by some English mer- ‘ chants, from the entries of the port of London; ‘ by which it was computed that the French ‘ overbalance amounted to about a million. ‘ This was presented by our merchants to our ‘ lords commissioners, upon a treaty of com- ‘ merce with France in 1674, (which came to no ‘ conclusion) and afterwards to the parliament; ‘ which seems to impeach the estimate of the ‘ French overbalance reported by Mr. Fortrey, ‘ as to the quantum.’

However, the same Author adds afterwards, ‘ But that I may not totally desert Mr. Fortrey, ‘ I shall take notice, that this English compu- ‘ tation was taken from the entries of the port ‘ of London only, from whence there may not ‘ be so just a calculation for all the rest of our ‘ ports; and that the entries do not comprehend ‘ any of those French commodities which were ‘ prohibited by our former laws, and are there- ‘ fore imported without entry, which are ac- ‘ counted to amount to some hundreds of thou- ‘ sand pounds yearly, perhaps near to another ‘ million.’

From which words may be gathered, that this Author is inclined to think Mr. Fortrey’s estimate was right.

It is to be wished, authentic copies might be recovered of the papers from whence these Writers made their several computations, that the grounds may be seen upon which they went. And if any

* *Britannia Linguens*, p. 190.

one has memorials relating to this subject, he would do his country good service, in this juncture, to expose them to public view.

A council of Trade (by authority of parliament) composed of industrious and skilful men, would go a great way in finding out how this whole matter stands.

For if the imports from France, and our exports thither for six years before the war, were carefully extracted out of the custom-house books; and if the prime cost of the respective investments or parcels of goods, were truly valued and stated by judicious and disinterested persons, a judgment might from thence be made somewhat nearer the truth than the random guesses here taken notice of, which seem without any true foundation.

And though no certain and positive judgment could from thence be formed, which should come demonstratively within less than a hundred or two hundred thousand pounds of the real fact; yet to come so near the truth, as within one or two hundred thousand pounds, which peradventure is practicable, may be a light and give some aim in making a new treaty of commerce with that kingdom.

And without so exact a view as is here proposed into the custom-house books, it seems a demonstration, that we could not be over-balanced in our trade with France near the sum which any of these Authors have mentioned.

But if, upon examination, the fact should prove to be as they have suggested; it is evident England did gain much more in the balance of its other European, the West and East-India Trades, than the Writer of these papers has anywhere computed, or this kingdom must long ago have been utterly exhausted.

Sir

Sir Josiah Child, in his excellent Discourse on the Balance of Trade, (p. 152) has laid down all along, that the true state of it is very difficult to be come at, however he recommends the notion as useful; to which we shall venture to add, that this speculation well followed and assisted, may, in all likelihood, lead us to know whether we lost by our dealings with France, annually a million, or 1,600,000, or 1,800,000, or 700,000, or 300,000 *l.* or peradventure very little; for there are men well versed in the nature of our Trade of all these different opinions.

By what the Writer of these papers has seen upon this subject, and by what helps he has been able to procure, which he owns not to be perfect; and by computing from the general state of our foreign and domestic business, he is rather inclined to think this matter has been all along mistaken.

And his thoughts are, (which he humbly submits to better judgments) that when the French first began to mind Trade, (which was towards the latter end of Richlieu's ministry) the balance lay of our side, as being a nation more versed in Traffic than they could be; for it holds in countries as in smaller affairs, that a subtle man, in all dealings, will outwit his less cunning neighbour. Besides, till the year 1660, foreign modes and vanities, and other luxuries had not so much obtained among us.

It is true, as our luxuries encreased, our profit from that kingdom might diminish; but we cannot help being of opinion, that we rather got than lost in the balance with the French, till they began to lay high duties, amounting to a prohibition, upon our manufactures, and upon some commodities of our importation, and till they prohibited the use of our East-India goods.

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It is granted indeed, after those high duties and prohibitions began to operate, that our dealings thither began to grow very disadvantageous to this nation; but whether in the degree commonly reckoned, seems at least very doubtful.

For if the bulk of our Trade, when it ran highest, did not amount to above 10 millions, reckoning our exports and imports at the value here; whereof our exports in commodities being but about 2,750,000*l.* (and money and bullion included but about 3,500,000*l.*) it follows, that if the Trade to France took up one million thereof, and was so prejudicial to us, the other part of our exports in commodities being but 1,750,000*l.* must make a profit of near two millions, to balance the loss by the French kingdom only; and we must make a profit of about three millions, to balance that and our other suggested losses by Trade; and how such a profit shall be made, unless our importations be greater than our exportations, is hard to imagine: For if our gain by Trade be only so much as our exports do exceed our imports, then 1,750,000*l.* exported, to the rest of the commercial world besides France, could enrich us only so much as our exports amount to, in case we imported nothing by way of return, or nothing but money. But if our whole exports are about 3,500,000*l.* and our imports are 6,500,000*l.* it follows, that though our imports do exceed our exports three millions, it is so far from being an argument, that we lose three millions yearly by the over-balance, that, quite contrary, if 3,500,000*l.* will purchase 6,500,000*l.* we are enriched even by what is commonly reckoned an over-balance.

However, the wise conduct of the Parliament, during the late war, has put things upon a more

equal foot than formerly they stood. Both countries are armed now with the same weapons; we have high duties and prohibitions, with which to combat their edicts and tarriffs of the same nature; but it is hoped, that upon mature consideration, both kingdoms will think it their mutual interest to meet upon more friendly terms; and now the peace is concluded, not to remain at such a distance as the present interruption of traffic between them must occasion.

There is already concluded a treaty of commerce between France and Holland, which seems fair of both sides; and there can be no good reason given why England should not expect as equal conditions; especially since the legislative power here has put what appears a bar to the Trade itself, until the balance between us can be better rectified.

The general terms of that treaty are, in all likelihood, what this kingdom may very well insist upon; and without them, the Trade betwixt us can hardly be upon an equal foot.

In order to public consideration, some of the principal articles of that treaty shall be here inserted.

A R T. VI.

“ Les sujets & habitants des pays de l’obeissance
 “ de Sa Majesté, & desdits Seigneurs estats généraux vivront, converseront, & frequenteront
 “ les uns avec les autres, en toute bonne amitié
 “ & correspondance; & jouiront entre eux de la
 “ liberté de commerce & navigation dans l’Europe, en toutes les limites des pays de l’un &
 “ de l’autre, de toutes sortes de marchandises &
 “ denrées, dont le commerce, & le transport, n’est
 “ défendu généralement & universellement a tous

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 “ titre

“ tant fujets qu’eftrangers par les loix & ordon-
“ nances des eftats de l’un & de l’autre.

A R T. VII.

“ Et pour cet effect, les fujets de Sa Majeſte
“ & ceux deſdits Seigneurs eftats generaux pour-
“ ront franchement, & librement frequenter avec
“ leurs marchandifes & navires, les pays, terres,
“ villes, ports, places & rivieres, de l’un & de
“ l’autre Eſtat, y porter & vendre a toutes per-
“ ſonnes indiftinctement; acheter, trafiquer &
“ transporter toutes fortes de marchandifes dont
“ l’entree ou ſortie, & transport, ne fera defendu
“ a tous fujets de Sa Majeſte, & deſdits Seigneurs
“ eftats generaux; fans que cette liberte reciproque
“ puiſſe etre defendue, limittée ou reſtraincte,
“ par aucun privilege, octroy ou aucune conces-
“ ſion particuliere; & fans qu’il ſoit permis a l’un
“ ou a l’autre de conceder, ou de faire a leurs
“ fujets des immunités, benefices, dons gratuits
“ ou autres avantages, par deſſus ceux de l’autre
“ ou a leur prejudice; & fans que leſdits fujets de
“ part & d’autre ſoyent tenus de payer plus grands,
“ ou autres droits, charges, gabelles ou impoſi-
“ tions quelconques ſur leurs perſonnes, biens,
“ denrees, navires ou frets d’iceux directement
“ ou indirectement, ſous quelque noms, titre ou
“ pretexte que ſe puiſſe etre, que ceux qui ſeront
“ payes par les propres & naturels fujets de l’un &
“ de l’autre.

A R T. VIII.

“ Les fujets des eftats generaux ne pourront
“ auſſi etre traite autrement ou plus mal dans les
“ droits de contable d’ancreage, du ſol parifis &
“ toutes autres charges & impoſitions de quelque
“ nom qu’elles puiſſent etre appelees, ſoit ſous le
“ titre du droit etranger ou autrement, ſans au-

“ cune reserve ou exception, que les sujets memes
“ de Sa Majeste Tres Chretienne, qui ne seront pas
“ bourgeois dans les lieux, ou lesdits droits se
“ leveront.

A R T. IX.

“ Qu'a l'egard du commerce du Levant en
“ France, & de vingt pour cent qui se leve a cette
“ occasion, les sujets des estats generaux des Pro-
“ vinces Unies jouiront aussi de la meme liberte &
“ franchise, que les sujets du Roy Tres Chretien,
“ tellement qu'il sera permis auxdits sujets des estats
“ generaux de porter des marchandises du Levant,
“ a Marseille & autres places permises en France,
“ tant par leurs propres vaisseaux, que dans des
“ vaisseaux Francois, & que ny dans l'un ny l'
“ autre cas lesdits sujets des estats generaux ne
“ seront assujettis audit vingt pour cent, si non
“ dans les cas, ou les Francois y sont sujets, por-
“ tant des marchandises dans leurs propres vais-
“ seaux a Marseille, ou outre places permises,
“ &c.

A R T. X.

“ Il sera permis aux sujets des seigneurs estats
“ generaux d'apporter, faire entrer & debiter en
“ France & dans les pays conquis, librement &
“ sans aucun empeschement du harang sale, sans
“ distinction, & sans etre sujets au rempacque-
“ ment & ce non obstant tous edits, declarations
“ & arrests du conseil a ce contraires, & nomme-
“ ment ceux des 15 Juillet, & quatorzieme Sep-
“ tembre mil six cent quatre vingt sept, portant
“ defences d'apporter ny faire entrer dans les ports
“ de France ou places conquises du harang autre-
“ ment qu'en vracq & sale du sel de brouage; &
“ qui ordonnent que ledit harang sera apporte
“ dans les Ports de Mers en vracq dans des barils,
“ dont

“ dont les dixhuit composeront douze de harang
“ pacque, lesquels arreſts demeureront revoques
“ & annulles.

A R T. XI.

“ L'on depeſchera reciproquement a la douane
“ ou aux bureaux, tant en France qu'aux pais des
“ eſtats generaux egalement & ſans aucune diſtinc-
“ tion les ſujets de l'une & de l'autre nation auſſi-
“ tot qu'il ſera poſſible, ſans leur cauſer aucun
“ empeschement ny retardement, quel qu'il puiſſe
“ etre.

A R T. XII.

“ L'on fera un nouveau tarrif commun & ſui-
“ vant la convenance reciproque, dans le tems de
“ trois mois, & cependant le tarrif de l'an 1667,
“ ſera execute par proviſion, & en cas, qu'on ne
“ convienne pas dans ledit tems dudit tarrif nou-
“ veau, le tarrif de l'an 1664, aura lieu pour
“ l'avenir.”

A R T. XV.

“ Les ſujets deſdits Seigneurs eſtats generaux
“ ne ſeront point reputes Aubains en France, &
“ ainſi ſeront exempts de la loy d'Aubaine, &c.”

A R T. XIX.

“ Ce transport & ce traficq ſ'eſtendra a toutes
“ ſortes de marchandises a l'exception de celles de
“ contrebande.”

A R T I C L E S E P A R E.

“ Que l'impoſition de cinquante ſolds par ton-
“ neuveau etablie en France ſur les navires des eſtran-
“ gers ceſſera entierelement a l'avenir, a l'egard des
“ navires des ſujets des etats generaux des Pro-
“ vines Unies, &c.”

These are the most material articles relating to the mercantile business between France and Holland: And if our treaty of commerce, now to be settled with that kingdom, be upon the same foot, with submission to better judgments, the Trade thither can never hurt England.

And if it is expected the high duties now lying upon French commodities should be taken off, the legislative power here may reasonably insist upon the following terms:

I. That we may carry thither all sort of goods, the importation of which is not universally forbidden to their own subjects.

II. Particularly as to the Levant goods, that we may be permitted to carry them to Marseilles, and other places in France, where their importation is allowed of; and that the imposition of 20 per cent. thereupon be taken off.

III. That the duties laid upon our woollen manufactures may be lessened, if it is expected the duties upon French wines and linen should be lessened here.

IV. That it may be free for us to carry thither sugars, tobacco, and other goods of our Plantation product, under moderate duties.

V. That all edicts and tarriffs be revoked which forbid the importing or wearing of our East-India goods; and that the impositions upon them be reduced to the same proportion as shall be thought convenient to lay here upon the luxurious consumption of commodities brought from France hither.

VI. That the imposition of 50 pence upon foreign shipping be taken off as to England.

In general there seems reason to think, that the public of this kingdom may very well insist upon having things brought as near as possible to the
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posture they were in about the years 1664 and 1670: And if this point can be firmly settled, peradventure we need not be apprehensive of losing by the trade with France.

The Writer of these papers did think it necessary to touch upon this subject of the Balance of Trade, in order to illustrate and enforce what he has said concerning the Plantations, and what he shall hereafter advance in relation to our East-India Traffic.

For upon a strict examination it will perhaps be seen, that this balance so much talked of, so little understood, and so hard to be truly found out, is no way to be kept even but by the wealth arising to us from both the Indies; and if so, it must certainly import the nation to protect, encourage, and secure, the two main fountains of its strength and riches.

But before we leave this matter, it will be requisite to answer one difficulty concerning the Balance of our Trade, started by the Author of *Britannia Languens*, at which most people stumble who either think or write upon this subject.

He makes the Mint the principal touchstone by which we are to try whether a nation gets or loses by Trade; and to prove, "that our national trade has been consumptive," he gives the following account:

An Account of all the Gold and Silver coined in his Majesty's Mint within the Tower of London, from the 1st of October 1599, being the 4th of Elizabeth, to November 1675, being 76 Years, divided into four Parts; showing how the Coin of this Kingdom did encrease in the three first Parts, proportionable to the encrease of Trade and Navigation, and how much it hath decreased in the fourth Part.

	Coined Total.		Yearly Medium.		Yearly Increase.		Total Increase.	
	l.	s. d.	l.	s. d.	l.	s. d.	l.	s. d.
From the 1st of October 1599, } to the last of March 1619, }	4,779,314	13 4	245,092	11 6				
From the 1st of March 1619, } to the last of March 1638, }	6,900,042	11 1	363,160	2 1½	118,067	10 4	2,243,283	1 2
From the last of March 1638 } to May 1657, - - - }	7,733,521	13 4½	407,027	9 1	161,934	17 7½	3,076,762	14 10½
From May 1657, to November 1675, - - - }	2,238,997	16 0¼	121,026	18 4	Yearly Decrease. 285,000	10 9½	Total Decrease. 5,291,009	19 4½
Total coined in the four Periods,	21,851,876	14 7½						

The Author would argue from this scheme, because the coinage was very great during the second and third period of time there mentioned, and very much decreased in the fourth period, that Trade was beneficial to us one season, and detrimental in the other.

But such as look into the bottom of this matter, can never admit the Mint to be the principal standard of a nation's foreign business.

Coinage may be encreased by many accidents: Large encouragements may sometimes force a trade, and bring into the Mint a great deal of money, which shall go away again; as when we coined about a million for the Spaniards, which we have taken notice of in the First Discourse.

It is very likely that the irregular form of the hammered money did make the Mint accounts swell beyond their true and real produce; that is to say, the heavier species might be culled out and melted, so that the same bullion came to be coined over and over again; which, by the way, is a mischief that will be now repeated, if care has not been taken to preserve the weights uniform in every distinct species.

A large coinage is a good symptom of a country's thriving; but then we must take along with us one consideration, that there is a certain quantity of ready cash sufficient to transact common business, beyond which coined money may not be needful; and when this happens, the Mint stands still of course.

It is very probable, that about the year 1657, there was of gold and silver coined in England about 14 millions, as we have shown Vol. I. Part II. Discourse I. p. 365, which was a sum competent to carry on our Foreign and Domestic Trade: And this satiety of the species might peradventure be
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the reason that there was less money coined from 1657 to 1675, than in the other three periods of time mentioned in the scheme.

A man succeeding in the world does generally most abound with cash in the very beginning of his business, it being then most convenient for him; but when he comes to such a degree of riches, he makes purchases of land, he lends upon securities, and converts his substance into another sort of wealth, and can command less ready money than heretofore. In the same manner, nations that begin to thrive by Trade coin apace at first, a large species being necessary to carry on an extended commerce; but when they have a sum sufficient for this use, they convert bullion, which is the result of Traffic, into stock of another kind; that is, they send it to buy effects abroad, they purchase foreign materials for building houses, and for fitting and rigging ships; they buy jewels, furniture, and things of ornament, and they turn their overplus of bullion into plate, and have by them great stocks of foreign commodities.

And in many of these instances the species of gold and silver is employed more usefully, and turns more to national profit, than if it were coined into money, of which, all above what is necessary for common use, becomes hidden treasure, as was plainly seen in the nine millions that probably were hoarded in this kingdom before the war, as we have shown, Vol. I. Part II. Discourse II. p. 441.

And from hence follows, that we might thrive as much by Trade, from 1657 to 1675, as we did before, though there was less work at the Mint during those years, if at the same time we had a great stock of all kinds, either circulating abroad or remaining at home, which was the result of bullion, and that was convertible into money

again, upon occasion; and that we had such a stock is apparent to any one, who considers what expences England has been able to make for these last 40 years.

We have dwelt the longer upon this head, because most of those who think this nation has, for some time, carried on a destructive Trade, and who from thence argue for prohibitions, and against the exportation of bullion, have derived their notions from this Author, whose book contains very many fine observations, and might be seasonable at the time it was written, when the state was entering into pernicious measures; but it is evident, the gentleman's zeal against France, and his care of the public good, did give him a more melancholy idea of our affairs than he had reason to entertain.

It is strange, Xenophon, so long ago, should see that exportation of bullion, in the way of Traffic, could not be prejudicial to a country; and yet that we, who are a trading nation, should startle at it, to whom experience should have given better lights. His words are *, ‘ And whereas in other
‘ trading cities merchants are forced to barter
‘ one commodity for another, in regard their coin
‘ is not current abroad; we abound not only in
‘ manufactures and products of our own growth,
‘ sufficient to answer the demands of all foreign
‘ traders; but in case they refused to export goods
‘ in return for their own, they may trade with us
‘ to advantage, by receiving silver in exchange
‘ for them, which transported to any other market,
‘ would pass for more than they took it for at
‘ Athens.’

* Vol. I. Part I. Discourse on the Revenues of the State of Athens, p. 313.

This wise statesman, long versed in affairs, (being 80 years old when this Discourse was written) not only saw that bullion, but that coined money might be exported with safety, when a gainful return did arise from the commodity purchased.

But here it may be objected, That Athens had silver mines, and that bullion was the native product of the place, and therefore might be bartered like any other commodity, without damage to the public.

To which we answer, That nations which have a way of bringing in bullion, to answer what is carried out, are in this sense upon the same foot with countries that have mines in their possession, and that bullion becomes there a commodity like any other of its own product.

Spain is possessed of the chief silver mines, and the exportation of it was, till last year, capital by the laws, and yet the country continues poor, but the reason of this is evident.

The strict prohibition to export the species was an early bar to industry, and rendered their treasure useless to the body of the people. If it had been there allowed a commodity, as in other places, of course it must have put them upon methods of turning it to more advantage; whereas, while their hands have been bound up by their own laws, their gold and silver brought from thence by stealth, are the very tools wherewith wiser nations have wrought, and by which so much wealth has been gathered. If this mistaken policy had not at first diverted their thoughts from Trade, they might have set up manufactures of their own, and then could not have been drained so much by the manufactures of other countries; Trade would have bred them up seamen, and produced great merchant

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merchant fleets, with which they might have obtained the East-India Traffic; and by the help of that vast treasure they were masters of, they might have carried the whole commercial world before them.

The Spaniards are a people who will, the latest, quit either a good or a bad council; and it was near 200 years before they could be convinced that it was pernicious to them, to fetter up their gold and silver by laws and prohibitions, but at last they have found it out; and yet a great many among us seem desirous of taking up the measures which even Spain has laid aside, as hurtful to the public.

This notion, that our bullion should be kept at home, runs through all Mr. P——n's schemes of Trade, and it is the ground of all his rancour to the East-India Traffic.

But whoever looks carefully into the foundation of any trading country's wealth, will find it chiefly to arise from this liberty of exporting gold and silver; and it is this that has so enriched the Hollanders and Venice, Leghorn, with the other trading towns of Italy.

But here it may be objected, that these places have but small territory, and little native product of their own, so that bullion is almost the only commodity they can deal in.

To answer this objection, which is indeed material, we must look back into the original of Trade itself.

We have laid down, Vol. I. Part II. Discourse I. p. 348, ' That mankind subsisted by their labour, ' and from what the earth produced, till their corruptions brought in fraud, avarice, and force: But ' when the strong began to invade the weaker, and ' when strength was to be maintained by policy, ' they

‘ they built cities, disciplined men, and erected dominions ; and when great numbers were thus confined to a narrower space, their necessities could not be all answered by what was near them and at hand, so that they were compelled to seek for remoter helps, and this gave rise to what we call Trade, which at first was only permutation of commodities.’

This general state of the matter is peradventure undeniable ; to which we shall add, that a country, in the beginning of its establishment, may subsist for some time, without foreign aids at all ; and though it encrease in numbers, its wants, for a while, may be supplied from abroad by the vent of its own product ; but if it grows yet more populous, a more extended Trade becomes necessary than can be had from what its soil produces.

For there is doubtless a proportion of people to the quantity of acres in a country, (respect being had to the nature of the soil) beyond which the natural product of the country is not well able to maintain more.

This proportion seems to have been in England about nine acres per head ; in France ten ; and in Holland eight acres per head. And to have been the state of Holland 150 years ago ; of England about the year 1600 ; and of France about the latter end of Richlieu’s ministry : from which periods of time the necessity of Foreign Traffic seems to have been unavoidable in the three nations.

And it may be farther concluded, that as either of the three countries become more populous, their Foreign Traffic must be proportionable in some measure to the superabundance of people beyond that here taken notice of, respect being had

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had to the conveniency and natural advantages of each nation for such foreign Traffic.

And as they shall yet further advance in numbers of people, the necessity in some proportion must encrease of bartering, not only the commodities of their own country with foreign nations, but likewise those of one foreign nation with another.

There seems reason to think, that about the year 1688, there was a change made in these proportions, as the inhabitants of each country encreased; and the numbers of people at that period of time considered in England, France, and Holland, that the account might run thus; and that each people might be sustained from the rents of land, and from trade and labour, in the proportions set down in this scheme.

The people of	{	At $7\frac{1}{4}$ acres per head.
England, by	{	At 6s. 2d. per acre.
a medium,	{	At 2l. 4s. $8\frac{1}{2}$ d. per head.
The people of	{	At $9\frac{1}{2}$ acres per head.
France, by a	{	At 5s. per acre.
medium,	{	At 2l. 7s. 6d. per head.
The people of	{	At $3\frac{2}{3}$ acres per head.
Holland, by	{	At 10s. per acre.
a medium,	{	At 1l. 16s. 8d. per head.

The proportions here allotted are in no degree capable to sustain the mass of mankind together; for, upon a moderate computation, it is reckoned that, to sustain the body of the people, one with another, in food and raiment, and other conveniencies consumed or spent, reserving something by way of encrease, there is a proportion necessary, peradventure according to the following scheme:

From

	From Rents of Land.		From Trade and Labour.		Annual In- come.	
	<i>l.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>l.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>l.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>
The people of Eng- land, by a medium, per head, - - -	2	4 8½	5	13 3½	7	18 0
The people of France, by a medium, per head, - - -	2	7 6	2	3 6	4	11 0
The people of Hol- land, by a medium, per head, - - -	1	16 8	3	3 4	5	0 0

Land, as the preceding articles show, falls short in each country of furnishing this expence; from whence follows, that the remainder must come from industry and trade.

It is true, as a people encreases in numbers, meliorating of land (a consequence of such encrease) helps a little; but these improvements can by no manner of means keep pace with the natural encrease of people by procreation, which must happen in countries wisely governed, and which are not interrupted in their progressive course by great wars, plagues, or famine.

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Improvements upon land help a people to more native product for exportation; but all this will not suffice to maintain countries grown very populous, especially, if they are now and then obliged to foreign expence; upon which account the three nations here mentioned, have been naturally driven to encrease in Trade, as they have encreased in people.

The Low Countries were the first streightened in territory, and so were the first compelled to seek for the reliefs that are to be had from an extended commerce.

England encreased very much in inhabitants by the dissolution of monasteries, and by almost 100 years peace which this kingdom enjoyed, from the death of Henry VII. to the last year of Queen Elizabeth; about which time we fell into another sort of Trade than our ancestors had followed, whose smaller numbers were plentifully enough maintained by the vent of their own product.

The people of France had been very much diminished by a civil war that lasted 40 years; and having a large extent of country thinly peopled, in respect of us and the Netherlands, Trade was not so soon necessary to that kingdom as to us and Holland. But when the French had that compliment of inhabitants which of course must put a nation upon new industry (and this might be about the year 1667), they began to follow those schemes Richlieu had laid, and in earnest to think of Foreign Traffic.

England (considering the accession we have had of strangers) is very little dispeopled by the last war; and our present numbers being near the same as they were about 1688, it is very probable that in the ensuing age we shall encrease in the like proportion as heretofore; and if so, an en-

crease of Trade, proportionable to our encrease of people, will be necessary to maintain this nation in the strength and plenty we for many years enjoyed. To which may be added, (our situation and natural advantages considered) that, if our foreign business were enlarged to the utmost extent it is capable of embracing, we should thereby acquire such wealth and power, as that, in the course of no long time, England with its proper forces might be able to deal with any nation whatsoever.

The Hollanders have augmented in inhabitants since 1688, and their land being capable of little farther improvement, of consequence their industry will be yet more active than heretofore, to nourish so great a people penned up in a narrow compass; so that as their numbers will daily encrease, they must every year enlarge their Trade.

As to France, the accounts are very different concerning its present number of people; if they are so decreased by persecution of the Protestants, by the late dearth of corn, and the last war, as some affirm, there will lie no necessity upon them to enlarge their Foreign Commerce, the quantity of acres being more than sufficient for the remaining heads. But if, as others pretend, they are not these last nine years diminished above a million, that is a breach which peace will soon repair; and if their numbers happen to encrease, they must likewise augment their Trade abroad.

We have given this view of these three nations, and what seems to have been their past and present condition, to shew that there lies in a manner the same necessity upon great empires, as upon single cities and small dominions, to extend

tend and enlarge their Traffic, as they increase in people.

England is capable of receiving all the benefits that Trade can bring to any country; we have a vast native product of our own to export; the growth of our Plantations creates us business in all the European markets; the herring fishery is a new mine of treasure, which we can open when we please; and our ports at home and in Ireland, enable us to carry on the beneficial commerce of buying goods in one place to sell in another, with more safety than most nations.

France needs only to depend upon its own product, if the Author of *Britannia Languens* be right in his accounts of that kingdom's exportations; for he says, ' Besides what the French receive from all the other regions of the world, that they draw from the northern countries only, ' p. 208.

				<i>l.</i>
' By their wines,	—	—	—	2,500,000
' By their salt,	—	—	—	1,000,000
' By their brandies,	—	—	—	500,000
' By their silks, stuffs, toys and ' fripperies,	—	—	—	4,000,000
				In all, 8,000,000

If this account be true (which we are far from allowing to have ever been their case) they may gather wealth sufficient by the vent of their manufactures and materials of their own growth, without entering upon those methods of Traffic which England and the Netherlands have followed, and without cultivating Plantations or aiming at an East-India Trade, which notwithstanding we see they have attempted; and this is an argument, joined with what they have been able to export in

the last war, 1st, That their exportations were never so large, as this gentleman and other Writers have suggested; and 2dly, That as their people have encreased, they have naturally fallen into the same measures of enlarging their foreign business, as are pursued by other countries under the like circumstances; but it is probable, that neither the genius of the nation, their site nor ports will allow them the same success, in such an attempt as has attended the English and Dutch, more skilful in trade and in sea-matters.

The Hollanders, as they have a narrow extent of territory, so their native product is very small. And, as Sir Josiah Child has observed*, “ Though they thrive so exceedingly by Trade, “ they will in probability never endamage this “ kingdom by the growth of their Plantations; “ since in fact they have never much succeeded “ by planting in America.” So that to nourish those multitudes which will be still encreasing in their country, in all likelihood they will proceed to encourage their manufactures for foreign exportation; they will endeavour still to be the chief carriers of the world, as they have been for many years; and they will strengthen themselves as much as possible in the East-Indies, by sending colonies thither, and by fortifying towns and castles upon the sea-coast, to secure that commerce which will be a perpetual spring of commodities, wherewith they may deal with the European nations, and keep up their most gainful trade, of buying in one place to sell in another; by which they not only get largely by freight and breed seamen, but have a full employment for their people.

* Sir J. C. Discourse of Trade, p. 196.

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These heads have been the longer dwelt upon, only to expose their weak and narrow notions, who would run all the treasure procured by trade, into the mint; from whence all above just what is necessary, will of course, and according to late practice, be carried into the usurer's chest, where it is useless; whereas, if what is more than necessary for the kingdom's use remains in bullion, it might be a productive stock abroad; for as money that circulates at home, begets money to private men, so bullion circulating abroad, begets bullion to a country.

By what has been here advanced, we hope to have made it apparent, that there may and does lie the same necessity upon greater empires to enlarge their foreign business, as upon smaller states and dominions; and that it imports England as well as Amsterdam, Venice, Leghorn, and the other trading cities of the world, not to fetter up its treasure by laws and prohibitions, but rather give it a free course, in order to get more.

And we thought it needful to endeavour at the clearing this point, before we come more closely to handle the East-India Trade, against which carrying out the species of gold and silver has been always a principal objection.

And upon the same account we believed it proper to try, whether the balance of trade might not be set in a truer light than Mr. Pollexfen has put it; and if he has grossly erred in its general posture, he may as well be mistaken in a particular instance; especially when he asserts, that England, for a long time, did lose 400,000 *l.* per ann. by the East-India Traffic.

We have not answered his strange notions upon Trade, paragraph by paragraph, as thinking it not right, and a tedious way of arguing; but

have rather chose all along to set up a different structure, and to propose another hypothesis, humbly submitting to the public, whether of us proceeds upon grounds most fair and probable. Whatever errors the Writer of these papers has or may be guilty of, he will most willingly retract upon better information, and hopes his opposite will deal as candidly; for in points so dark and difficult, sounder heads than either of us are masters of, may very well be mistaken.

But by the way we must here take notice, that the treaty of commerce here mentioned, concluded at Ryfwick the 20th of September 1697, between France and Holland, seems only to be a preliminary, which is to be followed by some other treaty; however, the XII. article seems to give it force, or at least to put the Hollanders in a good condition, though nothing should be done hereafter. The words of the article are: "A new tarrif shall be made on both sides, according to mutual agreement, within three months; in the mean time, the tarrif of the year 1667 shall be provisionally executed; and in case a new tarrif be not agreed upon within the said term of time, the tarrif of the year 1664 shall be in force hereafter." And the English nation needs desire no more, than that our Trade with France, in all circumstances, should be upon the same foot, as it was in that year. But now it is time more closely to take in hand our present argument.

This tract may perhaps be read by some, whose curiosity may not lead them to peruse the foregoing Discourse; upon which score, or to help the reader's memory, there shall be again inserted, what (upon the best lights we can procure) we conceive might be the general state of

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Trade about 1688, to make up the two millions national profit thence arising.

	<i>l. per ann.</i>
That the Plantation Trade might bring in ———	600,000
That the East-India Trade might bring in ———	500,000
That the European, African, and Levant Trades, by our own product, might bring in ———	600,000
Ditto, by re-exports of Plantation goods, ———	120,000
Ditto, by re-exports of East-India goods, — — —	1800 0
In all,	<u>2,000,000</u>

And we shall here repeat what we said in the preceding Discourse: “ That upon a better view
 “ of the East-India Trade, than we were able to
 “ make when the Essay was written, we find that
 “ the exports to India in bullion and wares might
 “ be about 500,000 *l.* per ann. of which the returns
 “ might be about 1,800,000 *l.* whereof there might
 “ be consumed at home to the value of 1,300,000 *l.*
 “ when it comes into the second, third, or fourth
 “ hand, as shall be explained hereafter; and re-
 “ exported to Europe at least 500,000 *l.* which
 “ 500,000 *l.* may be stated as the clear gain by
 “ that Trade; and the said 500,000 *l.* exported
 “ to Europe, producing 680,000 *l.* leaves a gain
 “ of 180,000 *l.* to the Trade of Europe.”

Our meaning in this account is as follows:
 That supposing 500,000 *l.* to have been annually
 sent for some time into India, either by the com-
 pany or by interlopers (which perhaps was the
 fact); that this prime cost does not return quite

fourfold, as we had laid down before, following the generality of Writers upon this subject, but may bring back in commodities to the value of about 1,800,000*l.* not at the East-India sales, as Mr. Pollexfen misunderstands us, but when they come into the second, third, or fourth hand.

That by a medium of several years, at least to the worth of 500,000*l.* per ann. was bought up here for foreign consumption; the returns of which might be 680,000*l.* per ann. which profit of 180,000*l.* (though arising truly from the Indies) yet we think, in a general balance, should be more justly placed to the account of Europe; and that 1,300,000*l.* might be consumed at home.

In this computation, the article most liable to exception is the 180,000*l.* profit made by re-exports of East-India goods; however, it holds good, if much the greatest part was carried out by our own merchants; but if the greatest part was bought up here on the account of foreigners, without any return but money or bills, then the article of 180,000*l.* lessens proportionably; but considering the expence of other foreign commodities, which East-India goods save to England in the main, our computation will peradventure be found right.

But here Mr. Pollexfen will object, if 500,000*l.* per ann. be exported, and that this brings back but 680,000*l.* the gain can properly be but 180,000*l.* per ann.

To which we answer, That in arguing upon these matters, the whole chain of things and universal posture of affairs must be considered.

When we say this Traffic is the cause of 680,000*l.* profit to England, it is not pretended that for 500,000*l.* in bullion carried out, there

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comes regularly back every year from abroad 1,180,000*l.* and that so there is added every year 680,000*l.* in bullion to the nation. However, if the same thing be done another way, and if in the progress and whole circuit of Trade, there has been through the means and by the help of this commerce, either saved or added to the kingdom's general stock every year, to the value of 680,000*l.* our proposition is well founded. But to explain this we must look of each side us, and a little backward.

Mr. Fortrey has computed our consumption of wrought silks from France, only to amount to 600,000*l.* per ann. but suppose our imports of that commodity from all Europe, do not exceed 400,000*l.* per ann. which may be nearer the truth. Now all experienced merchants agree, that East-India goods have lowered the price at least 25 per cent. of all silks from France, Italy and Holland; and if so, there is saved to England upon that article, per ann. — — —

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100,000

Mr. Fortrey has computed our consumption of linen from France only at 400,000*l.* per ann. and we import linen from several other places. But suppose our whole import of this commodity does not exceed 400,000*l.* per ann. which may likewise be a truer estimate. Experienced merchants agree that calicoes have lowered the price of linen throughout all Europe at least

25 per cent. and if so, there is
saved to England on that article

100,000

As to what may be consumed at home,
amounting to 1,300,000*l.* in the
second, third, and fourth hands,
who all have their proportion of
gains out of what was sold at the
sales, for may be 500,000*l.* We
say, all reasonable men must agree
that commodities rising to such a
sum, did purely, in their expence
upon European goods of the like
use and nature, and partly by
enabling them to export more of
their own product, in the room of
which, these goods are consumed,
save or get to the nation

— 300,000

This, with submission to better judgments,
we take to be the general state of the case; and
if so, the account will run thus,

Bought at the sales for foreign con-	<i>l.</i> per ann.
sumption — — —	500,000
The returns of which might add to	
the European balance — — —	180,000
Saved by lowering 25 per cent. in the	
price of foreign silks — — —	100,000
Saved by lowering 25 per cent. in the	
price of foreign linens — — —	100,000
Saved in expence of foreign goods	
of the like nature, in the room of	
which East-India goods are used	200,000
Saved in the consumption of our home	
materials which these goods sup-	
ply, and whereby our exportation	
is enlarged — — —	100,000
In all,	1,180,000
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Brought forward,	1,180,000
Out of which deduct for bullion and commodities exported	— 500,000
And there remains,	680,000

Which sum of 680,000*l.* we humbly conceive the East-India Traffic did yearly either add to the stock of England, or hinder us from losing, which is one and the same thing, when the general balance of Trade comes to be computed. And upon these grounds we went in the Essay upon this subject, in the main of which the Writer finds himself confirmed by every fresh enquiry, though he has now modelled his scheme somewhat in a more particular manner, as he has procured better information.

All the accounts he has been able to obtain agree in the chief article, viz. That there was 500,000*l.* value of East-India commodities exported for consumption abroad, when the Trade flourished. As to the other inferences and deductions, it is hoped they will appear well founded to such as look into the nature of things, and contemplate the universal posture of our foreign business.

The system here offered to the public is thus: That unless there had been an addition, for some time, to the stock of England of about two millions per ann. the nation must have sunk under the expences of the last war; that two millions could not be gained from the vent of our own product; that the growth of our Plantations could yield but such a proportion of this sum; that the remainder may be reasonably concluded to have proceeded from our Traffic to the Indies; that the bulk of our exports and imports together,
which

which, in one word, may be called Trade, amounted to about ten millions per ann. that the national profit from thence arising might be 20 per cent. though the gains of particular merchants were not probably above 10 per cent.

And it is hoped we are right in the repartition now offered, and in the respective allotments, for what England gets from America, from the East-Indies, and from its European Traffic; which last article our present scheme makes amount to 100,000*l.* per ann. more than the former; which alteration we made upon having better considered the balance with France than formerly. And though objections may be made to some particulars of our hypothesis, such as enquire nicely into the matter will peradventure find, that in the whole we come very near the truth (which is all we pretend to) and that there is no material error in the substantial part of these computations.

And in relation to our present subject: If for the 500,000*l.* carried to the Indies in goods and in bullion, England partly saves abroad, and partly draws from other countries so much; and if the goods brought from thence save the expence of so much in the consumption of our own product, and thereby enlarge our exportation; all this may very well be accounted national gain.

If but for these commodities, silks and linen abroad would have been 25 per cent. dearer: if, for near a fourth part of the value, goods from the Indies were had, that answered all the use of vanities which we should have otherwise fetched from the European markets at the par; if commodities bought in India cheap, answered the use of richer materials here at home, which thereby

we

we might export, then this Trade did by so much help every where to rectify the balance. And the trite saying, "That a penny saved is a penny got," holds full as well in national concerns as in domestic business.

We conceive the general state of the case to be thus, That when the Trade flourished, there might be exported in bullion and in goods, to the value of about 500,000 *l.* per ann. that this yielded at the first hand, and in the sales, about a million; that 500,000 *l.* per ann. was bought for foreign, and 500,000 *l.* for our home consumption; that out of the million is to be deducted the company's expences abroad and at home, which are at least 100,000 *l.* per ann. There is likewise to be deducted for losses at sea a very large sum, when reckoned by a medium of any number of years; there is also to be deducted for freight and for the king's customs; and all this together may reduce the gain made abstractedly by the company, to a sum not at all invidious. That the 500,000 *l.* sold for home-consumption, when it comes into the second hand, viz. the first buyer at the sale, and the third and fourth hands, who are the retailers and improvers, viz. painters, stainers, printers, embroiderers, flourishers, raisers and fitters, and so to the last consumer, may come to about 1,300,000 *l.* which is a profit to the nation, though not strictly a national profit.

That there was 500,000 *l.* per ann. exported one year with another for foreign consumption, when the Trade flourished, we have the authority of most who have either thought or writ upon this matter. Sir William Petty, (*Pol. Arith.* p. 84.) values the saltpetre, pepper, calicoes, diamonds, drugs and silks, brought out of the East-Indies above what was spent in England, at 800,000 *l.*

800,000*l.* per ann. And the Writer of these papers has in his hands a general estimate of the Trade of England, made the 14th January 1698 by a very nice computer, in a considerable station in the customs, who values the former exports of East-India goods at 500,000*l.* per ann. by a medium.

Having endeavoured to set the balance of Trade in a truer light, and that to export bullion is not so fatal as some imagine; and having made it appear that there lies a necessity upon great empires, as well as upon smaller dominions, to extend their Traffic; and having shewn how much our commerce to the Indies did probably contribute to rectify this balance, and upon the whole to put it of our side; we shall now proceed to examine what methods, in all likelihood, will most certainly tend to enlarge the Trade, and preserve it to this kindom.

Whenever the East-India Trade comes to be seriously considered, two points perhaps will appear very evident to such as employ their thoughts upon matters of this nature.

1st, That it must have at home a constitution not defective, but sound and wisely ordered, and such a one as may invite the people to venture largely in it; for if but a few embark there, and that fearfully and with a sparing hand, other nations with a greater stock will force it to take another course, and bring it into their channels, and a Trade once lost is hardly by any skill to be recovered.

2dly, Its constitution must be such as to be able to protect itself abroad; for two adventurers in a foreign country will deal upon very unequal terms, where one is strong enough to compete

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justice from the natives, and where the other can only beg or buy it.

The question therefore will be, which form or constitution will best answer these ends? And which way the Trade will be most enlarged, and best preserved and protected, either by laying it open to the whole people under a regulated company, or by managing it with a joint stock, as they have done for many years in England and Holland?

They who are for a regulated company, desire that the whole people should have liberty to deal to those parts, only under such rules and restrictions as the law shall establish.

They who are for a joint stock, mean that a company should be fixed, with certain powers and immunities, exclusive of all others.

To establish a regulated company will be plausible and popular; for men do not love to be restrained from the exercise of any power, though they are certain never to make use of it with any advantage to themselves.

But there seems good reason to fear, that a regulated company will not invite into the Trade so large a sum of money, as may be brought in by adventurers in a joint stock; that such a form will be inconsistent with the nature of this Traffic; that it will so weaken us in the Indies, as that the Hollanders in a convenient season may exclude us from those countries. These points, fairly handled and impartially stated, will set the matter in a true light, and shew what measures may be taken, with most safety, in this present juncture.

There is no doubt to be made, but if a regulated company were established, as is proposed, the first three or four years very large adventures would

would be made, and many ships might perhaps be sent thither; for it is our nature to run eagerly into new things: But when all these buyers resort to the market abroad, we must expect the price of goods will rise in some proportion; and where each dealer has a private interest of his own to follow, we have reason to believe they will bid one upon the other, as they are guided by the hopes of profit.

From whence must follow, that when these adventurers return with their goods to the European markets, they must be underfold by the Dutch, who shall have bought at a more easy and a better governed rate; for in the Indies the Dutch can have the price enhanced upon them but by us, we by them, and by one another, so that they shall deal only at a single, and we at a double disadvantage.

It is true, that the multitude of traders may make the India goods, for some time, cheaper here at home; but our own consumption being probably but about a half of what we bring from thence, and the largest national profit arising from what we sell abroad, and not from what we consume at home, we are to put the Trade in such a posture, that we may be able to supply our neighbours, and to sell cheap in foreign markets.

If, by disagreement among the merchants, the goods shall become dear to the first buyer, or if losses should happen at sea by storms or from an enemy; or suppose that by a prosperous Trade, a great glut of these goods should be imported into England, in any of these cases, if the first adventurers should be disappointed of the gain which they promised to themselves, it will bring a disreputation upon the Traffic, and discourage others from engaging in it.

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It is not a great sum, employed two or three years in this Trade, must preserve it to the kingdom; nor can the nation in general reap advantage by the fortunes which a few merchants may raise to themselves by skill and good conduct.

But it is a large treasure running in this channel with a constant and continued course, that must enrich England, and not a few ventures made by starts at random, and in an unsettled manner.

If the public can have assurance, such as will bring conviction at first sight, that 1,500,000*l.* will be employed as much to the nation's profit by a regulated company, as it may be under a joint stock, and this for a long tract of time without interruption, the parliament will have reason to listen to those who desire it, because it will be pleasing to the people, that all should be upon an equal foot in a gainful Traffic.

Perhaps, under such a settlement of the East-India Trade, men would venture largely, and our merchants might agree abroad, and not be discouraged at home by losses; but all this is only presumption, and no one can well affirm, that this is sure to happen; nor can a wise government upon such reasonings grounded, may be upon interest, take any measure, or form any resolution.

But there are strong objections to such an establishment, arising from the nature of the Trade itself; which will appear plainly to such as have considered the manners of the people, and form of government in those eastern countries.

The Mogul generally resides in the inmost part of his empire, worshipped, and now, in an extreme old age, rarely seen by his own subjects; much less can strangers have access to him, upon any injury or oppression.

The distant provinces (chiefly the sea-coasts where our dealings lie) are ruled with absolute command, by Rajas and Nabobs, who are generally his sons or near kinsmen; the native wealth of the place is such, that the prince need not court Foreign Trade, which must court him; and this makes his governors rapacious and insolent.

The common people are heathens, and retain much of the ancient virtue and morality; but the chief ministers of state, and the lieutenants of the empire, are Mahometans, and seasoned with all the fraud, pride and avarice of the European nations.

The greatness of the monarchy is such, and so flattered by the subjects, that no prince can make any alliance there, upon equal terms, nor have his ambassadors treated with due respect among them.

These considerations have obliged all nations that trade thither, to take in places of strength either by force or agreement; for whatever prince deals with a nation so remote, that war cannot be made in case of injury, must either have hostages from thence, or cautionary towns put into his hands, for the security of his people; and such we may reckon those forts and castles, which we now possess in the Indies; nor in all likelihood, can England carry on this Trade, without such pledges for our safety.

And they do not only serve for protection against the natives, but are the magazines in which our factors lay up such commodities as they buy at convenient seasons, and there we have our naval stores, and under them we can retire in case of danger from any European enemy; and in them chiefly we must place our hopes, upon any revolution or civil war that may happen, and which

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which is expected after the death of the present emperor.

The Pepper Trade now remaining to us, is preserved by fortifications we have erected in the island of Sumatra, and in the queen of Attinga's country on the coast of Malabar, in both which places the Dutch have likewise forts and colonies; it is true, the Pepper Trade does in no wise answer the expence; but if we should quit it, the Dutch will have the sole vending of that commodity, and may put what price they please upon it; and the monopoly of a thing so much in use, would be much more gainful to them, than their herring fishery; for we see to what a price they have raised nutmegs, cinnamon, mace and cloves, by having sole possession of the spice islands.

We have Fort St. George and the city of Madraspatan, which gives us the command over 100,000 people, and Fort St. David's on the coast of Coromandel; we have likewise the island of Bombay, near Surat; all which places create us an interest in the country, and by them we raise customs and duties upon the Indians, amounting in the whole to near 40,000 *l.* per ann.

The question therefore will be, in case of a regulated Trade, whether these forts and places of strength shall be preserved or slighted?

If it be not thought convenient to quit such holds, who must purchase them of the present company upon their dissolution? Will a stock be raised to that purpose, among the new adventurers? And in what proportion shall each adventurer be rated towards it? And who shall rate and determine these proportions? Shall the first adventurers do it by a pound-rate upon their exported goods, and reimburse themselves for their first cost, by a pound-rate upon succeeding Traders? In what proportion shall each adven-

turer pay towards the maintaining these garrisons? And where shall they be rated in England or in India?

Must each ship have a particular factor? Or grant that one may execute many commissions, with what honesty will they be performed in so remote a country?

Suppose our ships should continue to make depredations upon the Indian coasts, and seize their junks or trading vessels, as Every the pirate and others have done: Can loose adventurers, without discipline, power or command, in the country, hinder or punish such a fact? And will not all goods indifferently be seized for reparation of such an injury?

Some will pretend to answer these objections, by affirming these forts and castles may be slighted, and that, according to the model of the Turkey Company, this Trade may be governed and managed by a treaty of commerce with the Mogul, and by an ambassador residing at his court.

Such a scheme or model might perhaps save expence, and be advisable, if the cases were at all parallel, if the countries were no more distant one than the other, if the forms and constitutions of government were alike in each place; and lastly, there may be peradventure no danger for us to quit our forts, if the Hollanders would be contented to slight theirs.

The Turks, though accounted a barbarous people, are not ignorant of the strength, power and interest of the Christian Princes, of which the Indians as yet have but little knowledge.

There are always at the Porte divers ambassadors, who, in case of injury, are ready to mediate or represent, and to give one another mutual help and assistance, which can never happen at the Mogul's court. The Sultan and his Ministers

know that Christian Princes can league together, and in case of wrong or injury to their merchants, revenge themselves by incursions into his land, or by capture of his ships; and they are sensible the imperial city itself is liable to be insulted from the sea; all which the Mogul has no occasion to apprehend.

England and Constantinople are not so distant, but in case of oppression complaints may be made, and redress had in a few months, which under three years cannot be dispatched in India.

The Turkey Company deals principally but with three cities, Constantinople, Smyrna and Aleppo. The East-India merchants have several factories, some in countries whose Princes are sovereign, but tributary to the Mogul, to which the several Rajas are not much inferior: And if we pretend to manage this Trade by virtue of an alliance to be made, we must have distinct treaties with these Princes, and a Minister at all their courts.

Bonds, pacts, and agreements, would be of no value among private men, but for that coercive power which the law has to compel both parties to performance.

As the laws are wont to decide those disputes which happen between private persons, so, in case of difference, war determines between Princes.

As contracts would be vain and ineffectual where no law could be had, so a treaty of commerce and alliances would be absurd and fruitless between Princes, who, in case of a breach, are so distant, that they cannot make war the one upon the other.

But admit an alliance were made, and that there should be in the Indians a disposition to observe it with all faith and integrity; are we yet

safe? And have we not still reason to apprehend the Hollanders?

In the spice islands, where they have forts, and we have none, they do not allow us to have any dealing. Our places of strength give us hitherto a share with them in the Pepper Trade; but if by any fatal counsel we should be induced to slight those holds, will the Dutch give us better quarter than they have done in other places? Will they not quite exclude us also from those parts, and engross that commodity wholly to themselves? Commonwealths do seldom forego any advantage: And a commonwealth, consisting chiefly of merchants, may perhaps think any thing just and lawful that will so much encrease their power and riches.

It is true, we have not reason to apprehend such usage from allies who have been so faithful to us; but circumstances may alter, and wise governments are to provide against the remotest accidents.

If we quit our places of strength in India, is there not reason to think the French, Scots, Danes, Brandenburgers, or some other people, will take possession of them?

If our neighbours the Hollanders are willing to slight their forts, both nations will be indeed upon a more equal foot; but if not, these, among many other inconveniencies and dangers, may be expected:

I. When we have lost our strength, we shall probably lose our interest, since power is the only thing that is looked upon and valued in those barbarous countries; and they who want it, must be sure to pay largely when they ask for justice.

II. Our merchants will be eaten out with demurrage, when they shall have no magazines in
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which they can safely store Indian goods, to be bought against the arrival of their ships.

III. There must be 10 per cent. difference at least between laying up commodities at proper seasons, and buying them in a hurry just when the ships arrive.

IV. If we have no magazines there for naval stores, upon any necessity we must purchase them of the Dutch at their own rates.

V. Upon any civil war or disturbance in the country, we must be protected by the Dutch; or if any enemy, with whom we may be at war hereafter, come upon that coast, we must retire under their forts; in both which cases our Trade will be precarious.

VI. If there should be a breach between England and Holland, which is not impossible to happen hereafter, it will be in their power to seize our effects, and to exclude us for ever from those countries.

VII. If no rupture should happen, they may notwithstanding embroil us with the Indians, stop our ships, interrupt our voyages, insult us, spoil our markets, and seize our goods; and in any of these cases we can have no redress, but to complain, by tedious embassies, in Holland: All which is inconsistent with the nature of a remote Traffic, and must make it in time be abandoned by the merchants.

Several things look well in notion, which cannot be reduced to practice: We can see the errors of any present constitution, and either mend them or let them go on, if they be not such as may bring damage to the Public: But no human foresight can provide against, and reach all the mischiefs with which a new frame may be attended.

The well-governing a people is what has most employed the thoughts of men, and yet no politic institution was ever perfect: Upon which score the wisest rulers have always desired to tread in the old path, to follow ancient customs, and to observe those methods in their proceedings which have been approved of by longest experience.

England and Holland have hitherto managed the East-India Trade by way of a joint-stock, by which the wealth and strength of many are guided by the care and wisdom of a few, and so great a matter is governed by united councils.

This form of management has been for a long time successful to both nations; and though perhaps defective in many parts, it seems notwithstanding liable to fewer objections than any scheme that can be readily proposed.

New schemes of governing any matter are always to be suspected, nor can it be safe to unhinge a settled Trade; besides, such as claim an interest in this Traffic, under the present constitution, have a great deal of equity in their case: Their great losses deserve pity, and did not proceed from any fault of theirs, and without such losses their stock had been double its present value; they are in possession of a charter (framed according to most of the regulations prescribed by Parliament) which they have not forfeited; by virtue of this grant, and as it were under protection of a vote of the House of Commons, some hundreds of new adventurers are come into the old stock, and a great sum of money was raised, which as yet has brought no return of profit: They have an undoubted right to the forts and places of strength abroad, they are in the track of the business: The faults and errors in their conduct or constitution may be sooner mended, than a new

new model can be framed: And lastly, a change in this matter is peradventure not seasonable, unless we were in such a certain condition of strength as to struggle with all the mischiefs and dangers it may occasion.

For if a regulated company should not fall readily into their geers; if the want of species and deadness of credit cause but few ships to be fitted out; if any disputes should arise concerning the price or possession of the forts abroad; if thereupon any quarrels should happen in India; if, for want of skill and experience, there should be a general misgovernment in this affair, under a new constitution, which is very probable; our neighbours, who have a quick eye upon our errors, and lie ready to take all advantages, may, during any of the forementioned disorders, engross the whole Trade, and exclude England from the Indies.

Upon the whole matter, it does seem evident enough, that this Trade cannot be preserved by an alliance and treaty of commerce with the Indians; that forts and places of strength are essential to its preservation and protection; that these forts cannot be conveniently held and maintained by adventurers under a regulated company; that a regulated company may set the Trade so loose at home and so weaken it abroad, as to endanger its utter loss; and, that to manage it with a joint stock, seems most for the good of this kingdom.

The principal rivals in this fair mistress are the English and Dutch; it is true, that by our coldness and neglect, we have well nigh lost her kindness, which the Hollanders have gained by diligence and warmer application; the Scots, Danes, and Brandenburgers, are suiters at a distance; and France stands by, subtle, insinuating, and liberal,

beral, ready either to court or to force a favour.

All Trades have such a mutual dependence, and are so linked together, that the loss of one will, of necessity, bring decay upon all the rest.

The East-India Trade has extended and enlarged our concerns and interest abroad, begot new traffics to us; and (as we have shown) this Commerce, with the growth of the West-India Plantations, have principally contributed to put of our side the general balance between us and other countries; from whence follows, that we shall be confined to a very narrow compass, and must no more pretend to the dominion of the sea, if by ill conduct, in these two important branches, we should be reduced to deal only in our native product and home manufactures.

A country that has no fortified towns, and but few places of strength, will be exposed to frequent invasions, unless it has a great standing army (which will be thought dangerous to liberty) or a great fleet at sea; which, without infinite expence, is never to be compassed but by the help of Trade. So that there seems to lie a necessity upon us of cultivating and improving our Plantations, and of taking all right measures whereby the East-India Trade may be preserved to England.

But there will arise a question, whether this is any way to be brought about, unless it can receive more encouragement, and unless there be given to it some better existence in the law.

The present constitution of the new charter seems too narrow, and not ample and firm enough, and not to have powers sufficient to support the Trade upon an equal foot with our neighbours; nor probably will the people think it in a right condition, till they see it well established
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and become the care of the whole legislative authority.

The East-India company had flourished in this kingdom upwards of 30 years, and went on increasing from time to time; but not long since, either because their charter had its foundation only in the regal power, and for that some of their goods were thought to hinder the consumption of our own manufactures; and because it was seen what they really carried out, by those who did not enough consider what bullion their effects brought hither in return; and because there might be heretofore some ill government in their affairs, this Trade has lately been looked upon with an evil eye by many people.

And few great things being able to bear a narrow search, subsisting more by fame and credit than by any real strength, their weak part was presently discerned, till at last the validity of their constitution and charter came to be called in question; upon which the interlopers presuming, gave them disturbance both at home and in India.

No sooner had this happened, but men, suspecting their condition, called in from thence their money; their actions lessened, and by that anger and discountenance they found every where, the Company grew dispirited and disheartened, and had not the courage to enlarge their stock; and for want of stock they could not send out such a number of ships as were needful for their Trade, and necessary to form and compose such a strength as might enable them to return with safety to England; by which the original design of the government, in making them a corporation, came to be disappointed; for it was thought from the beginning, that nothing but a joint stock could produce such a joint force, as might be able to preserve

preserve the Traffic safe against pirates or foreign enemies, in so long a voyage.

And after many debates, their business was transmitted to the regal authority, which was desired by the House of Commons to put it under some regulation; but by the scope of these debates, it did not appear to be their sense (nor perhaps could it be done by any single part of the constitution) that a charter should be granted with such ample authorities as may be requisite for supporting so great a Trade, and which ought to have many liberties and privileges, and some sounder existence in the law, by being established by act of Parliament, to invite to it such a sum as will be wanting to carry on this Traffic with lasting safety and certain advantage.

And this Traffic having turned a great proportion of the 10 millions we were commonly esteemed to have running in the stock of Trade, its having received so many shocks and disorders both abroad and at home, must certainly have wrought very bad effects in our whole commerce, whose several branches hang together, and depend so much the one upon the other; and in the decay of this particular branch, perhaps may be found the reasons for part of that overbalance which lay upon us during the late war. For to give only one instance: If the five last ships that were taken had come home safe, the goods with which they were freighted, according to all estimation, would have yielded 1,200,000 *l.* of which half would probably have been exported, and by consequence we should have had to pay just 600,000 *l.* less in other countries; for the commerce of money, by exchange, goes in a circle; and a debt in Flanders may be paid by commodities sold in Spain or Italy. And if this Trade had proceeded in its usual course, a

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great part of that money the war carried out, might still have remained within the kingdom.

Now to bring what has been here said to bear in our present argument, this Trade being one principal branch of our commerce, and importing those commodities to England, that either fetch bullion or hinder its going out; and being by several accidents reduced to a low ebb and into bad circumstances, and the misfortunes under which it has for some time laboured, seeming to arise from a defect in its constitution; it must certainly concern the united wisdom of the nation to give it a better form, and to put it upon a more certain foot.

And if it cannot be well and safely managed but by a joint stock, and if this joint stock cannot be sufficiently enlarged without some better existence in the law; and if, as is probable, more powers would invite in more stock, supposing a larger stock requisite, it must follow, that it will be worth consideration whether it may not be necessary, and for the public good, to establish the East-India Trade by act of Parliament.

Mr. Pollexfen says *, “ That the Dutch yet “ never sent out $\frac{1}{7}$ th part so much bullion to the “ East-Indies as we.” And though he be mistaken here, as in most other of his computations, it is however agreed, that they carry less thither, and that they have managed the Trade with more national advantage than England has hitherto done, as he says, “ By trading with their ships, “ spices, and goods in those parts, and bringing “ home what thus got for the European markets.” But let him consider, whether this does not proceed from the nature of their constitution.

* England and East-India inconsistent, &c. p. 37.

The original stock of the Dutch was 600,000*l.* sterl. and this in 1602, and some Writers say, it was made up near three millions sterl. in 1608. Their company was almost coëval with the state itself; it was established by the government, and has been all along one of the principal objects of its care; its members are composed of the best and ablest heads of the country; they have been contented with little dividends, suffering the growing profit to be laid out in such improvements as might for ever secure the Trade to their nation: But this they were enabled to do from the stability and strength of their original constitution. Their having such a firm existence in the laws, encouraged them so to enlarge their stock, and to forego immediate gain, in prospect of future advantage; for they were all the while improving a sure inheritance, and not laying out money to better a disputable or a precarious title; their interest stands on as good a basis as the government itself: And upon this foundation they have expended so many millions to advance and perpetuate their interest in the Indies.

They have sent thither large colonies, erecting strong castles, and fortifying towns; so that they are become there another and a very potent people, under a good polity, with safe harbours, and in most places well defended against the natives: And it is by the strength of this constitution, into which they were put from the beginning of their dealings thither, that their Company has been enabled to carry on a twofold Trade, viz. from coast to coast in the country, and from India into Europe.

But if they had not been betimes formed into a powerful body, they could never have kept possession of the Spice-Islands, nor of those places

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where pepper grows; upon which commodity their Coast Trade depends, and whereby they are enabled to carry on the bulk of this Traffic with less exportation of bullion.

As the validity of their settlement did induce the first adventurers to embark largely in this business, so it has encouraged their successors to pursue measures and counsels that tend to a national advantage. But if their first establishment had been unsound, precarious, litigated, subject to every popular fury, and always in danger to be overthrown, such a transient and momentary constitution would have only looked upon the present gain, without consulting the common welfare of their country.

How comes it to pass that, since their original incorporation, the Dutch East-India Company have been contented with such small dividends? Do not all men agree, that this proceeds from letting the profits of the stock go to improvement of their capital in the Indies? It would exceed all belief, if we should set down what they are reported to have laid out in fortifying Ceylon and other places. So thrifty and wise a people would never have done this without sufficient reason, and unless they had been convinced it would turn at last to some account. They prudently foresaw from the beginning that a joint stock was necessary; upon which account they incorporated into one constitution the Seven Chambers of the Seven Provinces, which before traded apart: They found that the general Traffic would be rendered more national by a Coast Trade, but that it could not be carried on without settling in the country, without a sure footing there, nor unless they had good harbours, and strong places of abode and retreat,

treat, by which, upon any emergency, they might be protected from the natives.

To compass this, they have used all possible arts, and spared no expence. It is said they maintained one person at Bantam for about 20 years, who lived very high and kept a fine house, pretending to be there only for intelligence; but his true business was (as appeared afterwards) to watch a good opportunity of seizing the place, which he did by bringing down the forces of Batavia to dispossess the English, to assist the young Prince, and put him in possession of the kingdom: And, it is credibly reported, they did something like this at Macasser.

And lately a Raja, rebelling in Bengal, plundered the whole country towards the Bay, and had ravaged the English Factory at Chuttanutte, and taken all the Company's effects, had he not been stopped in his career by the English fortifications. The Hollanders took hold of this occasion to fortify at Hughley, and have done it so effectually that they declare for themselves; and are so strong, as not to apprehend any thing the Mogul or natives can attempt against them. Hughley is a great town lying on the river Ganges, which, by their fortifications, the Dutch now command. Chuttanutte lies on the same river, nearer the sea; but though it could resist a sudden incursion, it is but a small place, and the works not of strength sufficient to withstand any formal siege of a great army.

They think no cost too much in making regular fortifications wherever they can, thereby to secure themselves and their Trade: And by this warlike posture they are in, they have it in their power to interrupt the Trade of other Europeans.

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Having set forth by what measures and methods the Hollanders have probably secured and carried on their Coast-Trade, which Mr. Pollexfen, with good reason, says, "Has rendered the general Traffic a more national advantage to them than peradventure it has been to us, though (as we have shown) England has been a large gainer by it;" we shall now go on to examine whether our affairs there are not to be put upon a foot as profitable to this kingdom.

If their success has chiefly proceeded from the validity of their settlement; if thereupon their stock has been enlarged to the utmost the Trade will bear; if a sound constitution has encouraged the adventurers not so much to respect immediate gain as future advantage; if it has invited and enabled them to make such expences as may render them safe abroad, which has put them in a capacity to carry on a Coast-Trade; why may not the establishment of an East-India Company in England, by act of Parliament, have the same effect?

Mr. Dampier has shown, That it is not impracticable for us to have Spice Islands as well as our neighbours, and to come in with them for a share in that rich commodity.

But admit such a design should meet with great opposition and difficulties insuperable, yet, considering the vast extent of those countries, and the different degrees of latitude they lie under, it is no remote fancy at all to imagine, that we may carry on a Coast-Trade, not the same, but almost as profitable, by the single help of our own manufactures.

The use of our cloth obtains very much in Persia; it is not impossible to find ways of giving it vent in Tartary. Time and industry may open

us a passage to Japan, which country being of large extent, very wealthy and full of people, and lying far northward, might alone, as it is generally believed, take off great quantities of our English manufactures. We may get larger entrance into the Trades of Cochin-China and China, by factories at Tywan, Tonqueen, Amoy, and other places; nor would a company, established on a firm basis, be frightened at the expences which experiments, discoveries, and settling new trades, must without doubt occasion, when they shall have a prospect of recommending themselves to the nation by an attempt so much for the public good, as the design would be of promoting the consumption of our woollen manufactures in those climates, which are not quite so warm as the other regions of India. So that our commodities may get footing in those parts two ways, our finer cloths may further obtain in Persia and China, where our scarlets and draperies begin already to be in request; and the worser sort, and stuffs (which will promote the expence of our long and coarser wool) may find a market in North Tartary, Japan, and other countries.

It is very evident to such as have considered of this matter, that our woollen manufacture is capable of great improvement; but to make it a more national profit, the way must certainly be to promote a larger exportation, and a greater consumption of it, in foreign countries.

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The value of the wool yearly shorn in England, viz. about 12 millions of fleeces, by a medium, at 3*s.* 4*d.* per fleece, or 1*l.* 8*s.* per tod, at 12*d.* per pound, and above eight fleeces to the tod, may probably be about 2,000.000.

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What the worth of this wool may be when manufactured, is hardly capable of any computation, because the commodities into which it is wrought are of such different value.

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But suppose our yearly exports (not including gold and silver) to be about 3,000,000 *l.* there are reasons to think that our woollen manufactures are above $\frac{2}{3}$ ds of this exportation, and consequently amount to

2,000,000

Now suppose, by a general medium, that the material is improved, one with another, fourfold in the workmanship, the value of the woollen manufacture made here then amounts

to — — — — 8,000,000

Deduct for exportation — — 2,000,000

Consumed then at home — — 6,000,000

But if, partly by the use of a cheaper material here at home, and partly by enlarging our stock of sheep, (which a quick market for wool would certainly occasion) we could be enabled to export every year yet greater quantities of our woollen manufactures, more than now to all parts, (besides paying for the materials consumed at home in their stead) such exports would bring a yearly superlucration to the kingdom of a mighty sum.

Though wool be the general concern of England, there is nothing in which some men are more mistaken. And let Mr. Pollexfen say what he pleases, we think ourselves able to maintain, That the public of this country can by no manner of means be understood to get so much by what of

this commodity is consumed in the nation, as by what is carried to foreign markets: And that our industry would be better employed in finding out ways by which its expence abroad may be encreased, than in contriving, by prohibitions and unnatural methods, to force a Trade at home.

That wool should bear a good price, is most certainly the interest of the landed man; but then this must come in some natural course; for suppose that by a rot of sheep, its value should be advanced to 2 s. per pound, would this make for the interest of land? Most certainly not; no more than to have wheat brought from 30 s. to 3 l. per quarter, by blights or an ill season. But it would be well for land here, if a dearth abroad should occasion such a call for our grain as to bring it to that price. In the same manner, whatever value foreign consumption puts upon the woollen manufacture, is natural and good for England. But in relation to our own expence, without doubt, it must be the interest of this kingdom to have wool bear such a moderate price as may not discourage the working it; and that being wrought up, it may come so cheap to foreign markets, that other countries may not be able to undersell us, by which its future vent must be lessened.

But here Mr. Pollexfen will urge *, “ That our “ woollen goods are already a drug beyond sea.” To which may be answered, That very often in Germany, Holland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Turkey, and in the West-Indies, our woollen manufactures are scarce, and therefore sold very dear, and that much more of them would go off, if they were upon the place, and that yet greater

* England and East-India inconsistent, &c. p. 21.

quantities

quantities of them might be vended, if we could afford them cheaper.

Perhaps, indeed, the markets abroad are sufficiently supplied with the finer sort of draperies; but it is the interest of the landed man that this manufacture should be put upon such a foot, as that more wool may be expended; and that such a sort of cloth may be vended, as may consume our own as well as Spanish wool. It is true, we get by the manufacture of this commodity; but something that will promote the consumption of our own material would be most important to us. An account of the fine drapery may not be unacceptable to the reader, which we have procured from a very skilful hand, and is as follows:

From 25th December 1687, to the 25th December 1688.

	Pieces.
Exported Spanish cloths from the out-ports, — — — —	614
From the port of London, — —	8,420
	9,034
Consumed in England, about — —	10,000
Total of fine cloth made in England, —	19,034

It is true, the manufactures lately set up of crapes, serges, stuffs, &c. have consumed great quantities of the long wool: But there may arise a question, whether it would not be a more national profit that this wool should be converted to other uses, and made into coarser cloths and stuffs for the markets abroad, and at such a price as might discourage the manufacture in other places. And this way of employing the wool, would give it a

price, as well profitable to the kingdom in general, as to the landed interest; it being a most undeniable truth, that a rise in its value of 1*d.* per pound, proceeding from foreign expence, does more enrich the body of the nation, than a rise of 3*d.* per pound, occasioned only by our own consumption.

It is so rich and noble a material, and capable of such improvement, as that it may be turned a hundred ways to encrease the wealth and Trade of England.

And considering the vast extent of territory in those countries, their different climates, their riches, and how well many of those regions are peopled, we cannot help being of opinion, that by a good settlement of the Trade, by industry and good conduct, there may be procured a far greater consumption of our woollen goods every year, in the nations beyond the Line.

And if this could be brought about, we might carry on our Trade there with as much national advantage as the Hollanders have done; at least by such a course of proceeding we shall need to export less bullion. And considering the vast expence they are at in keeping their possession of the Spice Islands, peradventure it may be affirmed, that the East-India Trade may be rendered more profitable to England than it has ever been to Holland.

It is true, a great part of their importations into Europe are, in a manner, returns of the country's growth, viz. pepper, cinnamon, cloves, and nutmegs, but some of these spices are a burthen upon their entire dealings there; and the expences of both sides balanced, if we could carry thither our own manufactures, our gain in the whole would perhaps be found superior.

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Not only our draperies, coarse and fine, may obtain in those regions, but our other manufactures and commodities may be there introduced, with which we may purchase the goods of one country for the use of another, and so carry on a Coast Traffic; till at last, in the circuit of Trade, a large part of the goods brought from thence shall become the return of our own exportations.

But this is not to be compassed without sufficient powers, and but by great application and industry, in time, and by degrees: So great a national benefit must be the result of patience, and of councils that look forward a great way, and which more regard future good than the present advantage.

If the East-India Trade can be put upon such a foot, all its adversaries will be silenced, the clamours of exporting bullion will be at an end, and who would complain that Persia or Indian silks were worn here, if they were the return of English cloth; and when the value of five pounds sent thither brings back what yields to some persons or other eighteen pounds in England?

But no wise man can imagine, that an undertaking of this vast extent and compass, where the expence will be sure and the profit doubtful, can be proceeded upon by a Company who shall have an uncertain foundation and a precarious charter.

Can it be worth the while of any society of merchants to attempt discoveries, to endeavour the settling of new Trades with distant nations, and to alter the whole course of their affairs for the public good, when they are either every year in danger of being ruined themselves, or liable at every turn to have their whole projections defeated?

A Company may send out manufactures and commodities, but an interloper may go with ready bullion and spoil their markets. They may, at their great expence, lay the foundations of some Trade, which may turn to the account of England 20 years after; but long before they themselves can reap any fruits of their labour and expence, their charter may be questioned, and perhaps destroyed.

What encouragement can they have to enlarge their Trade, so as to embrace a more ample Traffic, when every season a fleet of interlopers may be fitted out, who shall bring home such a glut of goods as will depreciate all their commodities, and consequently reduce their actions to peradventure a half in value.

How can a society of merchants have large minds, and expatiate their thoughts for great and public undertakings, whose constitution is subject to such frequent changes, and who every year run the risk of their capital?

The East-India Company have expended vast sums in preserving the Pepper Trade on all parts of Sumatra, and on the Malabar coast, at the factories and settlements of Carwar, Callicut, Tellichery, Anjenge, and Retorah, the first and fourth of which places are fortified; and they have laid out upwards of 100,000 *l.* in attempts of settling factories and new trades with several nations of that country: And particularly, about the year 167 $\frac{1}{2}$, they lost 50,000 *l.* in their attempt of making a settlement at Japan, which, if it had succeeded, must have proved an unspeakable advantage to this kingdom; and it had been compassed, but that our neighbours represented King Charles II. to be married to a Portugueze, a nation which they hate; but the prejudice thereby,
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and through other misrepresentations conceived, may be in time removed. Such disappointments and losses they must frequently meet with, and be able to bear, who consult future benefit, and to render a Trade nationally good. They must plant one year, that from which, peradventure, they must expect no fruit till next age. They must lay designs to ripen hereafter; and often sow, with a liberal hand, what posterity must reap; which any society will be encouraged to do, that is upon a solid foundation.

That immortality which human kind has in view, has been the cause of all the great and noble things that have been at any time performed: Before revealed religion, we placed the hopes of it in the fame to be acquired by virtuous actions; but since we have been enlightened better, the prospect of another world has been the principal incitement to all the good that remains among us. This hope runs through all our deeds and designs whatsoever. Laws are contrived, and politic institutions are erected, through an opinion, that by skill at first, and afterwards by a long series of wisdom, governments may be rendered immortal. We build strong houses in prospect, that, at worst, the time of death is uncertain, and that life may be extended to a great length. Large estates and titles are acquired with much labour and hazard in view, that our posterity may continue on the earth many ages. But if the life of man were as short as that of some animals, it is a question (notwithstanding human reason) whether we should have any more laws, polity, arts, designs, or contrivance, than flies or summer insects.

What has been here said, holds generally in all human affairs, and by consequence in our present
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argument: So that no society of trading men can bring about any great thing for the common good, who think themselves but in a precarious and momentary possession of their rights and privileges.

And it is upon these grounds and principles, that we offer to public consideration, whether it may not be advisable, and for the interest of England to settle the East-India Trade by the legislative authority, for such a term of time, and upon such conditions, as shall be thought fair, equal and reasonable, by the united wisdom of the nation.

We are far from presuming to lay down any scheme about this matter; and the aim of all these papers being only to give some little hints for abler heads to work upon, we shall go no further than to say, that for a good establishment for a certain term of time, it may turn to their account who are concerned in this Trade, to advance upon such a fund as shall be agreed upon, a considerable sum of money, either towards clearing some branch of the King's revenue, in order to come at a present fund for the civil list, or to pay off some of the debts that press hardest on the government.

The public engagements considered, and the impositions that lie already upon most commodities both of foreign growth and of our home product examined, it will be very difficult to find out materials which may be the proper object of a new imposition. And such as maturely weigh the present circumstances of this kingdom, will peradventure be of opinion, that to establish this Trade by authority of parliament, in consideration of a loan to be made, may deserve to be thought on among the other Ways and Means

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of raising money; for upon strict enquiry it will perhaps be found, that hardly any other method of bringing in a ready sum can be proposed, which will lie with so little weight upon the whole body of the people: So that by taking this course, in all probability, two very important points will be gained at one and the same time; that is, the public will be supplied with a large sum in an easy manner, and one of the principal branches of our Foreign Traffic will thereby be secured to England.

A Company thus protected and countenanced by the state, would have more credit at home, make a better figure abroad, and be abler to contend with the wealth, power and subtilty of our neighbours.

When their affairs shall be thus made to have some consistency, when they shall have a being in the state, and a firm existence in the laws, they will be encouraged to make such settlements, and constitute such new factories, as may promote and enlarge the consumption of our English product: And they may be enabled upon such a bottom, so to strengthen themselves in India, as not to stand in fear hereafter of any attempts, either from the natives, or their European rivals.

They would be in a capacity to deal with the difficulties that may arise from the Scotch establishment, which seems now but a small scratch upon the body of our Trade, but, if not kept under by early remedies, may grow to a dangerous ulcer.

And, under this kind of constitution, they would be able to maintain in India such a naval force, as would certainly suppress those piratical designs, either of our own people, or of other nations, which embroil us with the Princes of
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that country, and if not prevented, must in a short time put an end to our whole Traffic thither.

They would have power enough either by fair terms to remove, or by force of arms to destroy any settlement of pirates, such as is now forming at the N. E. end of Madagascar, upon or near St. Mary's island; where it is said a considerable number of freebooters are nesting themselves, and grow so formidable, as that, in process of time, they may give great disturbance both to our East and West-India Trades.

When a company has the strength and wealth such an establishment would beget, they might exert themselves boldly in high attempts, for the honour and future advantage of their country; they may launch into profitable designs, and not fear the expence of fresh discoveries, or the unsuccessful event of any new settlement; they will be able to bear that loss with which repeated endeavours of introducing the wear and fashion of our manufactures in those nations, must in the beginning be attended. That which has discouraged adventurers upon a narrow bottom, ill supported and continually attacked, will not frighten those who shall stand upon a firmer basis: For as men who suspect they hold their estates by a slight tenure, fell woods, break ground up, and try to make the most, though the heart of the land be eaten out; whereas they who think they have a surer and longer title, commit no waste, but study improvements; so it fares with bodies of men engaged in Trade, who will make all the present profit they can, if they expect hourly to be supplanted; whereas they consult future advantage when their Trade is become in the nature of an estate for term of years, which they can transfer at a higher value and price, the

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Nor is it at all reasonable to apprehend, that a constitution of this kind will be too strong, too independent, and consequently liable to abuses; for suppose a bargain made and an establishment granted for so many years upon a valuable consideration, the supreme power can never be so bound up, but that it may justly exert itself whenever corruptions, misgovernment, neglect of national interest, or any other abuses of their privileges and settlement, shall call upon the legislative authority for correction.

On the contrary, a Company so settled will always stand in need of protection and countenance, and consequently must do things popular, national, and for the public good, in order to recommend themselves to the favour of that power from whence their establishment shall be derived; for if they fall into wrong measures, they will be the perpetual object of clamour and envy; but if they order their affairs so as to carry out little bullion, and to make a large part of their imports hither, in process of time, the returns of our own manufactures, theirs will become the favourite Traffic of the kingdom.

It is hoped we have sufficiently shewn, that the exportation of bullion is not so dangerous to a country as it has been vulgarly thought; but we must own, that a Trade carried on by permutation of commodities is more advantageous; for it gives employment to the people at home, and at the same time, may bring an overplus of gain: But such a national good must be the result of long industry, and must be effected by leisurely steps, and is rather to be constantly recommended by the state, than enforced by any law; for if our
merchants

merchants are tied up to one only exportation, while other countries are left free, our neighbours and rivals may easily supplant us in all the Indian markets.

But upon mature consideration of our own product and manufactures, and the situation, manners, and way of living among those people, as far as can be collected by books, and from enquiry, we are come to entertain a firm opinion, that England may carry on this Trade with as much national advantage as it has been managed by the Hollanders; but then both countries must be upon an equal foot in their constitution.

To form a right scheme of this whole matter will not be difficult, because there are several charters, both abroad and at home, which (with some amendments adapted to our laws and government) may be good models to go by; to which may be added,

That for the general satisfaction of the people, in a new establishment, great care should be taken to prevent frauds in the Company's sales, or any corruption or misgovernment among themselves; and that they should be enjoined to divide nothing but clear profit, which will preserve their capital, encrease their credit, and make their creditors secure.

That they should be impowered to raise money by a general court among themselves, to make up their capital, in case of great losses; by which method the Trade will never be at a stand for want of materials.

That to put them upon a more equal foot with the Scotch Company, all their exported commodities should go out custom-free; and that severe laws should be made to prevent the bringing in Scotch East-India goods by the north.

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Some other regulations might be here proposed, but this Discourse is already swelled much beyond our first intentions.

There were anciently great honours paid to such as had been the inventors or restorers of any useful arts, and who could contribute this way to the good of human kind; and without doubt, whoever could propose means, and by his application and industry bring it about, that a greater quantity of our English draperies might be consumed in these remote nations, would deserve considerable praise, as the author of an universal benefit to his country.

The Writer of these papers is very far from the vanity of thinking himself qualified for so great a work; but he may with modesty say, he has made all these things very much his study; and he who gives into any matter, with true zeal and a hearty affection, to do his country service, will proceed very far in it, though his natural and acquired abilities do not equal those of other men. And with this thought he has lately offered himself to go for India.

He desires to try whether he can reduce to practice the rules he has laid down, and to view with his own eyes, upon the spot, the institutions, manners, different climates, and form of living in those distant parts, and from such a prospect, perhaps he may be enabled to propose right and certain methods to secure this Trade, and to render it as grateful and popular, as it has been beneficial to England; the hopes of bringing which about, have made him think of this (at his time of day) hazardous undertaking; and he is willing to venture his life upon an attempt so much for the public good.

It

It is not to build a fortune, at the expence of his employers, that he proposes this long voyage; his labour of some years for the public, without any thought of recompence; his unspotted reputation and clean hands, in former employments, will sufficiently convince the better sort, to whom his writings are directed, that his courage and education have put him above such a mean design; he who has so boldly attacked high vices, will hardly give a hold upon himself: Besides, time and books have, he thinks, mortified in him all immoderate appetites, but that after fame, which he covets to purchase, by aiming at something for his country's profit.

If his endeavours can any way contribute towards removing the clamours that lie upon this Traffic; if he can lay a scheme of introducing a full vent of English drapery, by degrees, in Persia, China, and Japan, whereby this Trade will be upon a good foot, and have a right national turn, he shall think the honour to be gained by compassing these designs will render him more happy, than if he should acquire all that wealth others propose to themselves by such a venture.

The little cavillers about town will peradventure object, that he promotes the new constitution here proposed, to recommend himself, and to make his court; but it is notorious to very many, that if he could subject his mind to base flattery and servile arts, he need not go so far to seek employment; and the free spirit which runs through all his writings, is a sufficient proof, that he has all along consulted more the public good than his own private interest.

He thought he was obliged to take notice of these things, because it is commonly known he has offered to go for India; but it is with an

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honest design, and upon principles that respect the kingdom's service. And whoever know themselves to be uncorrupt, active, and to have a public spirit, with any useful talents, ought never to be ashamed of pretending to business. On the contrary, both here and elsewhere, they ought openly to brigue for employments of trust; they have the examples of the best men in all ages to justify this proceeding; and lazy virtue is almost as detrimental to the public as active vice: So that it seems a duty incumbent upon such as love their country, to make voluntary tender of their service, as often as they see occasion, in order to rescue the commonwealth from weak and polluted hands.

And now, in a few words, to recapitulate the whole matter of this Discourse, we have looked into the Balance of Trade, and examined the former notions relating to it, because these opinions may have an influence in our present councils; we have humbly submitted our thoughts to the public upon that nice subject; we have endeavoured to shew what proportion the branch now handled may bear in the general bulk of our foreign business; we have set forth some of the methods used by the Dutch, in managing their East-India Trade, and what measures may probably contribute to secure our interest there, and render our dealings thither a more national benefit to this kingdom.

Since the printing of the first part of this Discourse, we have seen a memorial delivered by the Council of Trade, by which we find the most material computations of this tract confirmed. This Memorial says, 'From East-India our importations
' from 70 to 88, have amounted upon the sales
' here, to about a million per ann. as we are in-
Vol. II. M ' formed;

‘ formed; of which we suppose about one half is
‘ usually re-exported.’

The Writer has in this, and in the former Discourses, more particularly examined Mr. Pollexfen’s notions concerning Trade, not out of any resentment; not thinking himself at all touched by the reflections in his Answer, nor out of any prejudice to the gentleman; for all that have the honour to know him, must grant he is a man of worth, a good patriot, and that he preserved his integrity in the worst of times: But in a general search after truth, errors (whatever the person be who commits them) must be detected; and perhaps it has been here made out, that he is not infallible.

Since the printing of the first part of this Discourse, we have likewise seen a calculation of the Naval Trade of England, anno 1688, and the profit then arising thereby; done by Mr. Gregory King, with the judgment and accuracy that always attend his performances; the sight of which has made the Writer of these papers entertain thoughts of handling, some time or other, more at large, several points concerning the Balance of Trade; but at present he is weary, and fears the reader is in the same condition. God be thanked his tedious work is at an end, which peradventure would have been more perfect, if he had received those public helps, which might have been reasonably expected in such an undertaking,

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A N
E S S A Y
UPON THE
PROBABLE METHODS
OF MAKING A
PEOPLE GAINERS
IN THE
BALANCE of TRADE.

Treating of these Heads, viz.

Of the People of England.

Of the Land of England, and its Product.

Of our Payments to the Public, and in what Manner the Balance of Trade may be thereby affected.

That a Country cannot encrease in Wealth and Power but by private Men doing their Duty to the Public, and but by a steady Course of Honesty and Wisdom, in such as are trusted with the Administration of Affairs.

By the AUTHOR of
The ESSAY on WAYS and MEANS.

Inter quæ L. Piso ambitum fori, corrupta judicia, scævitiæ oratorum, accusationes minitantium increpans, abire se, & cedere urbe, victurum in aliquo abdito & longinquo rure testabitur. Simul Curiam relinquebat. Tacit. lib. ii. Annal.

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A N
E S S A Y
UPON THE
PROBABLE METHODS
OF MAKING A
PEOPLE GAINERS
IN THE
BALANCE of TRADE.

S E C T. I.

THE Writer of these Papers stands in a manner engaged to say something upon this subject, having in his Discourses promised to handle several points concerning the Balance of Trade; to which design he was principally induced by the calculations then communicated to him by Gregory King, Esq; Lancaster Herald.

The Essay upon Ways and Means, and the Discourses lately set forth on the Revenues, and on the Trade of England, did meet with so good a reception from the best sort of men, that he finds himself encouraged once more to offer to the

public his observations of the like nature; from which, if any thing can be gathered that may promote, or that will hereafter tend to the welfare and prosperity of his country, he shall think his labours well rewarded.

It is true, his computations were attacked sometime after they were published, by two pamphlets; but so impotently, that he thinks he cannot do himself greater right, than to desire that all people who give themselves the trouble to read his writings, would likewise be pleased to peruse Mr. P. R—y's observations and Mr. T. E—d's remarks upon the said books. And he doubts not, but that any impartial reader, by comparing the schemes together, and by duly weighing the arguments of both sides, will think these answerers have rather strengthened and confirmed, than shaken his foundations.

It is an easy matter to pick out of any book, here and there, something to cavil at; which is the common method taken by the little scribblers of the town, of answering, as they call it, a writer; but all judicious men know that an able Author proceeds quite another way; and if his adversary has advanced a wrong proposition, or a false hypothesis, he sets up something in the room of what he would pull down, he offers another proposition or hypothesis, which shall visibly be truer, wiser and better founded: All other arguing (especially where any new matter has been advanced) being but wretched sophistry, that carries with it no conviction. What has been here said, is all the reply the Writer of these papers designs to make to the two forementioned pamphlets and their Authors, who (whatever they may be good for else) have shewn by their works, that figures and calculations

culations about the King's Revenue are very little their province.

He thought it might be of use (in the heat of a war that had then the appearance of lasting a great while) to propose Ways and Means by which taxes might be laid more equally, and by consequence more lightly upon the people; and when the peace was concluded, he believed he might do his country service to treat of the Public Revenues and of the Trade of England, the quiet times which the King's valour and wisdom had newly procured, seeming most seasonable to propose some kind of remedy for those disorders in the administration, which a war of such length had undoubtedly occasioned. In the tracts therefore which he published, he handled Credit, the King's Revenues, the Public Debts and Engagements, and several points relating to Trade, thereby to give some view what improvements this nation was capable of, under a careful and steady management.

And having deeply imprinted in his mind, the notion that all our thoughts, endeavours, and designs, should tend to the good and welfare of our country; and being convinced that even where abilities are wanting, the very intentions are commendable and virtuous, he is resolved to continue his studies upon the same subject, and to look yet farther into the condition and posture of this kingdom.

He is now indeed called up to a station, wherein he has the opportunity of delivering his thoughts concerning the business of England another way than by his pen; but it is many years since he had the honour to sit in parliament; and he doubts very much, whether he shall be able to arrive at any degree of expressing himself readily and well; without which, the best and most useful matter

loses all its energy and effect before a great assembly. Writing and speaking are talents very different; a tolerable stile may be attained to by great application and diligence; but elocution is a gift (and if employed to honest uses) one of the greatest bounties nature can bestow upon a man: He who has not the seeds of it within him, shall never come at it by art or labour; and (which perhaps is not vulgarly observed) writing much extinguishes the faculty of talking well off hand, in some persons who would otherwise have a competent share thereof; for if the Writer be of any form, he accustoms himself to a correctness and a choice of words; and this nicety and care beget a diffidency in him which is altogether inconsistent with the happiness of speaking well in public. Such therefore, as fear they cannot deliver their thoughts well and clearly another way, must commit them to writing, in order to make whatever qualities they have, of service to their country.

The matters we have hitherto handled, have been in a manner entirely new, and such wherein very little help could be had from books; and (it being the interest of some persons of no small power in the management of affairs, that many truths, important for England to be known, should rather be concealed, if possible, in the center of the earth, than laid open) the aids and lights which might be gathered from the public accounts and offices, have been industriously withheld from all who are not servile applauders of their wild and destructive conduct; however, he will proceed on with his work, notwithstanding the potent malice of such men, utterly indifferent how much his enquiries offend them, provided they yield any benefit to the king and kingdom.

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His aim always has been and ever shall be, to shew how the wealth and strength of England is to be secured and improved; to set the matters thereunto conducing in a true light; to instill into the minds of young gentlemen a desire of looking into the Revenues and Trade of the nation; that having therein an insight themselves, they may not be, in some future reign, insnared by the wicked arts of false and rapacious ministers, who will be ever craving for large supplies, but careless how they waste the public treasure; who will be always coveting new funds, which they will lay by as so much lumber of the state, when they have borrowed all they can upon them, not minding how any new branch is managed; who will be for shearing the sheep as many times as they can every year without any care of the flock, or how the fleece shall grow again; and who will be for pulling down the commonwealth, so they may build up their own fortunes.

It shall not be here argued, whether the skill of physic be now brought to perfection, or whether it is yet capable of further improvements; but this may be safely pronounced, that the knowledge of the sinews, muscles, arteries and veins, with the late discovery of the circulation of the blood and all the parts of anatomy, conduce very much to render this dark science more plain and certain.

In the same manner, such as would understand the body politic, its true constitution, its state of health, its growth or decay, its strength or weakness, and how to apply remedies to the various distempers to which it is incident, must study and look narrowly into all the distinct parts of the commonwealth, its Trade, the current money, (which is its flowing blood) the arts, labour and

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manufactures, and the number of its people; with many other things which altogether are the members of which the great body is composed.

From these topics, to reason upon matters of government, has been the method we have hitherto taken, and which we shall pursue in the following tract; and the way we go of arguing and concluding upon things by figures, being in a manner new, and made use of but by two or three before us, and that too but very superficially, it is hoped grains of allowance will be made, and that we shall be looked upon as beginners of an art not yet polished, and which time may bring to more perfection.

In all arts and sciences, the first inventions have been rude and unskilful: Very anciently, the Ægyptians knew something of geometry, and the Assyrians of astronomy; but as well these, as all other parts of knowledge, were but a shapeless body, till brought into some form by the artful hands of Pherecides, Thales, Anaximander and Pythagoras; and yet philosophy had neither strength nor beauty, till it was further improved in the three successive schools of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.

What has been here said of sublimer things, holds as well in speculations of an inferior nature, and in arts merely mechanical, whose first principles and rudiments must be imperfect. But if this our manner of enquiring into matters that relate to polity and government, be found any ways instructive and beneficial to the public, we hope hereafter to be followed by abler hands, who shall finish what we are but beginning.

We have formerly said, * “ That to find out

* Discourses on the Public Revenues and on Trade, Vol. II. Part II. p. 85, 86.

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“ the true Balance of Trade, in order to adapt
 “ thereunto our laws and form of living, would
 “ bring as much wealth to this country, as is re-
 “ quisite to render a nation safe and happy.
 “ That an exact balance between us and every
 “ distinct place, perhaps cannot by any human
 “ skill be attained to; and that it is not certain
 “ whether a scrutiny so very nice would be of
 “ any use. But that without doubt, a general
 “ state of this matter formed upon strict enquiry,
 “ with deliberation and skill, and such an one as
 “ would carry with it a demonstration of being
 “ somewhat near the truth, must be a great help
 “ to the rulers and ministers of a country, and a
 “ good guide in many important counsels.”

That we have been heretofore large gainers by
 Trade, is manifest from the expensive war we
 were able to carry on for so many years; and though
 to find out in what particulars we got or lost,
 may be very difficult; yet to give some general
 view of the matter may not be impossible: And
 we shall endeavour to shew from whence such
 may take their rise, who would have some pro-
 spect of a thing so vast and that seems at such a
 distance.

And albeit to know the quantum of our yearly
 gains, may not perhaps so much import the state;
 yet to be watchful that we do not lose, waste and
 impair from time to time, must certainly be the
 concern of every one who loves his country; and
 as it behoves private men frequently to balance
 their accounts, and to see how their condition
 stands; so without doubt, it is a duty incumbent
 upon those who are in power, very often to con-
 template the posture of the nation, in order to
 this, that growing mischiefs may have a sudden
 cure.

As the wealth of all kinds stored up in this kingdom was of late our chief support, so what we are hereafter to get, must defend us against the accidents at home and abroad, to which all governments are liable; and upon this account the motions of Trade ought to be observed with a strict and careful eye.

And we owe it to our country to communicate what we think may conduce to make it flourish; and the men in power should encourage such attempts, at least they should not oppress nor contrive their ruin, who employ their whole time, and impair their own health, in studying to promote the common good.

But they who act upon a principle are not easily disheartened. In this essay we shall set forth some probable methods of making a nation gainers in the Balance of Trade; and we shall close the Discourse with endeavouring to shew, that this Balance is not to be put of our side, (by which we mean that a country cannot encrease in wealth and power) but by private men doing their duty to the public, and but by a steady course of honesty, care and wisdom, in such as are trusted with the administration.

The wounds of the late war have drained us of so much blood, and our foreign commerce has met with such a ruffle and interruption in all parts of the world, and our neighbours grow so fast upon us, some in wealth, and others in shipping and the skill of Trade, that poverty must grow upon us apace, our naval strength must decrease, and we must utterly lose the dominion of the sea, unless the legislative authority exert itself with vigour, and interpose betimes to prevent our impending ruin.

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* Discour
Part II. p. 2

We have said formerly, * “ That gold and silver are indeed the measure of Trade, but that the spring and original of it, in all nations, is the natural or artificial product of the country; that is to say, what their land, or what their labour and industry produces.”

There is no man that can reasonably dispute this position; and if granted, it follows from thence, that to know rightly how the Balance of Trade stands with any nation, a due inspection must be made into their natural or artificial product.

But this natural or artificial product being most of it the result of the people's labour and industry, we shall be still in the dark as to all enquiries of this kind, without maturely considering the numbers of the people.

In these sort of speculations not only the quantity but quality of the inhabitants must be duly pondered; they must be divided into their several ranks and classes: It must be distinguished who by their arts, labour or industry are encreasing, and who by their expence, poverty or sloth, are decreasing the kingdom's wealth. Of these subdivisions are likewise to be made, of what numbers are employed in the church, in war, in the fleets mercantile and warlike, in the law, in offices, in merchandize, in shop-keeping and trades, in handicrafts; and who both of the higher and lower degree are persons living upon their estates; who are freeholders, farmers, labouring people, servants, cottagers, alms people, and vagrants.

* Discourses on the Public Revenues and on Trade, Vol. I. Part II. p. 354.

The people being thus distributed into their proper ranks, we are likewise to enquire into the quality of the land they are to cultivate and improve, in order to that natural or artificial product which is the medium whereby a superlucration of wealth is to be gotten. We should examine what proportion of it is arable, pasture and meadow, woods and coppices, forests, parks and common, heaths, moors, mountains, and barren land, houses and homesteads, &c. rivers, lakes, meers, roads, ways, and waste land.

The land is to yield the product, which product is to yield the wealth, so that we should enquire how this product stands in every particular but more especially in the principal constituent parts of England's strength; namely, wool, corn and our mines; for it is by the well ordering and wise disposition of these branches of our wealth that we are to be gainers in the Balance of Trade.

We shall therefore handle distinctly these heads viz. the people, the land and its product, and shall endeavour to lay down several matters, from whence (peradventure with good grounds of probability) some conclusions may be made in relation to our present subject; and because taxes influence very much in the Balance of Trade, as will be shewn hereafter, we shall likewise say something concerning our payments to the public.

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S E C T. II.

Of the people of England.

THE Writer of these papers has seen the before-mentioned Mr. King's natural and political observations and conclusions upon the state and condition of England in manuscript. The calculations therein contained are very accurate, and more perhaps to be relied upon than any thing that has been ever done of the like kind. This skilful and laborious gentleman has taken the right course to form his several schemes about the numbers of the people; for besides many different ways of working, he has very carefully inspected the poll books, and the distinctions made by those acts, and the produce in money of the respective polls going every where by reasonable and discreet mediums; besides which pains, he has made observations of the very facts in particular towns and places, from which he has been able to judge and conclude more safely of others; so that he seems to have looked further into this mystery than any other person.

With his permission we shall offer to the public, such of his computations as may be of use, and enlighten the matter before us.

He lays down, that if the first people of England was by a colony or colonies, consisting of a number between 100 and 1000 people, (which seems probable) such colony or colonies might be brought over between the year of the world 2400 and 2600, viz. about 8 or 900 years after the flood, and 14 or 1500 years before the birth of Christ; at which time the world might have about
a mil-

a million of families, and four or five millions of people.

From which hypothesis, it will follow by an orderly series of encrease,

That when the Romans invaded England, 53 years before Christ's time, the kingdom might have about '360,000 people, and at Christ's birth about 400,000.

That at the Norman conquest anno Christi 1066, the kingdom might contain somewhat above 2,000,000.

That anno 1260, or about 200 years after the Norman conquest, it might contain about 2,750,000 people, or half the present number; so that the people of England may have doubled in about 435 years last past.

That in all probability the next doubling will be in about 600 years to come, viz. by the year 2300, at which time it may have about 11,000,000 of people, and the kingdom containing about 39 millions of acres, there will be then about three acres and a half per head.

That the encrease of the kingdom for every 100 years of the last preceding term of doubling, and the subsequent term of doubling may have been, and in probability may be, according to the following scheme:

Anno

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Anno Christi.	Number of People.	Encrease every hundred years.
1300	2,860,000	
	—	440,000
1400	3,300,000	
	—	540,000
1500	3,840,000	
	—	780,000
1600	4,620,000	
	—	880,000
1700	5,500,000	
	—	920,000
1800	6,420,000	
	—	930,000
1900	7,350,000	
	—	930,000
2000	8,280,000	
	—	925,000
2100	9,205,000	
	—	910,000
2200	10,115,000	
	—	985,000
2300	11,000,000	

Whereby it may appear, that the encrease of the kingdom being 880,000 people in the last 100 years, 920,000 in the next succeeding 100 years, the annual encrease at this time may be about 9000 souls per ann.

But whereas the yearly births of the kingdom are about

1 in 28.95, or — — 190,000 souls.

Brought over, 190,000 souls.
And the yearly burials 1 in

32.35, or — 170,000 souls.
hence 29 1/2 per annum

Whereby the yearly encrease
would be — 20,000 souls.

It is to be noted,

1st, That the allow- p. an. }

ance for plagues
and great mortali-
ties may come to,
at a medium —

4000

2dly, Foreign or civil
wars at a medium

3500

3dly, The sea con-
stantly employing
about 40,000, may
precipitate the death
of about —

2500

4thly, The planta-
tions (over and
above the accession
of foreigners) may
carry away —

1000

11,000 per ann.

Whereby the neat annual en-
crease may be but —

9,000 souls.

That of these 20,000 souls, which would be the
annual encrease of the kingdom by procreation,
were it not for the forementioned abatements,

The country encreases annually by
procreation — —

20,000 souls.

The cities and towns, exclusive of
London, by procreation, —

2,000 souls.

But London and the bills of mor-
tality decrease annually —

2,000 souls.

So

So that London requires a supply of 2000 souls per ann. to keep it from decreasing, besides a further supply of about 3000 per ann. for its encrease at this time. In all 5000, or above a half of the kingdoms neat encrease.

Mr. King further observes, that by the assessments on marriages, births and burials, and the collector's returns thereupon, and by the parish registers, it appears, that the proportions of marriages, births and burials, are according to the following scheme :

N 2

People

People.	Annual Marriages.				Annual Births.				Annual Burials.			
530,000	London and bills of mortality —	1 in 106.	In all, 5000.	Producing 4.	Children each.	London and bills of mortality —	1 in 26 $\frac{1}{2}$.	In all, 20,000.	1 in 24.1	In all, 22,000		
870,000	The cities and market towns —	1 in 128.	In all, 6800.	Producing 4.5	Children each.	The cities and market towns —	1 in 28 $\frac{1}{2}$.	In all, 30,600.	1 in 30.4	In all, 28,600		
4,100,000	The villages and hamlets —	1 in 141.	In all, 29,200.	Producing 4.8	Children each.	The villages and hamlets —	1 in 29.4	In all, 139,400.	1 in 34.4	In all, 119,400		
5,500,000		1 in 134.	41,000.	4.64			1 in 28.95	190,000.	1 in 32.35	170,000		

Whence

Whence it may be observed, that in 10,000 co-existing persons,

There are 71 or 72 marriages in the country, producing 343 children.

78 marriages in the towns, producing 351 children.

94 Marriages in London, producing 376 children.

Whereby it follows,

1st, That though each marriage in London produces fewer people than in the country, yet London in general having a greater proportion of breeders, is more prolific than the other great towns, and the great towns are more prolific than the country.

2dly, That if the people of London of all ages were as long lived as those in the country, London would encrease in people much faster *pro rata* than the country.

3dly, That the reasons why each marriage in London produces fewer children than the country marriages, seem to be,

1st, From the more frequent fornications and adulteries.

2dly, From a greater luxury and intemperance.

3dly, From a greater intenseness on business.

4thly, From the unhealthfulness of the coal smoke.

5thly, From a greater inequality of age between the husbands and wives.

6thly, From the husbands and wives not living so long as in the country.

He farther observes, accounting the people to be 5,500,000, that the said five millions and a half (including the transitory people and vagrants) appear by the assessments on marriages, births and

burials, to bear the following proportion in relation to males and females, and other distinctions of the people, viz.

Vide Scheme A.

So that the number of communicants is in all 3,260,000 souls. *both males & females above 16 years of age*

And the number of fighting men between 16 and 60, is 1,308,000. *active citizens*

That the batchelors are about 28 per cent. of the whole. *1 m 1 1/4 or 1 m 2 nearly*

Whereof those under 25 years are $25\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. *1 m 4 1/5*

And those above 25 years are $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

That the maidens are about $28\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the whole.

Whereof those under 25 years are $26\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

And those above 25 years are 2 per cent.

That the males and females in the kingdom in general, are aged, one with another, 27 years and a half.

That in the kingdom in general, there are near as many people living under 20 years of age, as there are above 20, whereof half of the males is under 19, and one half of the females is under 21 years.

That the ages of the people, according to their several distinctions, are as follow, viz.

In London and bills of mortality,	Males.		Females.		Both.
	10 to 13	8 to 9	10 to 13	8 to 9	
In the other cities and market towns,	230,000	410,000	300,000	460,000	530,000
In the rural parts of the kingdom,					870,000

In London and bills of mortality,	Males.	Females.	Both.
In the other cities and market towns,	10 to 13	230,000	300,000
In the villages and hamlets,	8 to 9	410,000	460,000
	100 to 99	2,060,000	2,040,000
	27 to 28	2,700,000	2,800,000
			5,500,000

That as to other Distinctions they appear by the said Affessments to bear these Proportions:

	People.	Males.	Females.
Husbands and wives at above $34\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.	1,900,000	950,000	950,000
Widowers at above $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.	90,000	90,000	
Widows at about $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.	240,000		240,000
Children at above 45 per cent.	2,500,000	1,300,000	1,200,000
Servants at about $10\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.	560,000	260,000	300,000
Sojourners and single persons, 4 per cent.	210,000	100,000	110,000
	5,500,000	2,700,000	2,800,000
	100		

And that the different Proportions in each of the said Articles between London, the great Towns, and the Villages, may the better appear, he has formed the following Scheme:

London and bills of mortality.	Souls.	The other cities and great towns.	Souls.	The villages and hamlets.	Souls.
Husbands and wives, 37 per cent.	196,100	36 per cent.	313,200	34 per cent.	1,394,000
Widowers, — 2 per cent.	10,600	2 per cent.	17,400	1½ per cent.	61,500
Widows, — 7 per cent.	37,100	6 per cent.	52,200	4½ per cent.	184,500
Children, — 33 per cent.	174,900	40 per cent.	348,000	47 per cent.	1,927,000
Servants, — 13 per cent.	68,900	11 per cent.	95,700	10 per cent.	410,000
Sojourners, — 8 per cent.	42,400	5 per cent.	43,500	3 per cent.	123,000
—	—	—	—	—	—
100	530,000	100	870,000	100	4,100,000

He further observes, supposing the People to be 5,500,000, that the yearly Births of the Kingdom may be 190,000, and that the several Ages of the People may be as follows:

	In all.	Males.	Females.
Those under 1 year old,	170,000	88,500	81,500
Those under 5 years old,	820,000	413,300	406,700
Those under 10 years old,	1,520,000	762,900	757,100
Those under 16 years old,	2,240,000	1,122,000	1,118,000
Those above 16 years old,	3,260,000	1,578,000	1,682,000
Those above 21 years old,	2,700,000	1,300,000	1,400,000
Those above 25 years old,	2,400,000	1,152,000	1,248,000
Those above 60 years old,	600,000	270,000	330,000
Those under 16 years old,	2,240,000		
Those above 16 years old,	3,260,000		
Total of the people,	5,500,000		

At a medium		Years.
The husbands are aged	— 43 years apiece,	which at $17\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. makes 742
The wives	— 40 years apiece,	$17\frac{1}{4}$ — 690
The widowers	— 56 years apiece,	$1\frac{1}{2}$ — 84
The widows	— 60 years apiece,	$4\frac{1}{2}$ — 270
The children	— 12 years apiece,	45 — 540
The servants	— 27 years apiece,	$10\frac{1}{2}$ — 284
The sojourners	— 35 years apiece,	4 — 140
At a medium $27\frac{1}{2}$		<u>100</u> — 2750

Having thus stated the numbers of the people, he gives a scheme of the income and expence of the several families of England, calculated for the year 1688.

Vide Scheme B.

Mr. King's modesty has been so far overruled, as to suffer us to communicate these his excellent computations, which we can the more safely commend, having examined them very carefully, tried them by some little operations of our own upon the same subject, and compared them with the schemes of other persons, who take pleasure in the like studies.

What he says concerning the number of the people to be 5,500,000 is no positive assertion, nor shall we pretend any where to determine in that matter; what he lays down is by way of hypothesis, that supposing the inhabitants of England to have been 1300, 2,860,000 heads, by the orderly series of encrease allowed of by all writers, they may probably be about anno 1700, 5,500,000 heads; but if they were anno 1300 either less or more, the case must proportionably alter; for as to his allowance for plagues and great mortalities, civil wars, the sea and the plantations, they seem very reasonable, and not well to be controverted.

Upon these schemes of Mr. King, we shall make several remarks, though the text deserves much a better comment.

The people being the first matter of power and wealth, by whose labour and industry a nation must be gainers in the Balance, their encrease or decrease must be carefully observed by any government that designs to thrive; that is, their encrease must be promoted by good conduct and
wholesome

Number of
families

3,000
12,000
5,000
5,000
2,000
8,000
10,000
2,000
8,000
40,000
120,000
150,000
15,000
50,000
60,000
5,000
4,000
500,500
50,000
364,000
400,000
35,000
849,000
500,500
849,000
349,580

A Scheme of the Income and Expence of the several Families of England, calculated for the Year 1688.

Number of families.	RANKS, DEGREES, TITLES, and QUALIFICATIONS.	Heads per family.	Number of persons.	Yearly income per family.	Yearly income in general.	Yearly income per head.	Yearly expence per head.	Yearly encrease per head.	Yearly encrease in general.
				l. s.	l.	l. s.	l. s. d.	l. s. d.	l.
160	Temporal lords	40	6,400	3,200 0	512,000	80 0	70 0 0	10 0 0	64,000
26	Spiritual lords	20	520	1,300 0	33,800	65 0	45 0 0	20 0 0	10,400
800	Baronets	16	12,800	880 0	704,000	55 0	49 0 0	6 0 0	76,800
600	Knights	13	7,800	650 0	390,000	50 0	45 0 0	5 0 0	39,000
3,000	Esquires	10	30,000	450 0	1,200,000	45 0	41 0 0	4 0 0	120,000
12,000	Gentlemen	8	96,000	280 0	2,880,000	35 0	32 0 0	3 0 0	288,000
5,000	Persons in greater offices and places	8	40,000	240 0	1,200,000	30 0	26 0 0	4 0 0	160,000
5,000	Persons in lesser offices and places	6	30,000	120 0	600,000	20 0	17 0 0	3 0 0	90,000
2,000	Eminent merchants and traders by sea	8	16,000	400 0	800,000	50 0	37 0 0	13 0 0	208,000
8,000	Lesser merchants and traders by sea	6	48,000	198 0	1,600,000	53 0	27 0 0	26 0 0	288,000
10,000	Persons in the law	7	70,000	154 0	1,540,000	22 0	18 0 0	4 0 0	280,000
2,000	Eminent clergymen	6	12,000	72 0	144,000	12 0	10 0 0	2 0 0	24,000
8,000	Lesser clergymen	5	40,000	50 0	400,000	10 0	9 4 0	0 16 0	32,000
40,000	Freeholders of the better sort	7	280,000	91 0	3,640,000	13 0	11 15 0	1 5 0	350,000
120,000	Freeholders of the lesser sort	5½	660,000	55 0	6,600,000	10 0	9 10 0	0 10 0	330,000
150,000	Farmers	5	750,000	42 10	6,375,000	8 10	8 5 0	0 5 0	187,500
15,000	Persons in liberal arts and sciences	5	75,000	60 0	900,000	12 0	11 0 0	1 0 0	75,000
50,000	Shopkeepers and tradesmen	4½	225,000	45 0	2,250,000	10 0	9 0 0	1 0 0	225,000
60,000	Artizans and handicrafts	4	240,000	38 0	2,280,000	9 10	9 0 0	0 10 0	120,000
5,000	Naval officers	4	20,000	80 0	400,000	20 0	18 0 0	2 0 0	40,000
4,000	Military officers	4	16,000	60 0	240,000	15 0	14 0 0	1 0 0	16,000
500,586		5½	2,675,520	68 18	34,488,800	12 18	11 15 4	1 2 8	3,023,700
								Decrease.	Decrease.
50,000	Common seamen	3	150,000	20 0	1,000,000	7 0	7 10 0	0 10 0	75,000
364,000	Labouring people and out-servants	3½	1,275,000	15 0	5,460,000	4 10	4 12 0	0 2 0	127,500
400,000	Cottagers and paupers	3¼	1,300,000	6 10	2,000,000	2 0	2 5 0	0 5 0	325,000
35,000	Common soldiers	2	70,000	14 0	490,000	7 0	7 10 0	0 10 0	35,000
849,000		3¼	2,795,000	10 10	8,950,000	3 5	3 9 0	0 4 0	562,500
	Vagrants; as gipfies, thieves, beggars, &c.		30,000		60,000	2 0	4 0 0	2 0 0	60,000
500,586	Encreasing the wealth of the kingdom	5½	2,675,520	68 18	34,488,800	12 18	11 15 4	1 2 8	3,023,700
849,000	Decreasing the wealth of the kingdom	3¼	2,825,000	10 10	9,010,000	3 3	3 7 6	0 4 6	622,500
349,586	Neat totals,	4½	5,500,520	32 5	43,491,800	7 18	7 9 3	0 8 9	2,401,200

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wholesome laws, and if they have been decreased by war, or any other accident, the breach is to be made up as soon as possible, for it is a maim in the body politic affecting all its parts.

Almost all countries in the world have been more or less populous, as liberty and property have been there well or ill secured. The first constitution of Rome was no ill-founded government, a kingly power limited by laws; and the people encreased so fast, that from a small beginning, in the reign of their sixth king, they were able to send out an army of 80,000 men. And in the time of the commonwealth, in that invasion which the Gauls made upon Italy, not long before Hannibal came thither, they were grown so numerous, as that their troops consisted of 700,000 foot, and 70,000 horse; it is true, their allies were comprehended in this number, but the ordinary people fit to bear arms, being mustered in Rome and Campania, amounted to 250,000 foot and 23,000 horse.

Nothing therefore can more contribute to the rendering England populous and strong, than to have liberty upon a right foot, and our legal constitution firmly preserved. A nation may be as well called free under a limited kingship as in a commonwealth; and it is to this good form of our government, that we partly owe that doubling of the people, which has probably happened here in 435 years last past. And if the ambition of some, and the mercenary temper of others, should bring us at any time to alter our constitution, and to give up our ancient rights, we shall find our members diminish visibly and fast. For liberty encourages procreation, and not only keeps our own inhabitants among us, but invites
strangers

strangers to come and live under the shelter of our laws.

The Romans indeed made use of an adventitious help to enlarge their city, which was by incorporating foreign cities and nations into their commonwealth; but this way is not without its mischiefs *. For the strangers in Rome by degrees had grown so numerous, and to have so great a vote in the councils, that the whole government began to totter and decline from its old to its new inhabitants; which Fabius the cenfor observing, he applied a remedy in time, by reducing all the new citizens into four tribes, that being contracted into so narrow a space, they might not have so malignant an influence upon the city.

An act of general naturalization would likewise probably encrease our numbers very fast, and repair what loss we have suffered in our people by the late war: It is a matter that has been very warmly contended for by many good patriots; but peradventure it carries also its danger with it, which perhaps would have the less influence by this expedient, namely, if an act of parliament were made, that no heads of families, hereafter to be naturalized for the first generation, should have votes in any of our elections. But as the case stands, it seems against the nature of right government, that strangers (who may be spies, and who may have an interest opposite to that of England, and who at best ever join in one link of obsequiousness to the ministers) should be suffered to intermeddle in that important business of sending members to parliament. From their sons indeed there is less to fear, who by birth and na-

* Machiavel's discourses on Livy.

ture may come to have the same interest and inclinations as the natives.

And though the expedient of Fabius Maximus to contract strangers into four tribes, might be reasonable, where the affairs of a whole empire were transacted by magistrates chosen in one city, yet the same policy may not hold good in England; foreigners cannot influence elections here by being dispersed about in the several counties of the kingdom, where they can never come to have any considerable strength. But some time or other they may endanger the government, by being suffered to remain, such vast numbers of them, here in London, where they inhabit all together, at least 30,000 persons in two quarters of the town, without intermarrying with the English, or learning our language, by which means, for several years to come, they are in a way still to continue foreigners, and perhaps may have a foreign interest and foreign inclinations: To permit this cannot be advisable or safe. It may therefore be proper to limit any new acts of naturalization, with such restrictions as may make the accession of strangers not dangerous to the public.

An accession of strangers, well regulated, may add to our strength and numbers; but then it must be composed of labouring men, artificers, merchants, and other rich men, and not of foreign soldiers, since such fright and drive away from a nation more people than their troops can well consist of: For if it has been ever seen that men abound most where there is most freedom, (China excepted, whose climate excels all others, and where the exercise of the tyranny is mild and easy) it must follow that people will in time desert those countries whose best flower is their liberties, if those liberties are thought precarious or in danger.

That

That foreign soldiers are dangerous to liberty, we may produce examples from all countries and all ages; but we shall instance only one, because it is eminent above all the rest.

* The Carthaginians, in their wars, did very much use mercenary and foreign troops; and when the peace was made between them and the Romans, after a long dispute for the dominion of Sicily, they brought their army home to be paid and disbanded, which Gesco their general had the charge of embarking, who did order all his part with great dexterity and wisdom. But the state of Carthage wanting money to clear arrears, and satisfy the troops, was forced to keep them up longer than was designed. The army consisted of Gauls, Ligurians, Balearéans, and Greeks. At first they were insolent in their quarters in Carthage, and were prevailed upon to move to Sicca, where they were to remain and expect their pay. There they grew presently corrupted with ease and pleasure, and fell into mutinies and disorder, and to making extravagant demands of pay and gratuities; and in a rage, with their arms in their hands, they marched 20,000 of them towards Carthage, encamping within 15 miles of the city; and chose Spendius and Matho, two profligate wretches, for their leaders, and imprisoned Gesco, who was deputed to them from the commonwealth. Afterwards they caused almost all the Africans, their tributaries, to revolt; they grew in a short time to be 70,000 strong; they fought several battles with Hanno and Hamilcar Barcas. During these transactions, the mercenaries that were in garrison in Sardinia mutinied likewise, murdering their commander and all the Carthaginians; while

* Polybius, lib. i.

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Spendius and Matho, to render their accomplices more desperate, put Gesco to a cruel death, presuming afterwards to lay siege to Carthage itself. They met with a shock indeed at Prion, where 40,000 of them were slaughtered; but soon after this battle, in another, they took one of the Carthaginian generals prisoner, whom they fixt to a cross, crucifying 30 of the principal senators round about him. Spendius and Matho were at last taken, the one crucified and the other tormented to death: But the war lasted three years and near four months with excessive cruelty; in which the state of Carthage lost several battles, and was often brought within a hair's breadth of utter ruin.

If so great a commonwealth as Carthage, though assisted at that time by Hiero King of Syracuse, and by the Romans, ran the hazard of losing their empire, city and liberties, by the insurrection of a handful of mercenaries, whose first strength was but 20,000 men, it should be a warning to all free nations, how they suffer armies so composed to be among them; and it should frighten a wise state from desiring such an encrease of people, as may be had by the bringing over foreign soldiers.

Indeed, all armies whatsoever, if they are over large, tend to the dispeopling of a country, of which our neighbour nation is a sufficient proof; where, in one of the best climates in Europe, men are wanting to till the ground. For children do not proceed from the intemperate pleasures taken loosely and at random, but from a regular way of living, where the father of the family desires to rear up and provide for the offspring he shall beget.

Securing

Securing the liberties of a nation, may be laid down as a fundamental for encreasing the numbers of its people; but there are other polities thereunto conducing, which no wise state has ever neglected.

No race of men did multiply so fast as the Jews, which may be attributed chiefly to the wisdom of Moses their lawgiver, in contriving to promote the state of marriage.

The Romans had the same care, paying no respect to a man childless by his own fault, and giving great immunities and privileges, both in the city and provinces, to those who had such and such a number of children. Encouragements of the like kind are also given in France to such as enrich the commonwealth by a large issue.

But we in England have taken another course, laying a fine upon the marriage-bed, which seems small to those who only contemplate the pomp and wealth round about them, and in their view; but they who look into all the different ranks of men, are well satisfied that this duty on marriages and births is a very grievous burthen upon the poorer sort, whose numbers compose the strength and wealth of any nation. This tax was introduced by the necessity of affairs. It is difficult to say what may be the event of a new thing; but if we are to take measures from past wisdom, which exempted prolific families from public duties, we should not lay impositions upon those who find it hard enough to maintain themselves. If this tax be such a weight upon the poor, as to discourage marriage and hinder propagation, which seems the truth, no doubt it ought to be abolished; and at a convenient time we ought to change it for some other duty, if there were only this single reason

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that it is so directly opposite to the polity of all ages and all countries.

In order to have hands to carry on labour and manufactures, which must make us gainers in the Balance of Trade, we ought not to deter, but rather invite men to marry, which is to be done by privileges and exemptions for such a number of children, and by denying certain offices of trust and dignities to all unmarried persons; and where it is once made a fashion among those of the better sort, it will quickly obtain with the lower degree.

Mr. King, in the foregoing scheme, [see p. 180.] (for which he has as authentic grounds as perhaps the matter is capable of) lays down, that the annual marriages of England are about 41,000, which is one marriage out of every 134 persons: Upon which we observe, that this is not a due proportion, considering how few of our adult males (in comparison with other countries) perish by war or any other accident; from whence may be inferred, that our polity is some way or other defective, or the marriages would bear a nearer proportion with the gross number of our people; for which defect, if a remedy can be found, there will be so much more strength added to the kingdom.

From the books of assessment on births, marriages, &c. by the nearest view he can make, he divides the 5,500,000 people into 2,700,000 males, and 2,800,000 females; from whence (considering the females exceed the males in number, and considering that the men marry later than women, and that many of the males are of necessity absent in the wars, at sea, and upon other businesses) it follows, that a large proportion of the females remain unmarried, though at an adult age, which is a dead loss to the nation, every
I birth

birth being so much certain treasure; upon which account, such laws must be for the public good, as induce all men to marry whose circumstances permit it.

From his division of the people, it may be likewise observed, that the near proportion there is between the males and females, (which is said to hold also in other places) is an argument (and the strongest that can be produced) against polygamy, and the encrease of mankind, which some think might be from thence expected; for if nature had intended to one man a plurality of wives, she would have ordered a great many more female births than male, her designments being always right and wise.

The securing the parish for bastard children, is become so small a punishment, and so easily compounded, that it very much hinders marriage. The Dutch compel men of all ranks to marry the woman whom they have got with child; and perhaps it would tend to the farther peopling of England, if the common people here, under such a certain degree, were condemned by some new law to suffer the same penalty.

A country that makes provision to encrease its inhabitants, whose situation is good, and whose people have a genius adapted to Trade, will never fail to be gainers in the Balance, provided the labour and industry of their people be well managed and carefully directed.

The more any man contemplates these matters, the more he will come to be of opinion, that England is capable of being rendered one of the strongest nations, and the richest spot of ground in Europe.

It is not extent of territory that makes a country powerful, but numbers of men well employed.

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convenient ports, a good navy, and a soil producing all sort of commodities. The materials for all this we have, and so improveable, that if we did but second the gifts of nature, with our own industry, we should soon arrive to a pitch of greatness that would put us at least upon an equal foot with any of our neighbours.

If we had the compliment of men our land can maintain and nourish; if we had as much trade as our stock and knowledge in sea-affairs is capable of embracing; if we had such a naval strength as a trade so extended would easily produce; and if we had those stores and that wealth which is the certain result of a large and well-governed traffic, what human strength could hurt or invade us? On the contrary, should we not be in a posture not only to resist, but to give the law to others?

Our neighbouring commonwealth has not in territory above eight millions of acres, and perhaps not much above 2,200,000 people; and yet what a figure have they made in Europe for these last hundred years? What wars have they maintained? What forces have they resisted? and to what a height of power are they now come, and all by good order and wise government?

They are liable to frequent invasions; they labour under the inconvenience and danger of bad ports; they consume immense sums every year to defend their land against the sea; all which difficulties they have subdued by an unwearied industry.

We are fenced by nature against foreign enemies; our ports are safe; we fear no irruptions of the sea; our land territory at home is at least 39 millions of acres; we have in all likelihood not less than 5,500,000 people; what a nation might we then become, if all these advantages were tho-

roughly improved, and if a right application were made of all this strength, and of these numbers?

They who apprehend the immoderate growth of any Prince or State, may perhaps succeed by beginning first, and by attempting to pull down such a dangerous neighbour, but very often their good designs are disappointed. In all appearance they proceed more safely, who under such a fear make themselves strong and powerful at home. And this was the course which Philip King of Macedon, the father of Perseus, took, when he thought to be invaded by the Romans.

The greatness of Rome gave Carthage very anxious thoughts; and it rather seems that they entered into the second Punic war, more for fear the Romans should have the universal empire, than out of any ambition to lord it themselves over the whole world. Their design was virtuous, and peradventure wise, to endeavour at some early interruption to a rival that grew so fast; however, we see they miscarried, though their armies were led by Hannibal. But Fortune, which had determined the dominion of the earth for Rome, did perhaps lead them into the fatal counsel of passing the Eber, contrary to the articles of peace concluded with Asdrubal, and of attacking Saguntum, before they had sufficiently recovered of the wounds they had suffered in the wars about Sicily, Sardinia, and with their own rebels. If the high courage of Hannibal had not driven the commonwealth into a new war, while it was yet faint and weak, and if they had been suffered to pursue their victories in Spain, and to get firm footing in that rich, warlike, and then populous country, very probably in a few years they might have been a more equal match for the Roman people. It is true, if the Romans had endeavoured at the con-

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quest of Spain, and if they had disturbed the Carthaginians in that country, the war must have been unavoidable; because it was evident in that age, and will be apparent in the times we live in, that whatever foreign power already grown great, can add to its dominion the possession of Spain; will stand fair for universal empire.

But unless some such cogent reason of state, as is here instanced, intervene, in all appearance, the best way for a nation that apprehends the growing power of any neighbour, is to fortify itself within; we do not mean by land armies, which rather debilitate than strengthen a country, but by potent navies, by thrift in the public treasure, care of the people's trade, and all the other honest and useful arts of peace.

By such an improvement of our native strength, agreeable to the laws and to the temper of a free nation, England, without doubt, may be brought to so good a posture and condition of defending itself, as not to apprehend any neighbour jealous of its strength, or envious of its greatness.

And to this end we open these schemes, that a wise government, under which we live, not having any designs to become arbitrary, may see what materials they have to work upon, and how far our native wealth is able to second their good intentions of preserving us a rich and a free people.

Having said something of the number of our inhabitants, we shall proceed to discourse of their different degrees and ranks, and to examine who are a burthen and who a profit to the public; for by how much every part and member of the commonwealth can be made useful to the whole, by so much a nation will be more and more a

gainer in this Balance of Trade which we are to treat of.

Mr. King, from the assessments on births and marriages, and from the polls, has formed the scheme here inserted*, of the ranks, degrees, titles, and qualifications of the people. He has done it so judiciously, and upon such grounds, that it is well worth the careful perusal of any curious person; from thence we shall make some observations, in order to put our present matter in a clearer light.

1st, This scheme detects their error, who, in the calculations they frame, contemplate nothing but the wealth and plenty they see in rich cities and great towns, and from thence make a judgment of the kingdom's remaining part; and from this view conclude, that taxes and payments to the public do mostly arise from the gentry and better sort, by which measures they neither contrive their imposition aright, nor are they able to give a true estimate what it shall produce; but when we have divided the inhabitants of England into their proper classes, it will appear that the nobility and gentry are but a small part of the whole body of the people.

Believing that taxes fall chiefly upon the better sort, they care not what they lay, as thinking they will not be felt; but when they come to be levied, they either fall short, and so run the public into an immense debt, or they light so heavily upon the poorer sort, as to occasion insufferable clamours; and they whose proper business it was to contrive these matters better, have been so unskilful, that the legislative power has been more than once compelled, for the people's ease, to give

* See Scheme B.

new funds, instead of others that had been ill projected.

This may be generally said, That all duties whatsoever upon the consumption of a large produce, fall with the greatest weight upon the common sort: So that such as think in new duties that they chiefly tax the rich, will find themselves quite mistaken; for either their fund must yield little, or it must arise from the whole body of the people, of which the richer sort are but a small proportion.

And though war, and national debts and engagements, might heretofore very rationally plead for excises upon our home consumption, yet, now there is a peace, it is the concern of every man that loves his country, to proceed warily in laying new ones, and to get off those which are already laid, as fast as ever he can. High customs and high excises both together are incompatible; either of them alone are to be endured, but to have them co-exist is suffered in no well-governed nation. If materials of foreign growth were at an easy rate, a high price might be the better borne in things of our own product; but to have both dear at once (and by reason of the duties laid upon them) is ruinous to the inferior rank of men; and this ought to weigh more with us, when we consider that even of the common people, a subdivision is to be made, of which one part subsist from their own havings, arts, labour, and industry; and the other part subsist a little from their own labour, but chiefly from the help and charity of the rank that is above them. For, according to Mr. King's scheme*,

* See Scheme B. *pa. 184*

The nobility and gentry, with their families and retainers, the persons in offices, merchants, persons in the law, the clergy, freeholders, farmers, persons in sciences and liberal arts, shopkeepers and tradesmen, handicraftsmen, naval officers, with the families and dependents upon all these altogether, make up the number of — — — 2,675,520 heads.

The common seamen, common soldiers, labouring people, and out-servants, cottagers, paupers, and their families, with the vagrants, make up the number of — — — 2,825,000 heads.

In all, 5,500,520 heads.

So that here seems a majority of the people, whose chief dependence and subsistence is from the other part, which majority is much greater, in respect of the number of families, because 500,000 families contribute to the support of 850,000 families. In contemplation of which, great care should be taken not to lay new duties upon the home consumption, unless upon the extremest necessities of the state; for though such impositions cannot be said to fall directly upon the lower rank, whose poverty hinders them from consuming such materials (though there are few excises to which the meanest person does not pay something) yet indirectly, and by unavoidable consequences, they are rather more affected by high duties upon our home consumption, than the wealthier degree of people; and so we shall find the case to be, if we look carefully into all the distinct ranks of men there enumerated.

1st, As

1st, As to the nobility and gentry; they must of necessity retrench their families and expences, if excessive impositions are laid upon all sorts of materials for consumption; from whence follows, that the degree below them of merchants, shopkeepers, tradesmen, and artificans, must want employment.

2^{dly}, As to the manufactures; high excises in time of peace are utterly destructive to that principal part of England's wealth; for if malt, coals, salt, leather, and other things, bear a great price, the wages of servants, workmen, and artificers, will consequently rise, for the income must bear some proportion with the expence; and if such as set the poor to work, find wages for labour or manufacture advance upon them, they must rise in the price of their commodity, or they cannot live; all which would signify little, if nothing but our own dealings among one another were thereby affected; but it has a consequence far more pernicious in relation to our Foreign Trade, for it is the exportation of our own product that must make England rich; to be gainers in the Balance of Trade, we must carry out of our own product what will purchase the things of foreign growth that are needful for our own consumption, with some overplus, either in bullion or goods, to be sold in other countries; which overplus is the profit a nation makes by trade, and it is more or less, according to the natural frugality of the people that export, or as from the low price of labour and manufacture they can afford the commodity cheap, and at a rate not to be underfold in foreign markets. The Dutch, whose labour and manufactures are dear by reason of home excises, can notwithstanding sell cheap abroad, because this disadvantage they labour under is balanced by the par-

simonious temper of their people : But in England, where this frugality is hardly to be introduced, if the duties upon our home consumption are so large as to raise considerably the price of labour and manufacture, all our commodities for exportation must by degrees so advance in the prime value, that they cannot be sold at a rate which will give them vent in foreign markets ; and we must be every where underfold by our wiser neighbours. But the consequence of such duties in time of peace, will fall most heavily upon our woollen manufactures, of which most have more value from the workmanship than the material ; and if the price of this workmanship be enhanced, it will in a short course of time put a necessity upon those we deal with of setting up manufactures of their own, such as they can, or of buying goods of the like kind and use from nations that can afford them cheaper. And in this point we are to consider, that the bulk of our woollen exports does not consist in draperies made of the fine wool, peculiar to our soil, but is composed of coarse broad cloths, such as Yorkshire cloths, kerseys, which make a great part of our exports, and may be, and are made of a coarser wool, which is to be had in other countries : So that we are not singly to value ourselves upon the material, but also upon the manufacture, which we should make as easy as we can, by not laying over-heavy burthens upon the manufacture : And our woollen goods being $\frac{2}{3}$ ds of our foreign exports, it ought to be the chief object of the public care, if we expect to be gainers in the Balance of Trade, which is what we hunt after in these enquiries.

3dly, As to the lower rank of all, which we compute at 2,825,000 heads, a majority of the whole

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whole people, their principal subsistence is upon the degrees above them; and if those are rendered uneasy, these must share in the calamity; but even of this inferior sort, no small proportion contribute largely to excises, as labourers and out-servants, which likewise affect the common seamen, who must thereupon raise their wages, or they will not have wherewithal to keep their families left at home; and the high wages of seamen is another burthen upon our Foreign Traffic. As to the cottagers, who are above $\frac{1}{5}$ th part of the whole people, some duties reach even them, as those upon malt, leather, and salt, but not much, because of their slender consumption; but if the gentry, upon whose woods and gleanings they live, and who employ them in day-labour; and if the manufacturers, for whom they card and spin, are overburthened with duties, they cannot afford to give them so much for their labour and handywork; nor to yield them those other reliefs which are their principal subsistence, for want of which, these miserable wretches must perish with cold and hunger.

Thus we see excises either directly or indirectly fall upon the whole body of the people; but we do not take notice of these matters, as receding from our former opinion: On the contrary, we still think them the most easy and equal way of taxing a nation; and perhaps it is demonstrable, that if we had fallen into this method at the beginning of the war, of raising the year's expence within the year by excises, England had not been now indebted so many millions; but what was advisable, under such a necessity and danger, is not to be pursued in times of peace, especially in a country depending so much upon trade and manufactures.

Our study now ought to be how those debts may be speedily cleared off, for which these new revenues are the funds, that Trade may again move freely as it did heretofore, without such a heavy clog; but this point we shall more amply handle, when we come to speak of our payments to the public.

Mr. King divides the whole body of the people into two principal classes, viz.

	Heads.			
* Encreasing the wealth of the kingdom,	—	—	—	— 2,675,520
Decreasing the wealth of the kingdom,	—	—	—	— 2,825,000

By which he means, that the first class of the people, from land, arts, and industry, maintain themselves, and add every year something to the nation's general stock; and besides this, out of their superfluity, contribute every year so much to the maintenance of others.

That of the second class, some partly maintain themselves by labour, (as the heads of the cottage families) but that the rest, as most of the wives and children of these, sick and impotent people, idle beggars and vagrants, are nourished at the cost of others; and are a yearly burthen to the public, consuming annually so much as would be otherwise added to the nation's general stock.

The bodies of men are without doubt the most valuable treasure of a country; and in their sphere, the ordinary people are as serviceable to the commonwealth as the rich, if they are employed in honest labour and useful arts: And such being more in number, do more contribute

* See Scheme B.

to encrease the nation's wealth, than the higher rank.

But a country may be populous and yet poor, (as were the ancient Gauls and Scythians) so that numbers, unless they are well employed, make the body politic big, but unwieldy; strong, but unactive; as to any uses of good government.

Theirs is a wrong opinion, who think all mouths profit a country that consume its product: And it may be more truly affirmed, that he who does not some way serve the commonwealth, either by being employed, or by employing others, is not only a useless, but hurtful member to it.

As it is charity, and what we indeed owe to human kind, to make provision for the aged, the lame, the sick, blind and impotent; so it is a justice we owe to the commonwealth, not to suffer such as have health, and who might maintain themselves, to be drones, and live upon the labour of others.

The bulk of such as are a burthen to the public, consists in the cottagers and paupers, beggars in great cities and towns, and vagrants.

Upon a survey of the hearth books, made in Michaelmas 1685, it was found, that of the 1,300,000 houses in the whole kingdom, those of one chimney amounted to 554,631; but some of these having land about them, in all our calculations, we have computed the cottagers but at 500,000 families. But of these a large number may get their own livelihood, and are no charge to the parish, for which reason Mr. King very judiciously computes his "cottagers and paupers" decreasing the wealth of the nation but at "400,000 families;" in which account he includes the poor houses in cities, towns, and villages,

lages, besides which he reckons 30,000 vagrants; and all these together, to make up 1,330,000 heads.

This is a very great proportion of the people to be a burthen upon the other part, and is a weight upon the land interest; of which the landed gentlemen must certainly be very sensible.

If this vast body of men, instead of being expensive, could be rendered beneficial to the commonwealth, it were a work no doubt highly to be promoted by all who love their country.

It seems evident to such as have considered these matters, and who have observed how they are ordered in nations under a good polity, that the number of such who, through age or impotence, stand in real need of relief, is but small, and might be maintained for very little; and that the poor rates are swelled to the extravagant degree we now see them at, by two sorts of people, one of which, by reason of our slack administration, is suffered to remain in sloth; and the other, through a defect in our constitution, continue in wretched poverty for want of employment, though willing enough to undertake it.

All this seems capable of a remedy; the laws may be armed against voluntary idleness, so as to prevent it; and a way may probably be found out to set those to work who are desirous to support themselves by their own labour: And if this could be brought about, it would not only put a stop to the course of that vice which is the consequence of an idle life, but it would greatly tend to enrich the commonwealth; for if the industry of not half the people maintains in some degree the other part; and besides, in times of peace, did add every year near 2,500,000 to the general stock of England, to what pitch of wealth and greatness might

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we not be brought, if one limb were not suffered to draw away the nourishment of the other; and if all the members of the body politic were rendered useful to it?

Nature in her contrivances has made every part of a living creature either for ornament or use, the same should be in a politic institution rightly governed.

It may be laid down for an undeniable truth, that where all work, nobody will want; and to promote this would be a greater charity and more meritorious, than to build hospitals, which very often are but so many monuments of ill-gotten riches attended with late repentance.

To make as many as possible of these 1,330,000 persons (whereof not above 330,000 are children too young to work) who now live chiefly upon others, get themselves a large share of their maintenance, would be the opening a new vein of treasure of some millions sterling per ann. it would be a present ease to every particular man of substance, and a lasting benefit to the whole body of the kingdom; for it would not only nourish but encrease the numbers of the people, of which many thousand perish every year, by those diseases contracted under a slothful poverty.

Our laws relating to the poor are very numerous, and this matter has employed the care of every age for a long time, though but with little success, partly through the ill execution, and partly through some defect in the very laws.

The corruptions of mankind are grown so great, that now-a-days laws are not much observed, which do not in a manner execute themselves; of this nature are those laws which relate to bringing in the Prince's revenue, which never fail to be put in execution, because the people must

must pay, and the Prince will be paid; but where only one part of the constitution, the people are immediately concerned, as in laws relating to the poor, the highways, assizes, and other civil economy, and good order in the state, those are but slenderly regarded.

The public good being, therefore, very often, not a motive strong enough to engage the magistrate to perform his duty, lawgivers have many times fortified their laws with penalties, wherein private persons may have a profit, thereby to stir up the people to put the laws in execution.

In countries depraved nothing proceeds well, wherein particular men do not one way or other find their account, and rather than a public good should not go on at all, without doubt it is better to give private men some interest to set it forward.

For which reason, it may be worth the consideration of such as study the prosperity and welfare of England, whether this great engine of maintaining the poor and finding them work and employment, may not be put in motion by giving some body of undertakers a reasonable gain to put the machine upon its wheels.

In order to which, we shall here insert a proposal delivered to the House of Commons last session of parliament, for the better maintaining the impotent, and employing and setting to work the other poor of this kingdom.

In matters of this nature, it is always good to have some model or plan laid down, which thinking men may contemplate, alter and correct, as they see occasion; and the Writer of these papers does rather chuse to offer this scheme, because he is satisfied it was composed by a gentleman of

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great abilities, and who has made both the poor rates, and their number, more his study than any other person in the nation. The proposal is as follows:

A Scheme for setting the Poor to work.

1st, **T**HAT such persons as shall subscribe and pay the sum of 300,000*l.* as a stock for and towards the better maintaining the impotent poor, and for buying commodities and materials to employ and set at work the other poor, be incorporated and made one body politic, &c. By the name of the governor and company for maintaining and employing the poor of this kingdom.

By all former propositions it was intended that the parishes should advance several years rates to raise a stock, but by this proposal the experiment is to be made by private persons at their risk; and 300,000*l.* may be judged a very good stock, which added to the poor rates for a certain number of years, will be a very good fund for buying commodities and materials for a million of money at any time. This subscription ought to be free for every body, and if the sum were subscribed in the several counties of England and Wales, in proportion to their poor rates, or the monthly assessment, it would be most convenient; and provision may be made that no person shall transfer his interest but to one of the same county, which will keep the interest there during the term; and as to its being one corporation, it is presumed this will be most beneficial to the public. For 1st, All disputes on removes which are very chargeable and burthen some will be at an end, this proposal intending, that wherever the poor are,

are, they shall be maintained or employed. 2dly, It will prevent one county which shall be diligent, imposing on their neighbours who may be negligent, or getting away their manufactures from them. 3dly, In case of fire, plague, or loss of manufacture, the stock of one county may not be sufficient to support the places where such calamities may happen; and it is necessary the whole body should support every particular member, so that hereby there will be a general care to administer to every place according to their necessities.

2dly, That the said corporation be established for the term of 21 years.

The corporation ought to be established for 21 years, or otherwise it cannot have the benefit the law gives in case of infants, which is their service for their education; besides, it will be some years before a matter of this nature can be brought into practice.

3dly, That the said sum of 300,000*l.* be paid in, and laid out for the purposes aforesaid, to remain as a stock for and during the said term of 21 years.

The subscription ought to be taken at the passing of the act, but the corporation to be left at liberty, to begin either the Michaelmas or the Ladyday after, as they shall think fit. And

per cent. to be paid at the subscribing to persons appointed for that purpose, and the remainder before they begin to act; but so as 300,000*l.* shall be always in stock during the term, notwithstanding any dividends or other disposition; and an account thereof to be exhibited twice in every year upon oath, before the lord chancellor for the time being.

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4thly, That the said corporation do by themselves or agents in every parish of England, from and after the day of during the said term of 21 years, provide for the real impotent poor, good and sufficient maintenance and reception, as good or better than hath at any time within the space of years before the said day of been provided or allowed to such impotent poor, and so shall continue to provide for such impotent poor, and what other growing impotent poor shall happen in the said parish during the said term.

By impotent poor is to be understood all infants and old and decrepid persons not able to work; also persons who by sickness or any accident are for the time unable to labour for themselves or families; and all persons (not being fit for labour) who were usually relieved by the money raised for the use of the poor; they shall have maintenance, &c. as good or better, as within years they used to have.

This does not directly determine what that shall be, nor is it possible, by reason a shilling in one county is as much as two in another; but it will be the interest of the corporation that such poor be well provided for, by reason the contrary will occasion all the complaints or clamour that probably can be made against the corporation.

5thly, That the corporation do provide (as well for all such poor which on the said day of shall be on the poor books, as for what other growing poor shall happen in the said term, who are or shall be able to labour or do any work) sufficient labour and work proper for such persons to be employed in. And that provision shall be made for such labouring persons

sons according to their labour, so as such provision doth not exceed $\frac{3}{4}$ parts as much as any other person would have paid for such labour. And in case they are not employed and set to work, then such persons shall, until materials or labour be provided for them, be maintained as impotent poor; but so as such persons who shall hereafter enter themselves on the poor's books, being able to labour, shall not quit the service of the corporation without leave for the space of six months.

The corporation are to provide materials and labour for all that can work, and to make provision for them not exceeding $\frac{3}{4}$ parts as much as any other person would give for such labour. For example, if another person would give one of these a shilling, the corporation ought to give but nine-pence. And the reason is plain, 1st, Because the corporation will be obliged to maintain them and their families in all exigences, which others are not obliged to do, and consequently they ought not to allow so much as others. 2dly, In case any persons able to labour, shall come to the corporation, when their agents are not prepared with materials to employ them, by this proposal they are to allow them full provision as impotent poor, until they find them work, which is entirely in favour of the poor. 3dly, It is neither reasonable nor possible for the corporation to provide materials upon every occasion for such persons as shall be entered with them, unless they can be secure of such persons to work up those materials; besides, without this provision all the labouring people in England will play fast and loose between their employers and the corporation, for as they are disobliged by one, they will run to the other, and so neither shall be sure of them.

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6thly, That no impotent poor shall be removed out of the parish where they dwell, but upon notice in writing given to the church-wardens or overseers of the said parish, to what place of provision he or she is removed.

It is judged the best method to provide for the impotent poor in houses prepared for that purpose, where proper provision may be made for several, with all necessaries of care and maintenance. So that in some places one house will serve the impotent poor of several parishes, in which case the parish ought to know where to resort, to see if good provision be made for them.

7thly, That in case provision be not made for the poor of each parish in manner as aforesaid, (upon due notice given to the agents of the corporation) the said parish may order their poor to be maintained, and deduct the sum by them expended out of the next payments to be made to the said corporation by the said parish.

In case any accident happens in a parish, either by sickness, fall, casualty of fire, or otherways; and that the agent of the corporation is not present to provide for them, or having notice doth not immediately do it, the parish may do it, and deduct so much out of the next payment; but there must be provision made for the notice, and in what time the corporation shall provide for them.

8thly, That the said corporation shall have and receive for the said 21 years, that is to say, from every parish yearly so much as such parish paid in any one year, to be computed by a medium of 7 years; namely, from the 25th of March 1690, to the 25th of March 1697, and to be paid half yearly; and besides, shall receive the benefit of the revenues of all donations given

to any parish, or which shall be given during the said term, and all forfeitures which the law gives to the use of the poor; and to all other sums which were usually collected by the parish, for the maintenance of the poor.

Whatever was raised for or applied to the use of the poor, ought to be paid over to the corporation; and where there are any donations for maintaining the poor, it will answer the design of the donor, by reason there will be better provision for the maintenance of the poor than ever; and if that maintenance be so good as to induce further charities, no doubt the corporation ought to be entitled to them: But there are two objections to this article; 1st, That to make a medium by a time of war is unreasonable. 2dly, To continue the whole tax for 21 years, does not seem to give any benefit to the kingdom in that time. To the 1st, It is true we have a peace, but Trade is lower now than at any time during the war, and the charge of the poor greater; and when Trade will mend, is very uncertain. To the 2d, It is very plain, that although the charge may be the same to a parish in the total, yet it will be less to particular persons, because those who before received alms, will now be enabled to be contributors; but besides, the turning so many hundred thousand pounds a year (which in a manner have hitherto been applied only to support idleness) into industry; and the employing so many other idle vagrants and sturdy beggars, with the product of their labour, will altogether be a present benefit to the lands of England, as well in the rents as in the value; and further, the accidental charges in the streets and at doors, is, by a very modest computation, over and above the poor rates, at least 300,000*l.* per ann. which

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will be entirely saved by this proposal, and the persons set at work; which is a further consideration for its being well received, since the corporation are not allowed any thing for this service.

The greater the encouragement is, the better the work will be performed; and it will become the wisdom of the parliament in what they do, to make it effectual; for should such an undertaking as this prove ineffectual, instead of remedying it, it will encrease the mischief.

9thly, That all the laws made for the provision of the poor, and for punishing idle vagrant persons, be repealed, and one law made to continue such parts as are found useful, and to add such other restrictions, penalties, and provisions, as may effectually attain the end of this great work.

The laws hereunto relating are numerous, but the judgments and opinions given upon them are so various and contradictory, and differ so in sundry places, as to be inconsistent with any one general scheme of management.

10thly, That proper persons be appointed in every county to determine all matters and differences which may arise between the corporation and the respective parishes.

To prevent any ill usages, neglect or cruelty, it will be necessary to make provision that the poor may tender their complaints to officers of the parish; and that those officers having examined the same, and not finding redress, may apply to persons to be appointed in each county and each city for that purpose, who may be called supervisors of the poor, and may have allowance made them for their trouble; and their business may be to examine the truth of such complaints; and in case either the parish or corporation

ration judge themselves aggrieved by the determination of the said supervisors, provision may be made that an appeal lie to the quarter sessions.

11thly, That the corporation be obliged to provide for all public beggars, and to put the laws in execution against public beggars and idle vagrant persons.

Such of the public beggars as can work must be employed, the rest to be maintained as impotent poor; but the laws to be severely put in execution against those who shall ask any public alms.

This proposal, which in most parts of it seems to be very maturely weighed, may be a foundation for those to build upon, who have a public spirit large enough to embrace such a noble undertaking.

But the common obstruction to any thing of this nature, is a malignant temper in some who will not let a public work go on, if private persons are to be gainers by it: When they are to get themselves, they abandon all sense of virtue; but are clothed in her whitest robe, when they smell profit coming to another, masking themselves with a false zeal to the commonwealth, where their own turn is not to be served. It were better indeed, that men would serve their country for the praise and honour that follow good actions; but this is not to be expected in a nation, at least leaning towards corruption; and in such an age it is as much as we can hope for, if the prospect of some honest gain invites people to do the public faithful service. For which reason, in any undertaking where it can be made apparent that a great benefit will accrue to the commonwealth in general, we ought not to have

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an evil eye upon what fair advantages particular men may thereby expect to reap, still taking care to keep their appetite of getting within moderate bounds, laying all just and reasonable restraints upon it, and making due provision that they may not wrong or oppress their fellow-subjects.

It is not to be denied, but that if fewer hands were suffered to remain idle, and if the poor had full employment, it would greatly tend to the common welfare, and contribute much towards adding every year to the general stock of England.

Among the methods that we have here proposed of employing the poor, and making the whole body of the people useful to the public; we think it our duty to mind those who consider the common welfare of looking with a compassionate eye into the prisons of this kingdom, where many thousands consume their time in vice and idleness; wasting the remainder of their fortunes, or lavishing the substance of their creditors, eating bread and doing no work, which is contrary to good order, and pernicious to the commonwealth.

We cannot therefore but recommend the thoughts of some good bill that may effectually put an end to this mischief so scandalous in a trading country, which should let no hands remain useless.

It is not at all difficult to contrive such a bill as may relieve and release the debtor, and yet preserve to his creditors all their fair, just, and honest rights and interest.

And having in this manner endeavoured to shew that to preserve and encrease the people, and to make their numbers useful, are methods conducing to make us gainers in the Balance of Trade, we shall proceed to handle the second head.

S E C T. III.

Of the Land of England, and its Product.

IN treating of this matter, we shall again produce one of Mr. King's schemes, which are all of them so accurately done, that we may venture to say they are not to be controverted in any point so material, as to destroy the foundation of those reasonings, which the Writer of these papers, or any other person, shall form upon them.

He computes that England and Wales contain 39 millions of acres; according to the following scheme:

	Acres.	Value per acre.			Rent.
		l.	s.	d.	l.
Arable land, —	9,000,000	0	5	6	2,480,000
Pasture and meadow, —	12,000,000	0	8	8	5,200,000
Woods and coppices, —	3,000,000	0	5	0	750,000
Forests, parks and commons, —	3,000,000	0	3	8	570,000
Heaths, moors, mountains, and barren land, —	10,000,000	0	1	0	500,000
Houses and homesteads, gardens and orchards, churches and churchyards, —	1,000,000	The land.			450,000
		The buildings.			2,000,000
Rivers, lakes, meers and ponds, —	500,000	0	2	0	50,000
Roads, ways, and waste land, —	500,000				
In all,	39,000,000	about 6 2			12,000,000
	True yearly value.	Value, as rated to the 4s. tax.			Produce of the 4s. t. v.
So the yearly rents or value of the land is —	10,000,000	l.	l.	l.	l.
The houses and buildings, —	2,000,000	6,500,000	1,500,000	500,000	1,300,000
All other hereditaments, —	1,000,000				300,000
Personal estates, such as have been reached in the 4s. aids	1,000,000				100,000
In all,	14,000,000	9,050,000			1,800,000
So that whereas the tax of 4s. per pound, one aid with another, has produced but — — — — 1,800,000					
It should produce, if duly assessed, — — — — 2,800,000					

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The produce of the arable land be thus estimates in a year of moderate plenty :

	Bushels.	per Bushel. s. d.	Value.
Wheat,	14,000,000	at 3 6	2,450,000
Rye, —	10,000,000	at 2 6	1,250,000
Barley, —	27,000,000	at 2 0	2,700,000
Oats, —	16,000,000	at 1 6	1,200,000
Pease, —	7,000,000	at 2 6	875,000
Beans, —	4,000,000	at 2 6	500,000
Vetches,	1,000,000	at 2 0	100,000
In all,	79,000,000	at 2 3 $\frac{4}{5}$	9,075,000

This is only the neat produce, exclusive of the seed-corn, which, in some sorts of grain, being near $\frac{1}{3}$ th of the produce, and in others $\frac{1}{4}$ th, may, in general, be reckoned about 11 millions of bushels more, which makes the whole produce to be 90 millions of bushels, which, at 2 s. 3 $\frac{4}{5}$ d. per bushel in common, is about 10,338,600 l.

Note, That this value is what the same is worth upon the spot where the corn grew ; but this value is encreased by the carriage to the place where it is at last spent, at least $\frac{1}{4}$ th part more.

These 79 millions of bushels of grain are the product of eight of the nine millions of acres of arable land ; the other million of acres producing hemp, flax, woad, saffron, rape, hops, dying weeds, &c. the value of the product thereof may be about one million sterling.

So that the rent of the corn-land being about 2,200,000 l. per annum, and the neat produce thereof above 9,000,000 l. the produce is full four rents.

But

But deducting $\frac{1}{11}$ th part of the neat produce, or 700,000 *l.* in lieu of tythes, there remains 8,375,000 *l.* or three rents, and near $\frac{3}{10}$ ths.

Now the rents, or yearly value of the pasture and meadows, woods, coppices, forests, parks, commons, heaths, moors, mountains, and barren land, being about 7,000,000 *l.*

The produce being but 12,000,000 *l.* does not make fully two rents, there being little charge either in cultivating the land, or gathering the product thereof, comparatively to what there is in arable land.

This produce is principally in and by cattle, hay, timber, and fire-wood.

The produce by cattle, in butter,	<i>l.</i>
cheese, and milk, may be about	2,500,000
The value of the wool yearly shorn,	2,000,000
The value of the horses yearly bred,	250,000
The value of the flesh yearly spent,	
as food, — — —	3,350,000
The value of the tallow and hides of	
the cattle, — — —	600,000
The value of hay yearly consumed by	
horses, — — —	1,300,000
The hay yearly consumed by other	
cattle, — — —	1,000,000
The timber yearly felled for building	
and such uses, — — —	500,000
The wood yearly spent in firing, and	
petty uses, — — —	500,000
So the produce (including one mil-	
lion in hay spent by cattle) may be	
in all, — — — —	12,000,000

An Estimate of the Live Stock of the Nation.

<i>An Estimate of the Live Stock of the Nation.</i>			
Yearly breed or encrease.	The whole stock.	Value of each be- sides the skin.	Value of the stock.
		<i>l. s. d.</i>	<i>l.</i>
Beeves, sterks, and calves,	800,000	2 0 0	9,000,000
Sheep and lambs,	3,600,000	0 7 4	4,440,000
Swine and pigs,	1,300,000	0 16 0	1,600,000
Deer and fawns,	20,000	2 0 0	200,000
Goats and kids,	10,000	0 10 0	25,000
Hares and leverets,	12,000	0 1 6	1,800
Rabits and conies,	2,000,000	0 0 5	20,833
	7,742,000	0 0 0	15,287,633

So

So the value of the live stock for food may be	— — —	15,287,633
The value of the horses, &c. being 1,200,000 <i>l.</i> at 2 <i>l.</i> 10 <i>s.</i> each, breeding annually 100,000, may be		3,000,000
The value of the pelts and skins, over and above the wool,	—	2,400,000
The value of the wool yearly shorn or pelted, 12,000,000 of fleeces, at 3 <i>s.</i> 4 <i>d.</i> per fleece,	— —	2,000,000
The value of the whole stock of tame fowl, as geese, turkeys, hens, ducks, pigeons, swans, and pea- cocks,	— — — —	460,000
The whole stock of wild fowl about		12,000
In all,		23,159,633

From these schemes we shall make such observations as we think may relate to our present subject.

Of the 39 millions of acres in territory belonging to England, he lays down that there may be above a fourth part, viz. 10 millions of acres in heaths, moors, mountains, and barren land; three millions of acres in woods and coppices, and three millions in forests, parks, and commons. This division of the land seems to be made with great judgment: 1st, Because it agrees very well with the consumption of several commodities, of which we can come at a near knowledge by the *excises* now in being. 2dly, It corresponds exactly with that encrease in the kingdom's general rental, which, for these last hundred years, may have been observed from the produce of divers land-taxes, and from several other particulars,

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And there are undeniable reasons to be given, that this general rental, anno 1600, did not exceed six millions per ann. but through the help of that wealth which has flowed in to us by our Foreign Trade, it has advanced in several periods of time from six to eight, from eight to ten, and from 10 to 14 millions per ann. When the general rental was but six millions per ann. there was a great deal more barren land; of that which was cultivated, very much was capable of melioration; and there were more forests, woods, coppices, commons, and waste ground, than there is now, which our wealth did enable us from time to time to inclose, cultivate, and improve.

And for the future, as we grow in riches, and as our people encrease, those many millions of acres which now are barren, will by degrees most of them be improved and cultivated; for there is hardly any sort of ground which numbers of men will not render fertile; but then it must be supposed, that we do not go backward in our trade, for if that should happen, instead of improving what is waste, that which is improved and cultivated will rather return to the wildness and desolation of former times; for as we have said in our former Discourses, land and trade rise and fall together. Trade brings in the stock; this stock, well and industriously managed, betters land, and brings more product of all kind for exportation; the returns of which growth and product are to make a country gainers in the balance.

As to our quantity of land, in relation to its inhabitants, as the case stands, we seem now to have about $7\frac{1}{4}$ acres per head; but there are many reasons to think that England is capable of nourishing double its present number of people, which supposing them now to be 5,500,000, would be
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11 millions, and even then there will be as many acres per head as they have in Holland. And when we have this compliment of men, either in the natural course of time, or sooner, by the help of good conduct, we shall be in a state of power to deal with any strength in Europe. In the natural course of time this cannot happen in a great while, but the common progression of things may be hastened by art, so that if we are studious to preserve and encrease our people, peradventure in not many years, we may have hands enough, not only to make us safe from the insults of others, but to render us formidable to all our neighbours: And men being the truest strength and riches of a country, the councils of all wise states should tend to obtaining and keeping together as many as the land will nourish. There are indeed countries to whom their full compliment of inhabitants would be dangerous, and subject them to frequent famines in bad and unseasonable years for corn. As for example, if France had had as many people as the land will feed in times of common plenty, half of them must have perished during their late dearths for want of bread, because they have a vast inland country, and only the out parts upon such an emergency can be relieved by the assistance of other places. And we see that anciently, before there was much trade, there were frequent famines in the world, because one part could not then help another; for which reason the northern nations heretofore, when their people multiplied too fast, did disburden themselves by sending out numerous colonies to seek out new dwellings, in apprehension that by a scarce year they might be destroyed at home; but England (with any moderate care) is not liable to such a fear, though its present numbers should even be doubled,

doubled, because we have every where the sea to friend, and in such an extremity our wants may be supplied from other nations.

And our matter leading us into it, it may not be unnecessary here to take notice, that countries not overstocked with men, and though situated so as to be relieved by the sea, may suffer greatly, and be reduced very low for want of corn, unless they make some due provision against such a calamity.

The value of the wheat, barley, and rye, necessary for the sustenance of England, amounts at least to six millions of pounds per ann. at the common rate; from whence it is apparent, that if a long dearth should happen here, such as they lately had in France, though we may be supplied upon more easy terms than France was, and though we might still keep our people alive, yet that a disaster of this kind would exhaust more of our money than a war of ten years continuance. Suppose (which God forbid) that for two or three years successively, the season should prove so bad as to deprive us of half our usual crop; to supply such a want, what immense sums must be carried out of the kingdom? And it may be made evident, that such a scarcity did very much drain the French.

To provide against a calamity of the like nature, is no doubt of the highest consequence. That we have been deficient in this point of polity is too notorious, though providence has taken more care of us than a negligent people deserve. However, we have had outrageous famines in England, and in Edward III.'s reign, corn did once rise to 13 times the common value; this indeed can hardly happen again, because there are more different sorts of soils improved and manured
now

now than in that age; but at several times we have suffered wants of this kind very afflicting, and some time or other our negligence in a matter of such concern to the people's welfare, may come to be more severely punished.

By the best accounts we are able to procure, from such as have looked into these things, we find that in England, in a plentiful year, there is not above five months stock of grain at the time of the succeeding harvest, and not above four months stock in an indifferent year, which is but a slender provision against any evil accident. We enjoy the benefit of such different soils, viz. high lands and low lands, where one hits when the other fails, and now-a-days we seldom see corn above treble its common rate, which however would be fatal, if it should at any time continue so long as to make large supplies from abroad necessary to us. It is observed, that but $\frac{1}{10}$ th defect in the harvest may raise the price $\frac{3}{10}$ ths, and when we have but half our crop of wheat, which now and then happens, the remainder is spun out by thrift and good management, and eked out by the use of other grain; but this will not do for above one year, and would be a small help in the succession of two or three unseasonable harvests: For the scarcity even of one year is very destructive, in which many of the poorest sort perish, either for want of sufficient food, or by unwholesome diet.

We take it, that a defect in the harvest may raise the price of corn in the following proportions:

Defect.		Above the common rate.
1 Tenth	} Raises the price	3 Tenths.
2 Tenths		8 Tenths.
3 Tenths		1. 6 Tenths.
4 Tenths		2. 8 Tenths.
5 Tenths		4. 5 Tenths.

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So that when corn rises to treble the common rate, it may be presumed that we want above $\frac{1}{3}$ of the common produce; and if we should want $\frac{1}{10}$ ths, or half the common produce, the price would rise to near five times the common rate.

We dwell the longer upon this subject, being convinced in judgment, that nothing in the world can more impoverish a country, nor tend more to set it back with other people in the Balance of Trade for a long while, than such a calamity; it is indeed the scourge of God; but improvident states are more liable to it than wiser nations.

The Hollanders cannot nourish their people from their territory, and must always seek for assistance from abroad; but in prospect that the harvest may be bad now and then, in some, and even in all those places from whence they fetch their corn, whereby in scarce times they would be imposed upon, they take care to have granaries and storehouses, where in plenty years they lay up vast quantities of all sorts of grain against a dearer season; by which good and prudent œconomy, those dearths which in their turn have afflicted most other countries, fall but lightly upon their common people.

On the contrary, when such a calamity happens, they are able from their stores to assist other nations; and though we cannot go so high as * Sir Walter Raleigh, who is overlarge in his computations of this nature, and reckons the Dutch to get an immense sum by this sort of trade, yet it is apparent that they are very great gainers from time to time, by selling us our own corn dear, which they had bought cheap, and that they make us pay very largely for its store-room.

* Vide Sir Walter Raleigh's Remains, p. 173.

A nation that will get by foreign traffic, must carefully watch all these things; and the instance we have here given, is a great pull-back in the general Balance of Trade, and what the Dutch in this manner gain, is a dead loss to England.

But this evil is without doubt capable of a remedy. If they can afford to let their money lie dead for a time, pay freight backward and forward, and store-room, and yet be gainers by selling us our own commodity in a dearer market, why should not we think it worth our while to build granaries and public storehouses within our own dominions?

We take it that freight backward and forward in such a bulky ware as corn is, does overbalance the difference in the interest of money here and there; so that we seem to be imposed upon in this important matter, merely through that negligence of which wealthy nations are but too guilty.

It may therefore be worth the consideration of such as study the good of England, whether it would not be advisable, and for the public welfare, to settle a fund for erecting in every county granaries capable of containing such a quantity of corn as may nourish the people for a certain time, upon any emergent occasion, and as may hinder us at all times from purchasing at a dear rate our own product from our more wary neighbours.

This first step would be the most chargeable, but in the course of a few years the expence would be overpaid to the body of the kingdom; as to filling these stores with corn, sufficient to answer the people's occasions, we are inclined to think it would be best managed by private undertakers, whom the hopes of advantage will easily invite into such a business. But here again will come the common objection made to public things, that

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some private men will be thereby gainers ; and so, in the name of God, let them, provided they do the public service.

However, there are many reasons to think that such a business, from the very nature of it, would be more uncorruptibly managed than most other public matters. 1st, Some persons would look after it as a work of more meritorious charity than any that can be thought on. 2dly, In case of male administration, the clamours of the common people would be irresistible. 3dly, A great many different sorts of men would find themselves concerned in point of interest, to see it well and justly administered.

It is not here pretended to give any regular scheme of this whole matter, which would take up more time than consists with the brevity designed in these Discourses ; but it is hoped the hints now given will suffice to make some good patriots in due season lay to heart a business of such high importance to their land, to its product, and to the entire body of the people.

That corporation for setting the poor to work, of which a scheme has been here proposed, may very properly provide granaries round the kingdom.

It would likewise be very advisable to review the ancient laws concerning corn, for they no ways square with the present numbers of our people, nor with the growth of London, and indeed ought to be more adapted to many other circumstances of the times we now live in.

All countries thrive or decline by trade, as they well or ill manage their product and manufactures ; and wise nations observe carefully every part, where they think to have any probable advantage. If they excel in product and manufac-

ture, as in France, the government bends itself to encourage the people in the pursuit of what is judged profitable to the public. If they have little product of their own, as in Holland, they fall to be carriers of the world, and to buy goods in one place to vend in another, whereby the bulk of their riches has been gained.

England has an excellent product of its own, wherewith to sustain its inhabitants: The woollen manufacture is a wealth in a manner peculiar to us. We have besides the product of other countries subject to our dominion, the West-Indies. The East-Indies are an inexhaustible mine of vanities, to barter for the vanities of other countries, which a rich nation will always covet. We have ports and situation, and every thing that can contribute to make us the foremost people of the whole commercial world, only a little industry may be wanting, which to stir up is the drift of these enquiries.

We have looked into Mr. King's computation of the corn, because it should be the fundamental care of a good government to provide that the people never want it, for two or three years defect there pulls down whatever the merchant has been doing for a long time.

As to his estimate of our live stock in cattle, many conclusions perhaps useful may be formed from it, which we omit, as fearing to be too voluminous: We shall only observe, that it seems more the national interest of England to employ its land to the breeding and feeding of cattle, than to the produce of corn; for, as Mr. Fortrey has well noted*, "The profit of one acre of pasture in
" the flesh, hide, and tallow of an ox, or in the

* England's Interest and Improvement. p. 15.

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“ flesh, wool, and tallow of a sheep, or in the
 “ carcase of a horse, is of so much greater value
 “ abroad, than the like yield of the earth would
 “ be in corn; that the exportation of this nation
 “ might be at least double to what it is, if rightly
 “ disposed.”

It is true, in these matters men are apt to follow what they think their particular profit, but the influence of good laws would go a great way towards inclining them more to pursue what is for the general advantage; and indeed the private concerns of men should be always made subservient to the public interest.

Nor is force at all needful to bring this about, for men, in most of their measures, where the administration is wise and steady, may be induced to pursue the common welfare by directive laws, by examples from the prince and great ones, and by some few not very expensive encouragements. As for example, it is in the power of a King of England not only to have as many horses bred, but of what shape and size he pleases; his encouragement will at any time encrease the studds, and when he countenances the shape and size that he thinks will profit his country most that way, the breeders will forthwith turn all their care and industry.

Our ancestors have not been unmindful to promote the breed of horses, as we may see by 27 H. 8. 6. 32 H. 8. 13. foreseeing what an advantage might accrue thereby to England; but those old laws want revising, and to be more adapted to present use.

Our forefathers indeed were against transporting horses and mares above such a value, 11 H. 7. 13. 1 Ed. 6. 5. but when those prohibitions were enacted, the business of trade was not so well understood

stood as it is at present. However, in practice we have of late years consulted our national interest, which in all appearance is to let this commodity be traded for, as well as any other.

It may be convenient to restrain the carrying out of mares, but as to geldings and stone-horses we can see no danger in it. On the contrary, if such numbers were called for as would invite us to encrease our breeds, it would no doubt bring a great profit to the kingdom. Stone-horses yield most abroad, and cost no more rearing than geldings: Against this is objected, that we may thereby strengthen our enemies, by mending the breed of other countries; but there is little strength added to that enemy, whose money we take for a perishable commodity: Besides, the nation we have most reason to distrust, labour under a natural impediment of not excelling in the breed of horses; their ground is not proper for it. They do not want stallions, of which they may have as good, if not better than ours, from other parts, but they have neither mares nor fit pasture; and if they had mares, they would be yet to seek; for it is notorious that the shape, strength, and beauty of horses, proceed from the soil; and when that is changed, in the next race they degenerate.

This matter has been taken notice of, because it has been frequently desired that the ancient prohibitions here mentioned might be reinforced by some new law; but whether or no such a measure be right for England, is humbly submitted to better judgments.

Mr. King computes the value of the horses yearly bred to be about 250,000 *l*.

This estimate seems not to be out of the way, and from it we shall observe, that by good laws
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and a due care in their execution, and by encouragement from the great ones above, it might peradventure be brought about to double our yearly breed; and if this could be compassed, and if great numbers of them should be sold in foreign markets (provided it be deemed safe for the state) it would be a new addition to our national stock, and be just so much put into the scale, yet more to incline of our side the general balance.

Our mines are another product of the earth, and undoubtedly capable of great improvements; we ought to respect them as the parents of all our Trade, and which made us known to the first merchants of the world, the Phœnicians. We have tin, lead, copper, calamy, iron, coal, culm, allom, copperas, with other sort of minerals; and what is in this manner dug out of the earth, cannot be a less article than about 7 or 800,000 *l.* per ann. in the whole rental of the kingdom.

They who work these mines and deal in these materials, know best what laws and constitutions they want to make their business more easy at home, and to give their commodities a freer vent abroad; but if they need any help from the legislative power, most certainly they ought to have it, since their stock and labour turn so much to the common good; for whatever their product yields in foreign markets, is clear national profit.

There are lately published some extraordinary accounts of the mines in Cardiganshire, where it is said there are eight large veins of silver, lead and copper ore, lying near together in one mountain, nigh a navigable river and a good port.

* It is alleged, that these mines with a large

* Mine Adventure and Expedient, p. 7.

stock, in a few years, may be advanced to a clear profit of 170,000*l.* per ann. This computation does not seem at all extravagant to those who have looked into the accounts of what mines produce in other countries, provided the ore be good, the vein like to last, (and large ones seldom fail) and provided there be no invincible impediment from nature to their working: they have stood still several years for want of a good agreement among the adventurers.

It is said Sir H. M. has put them in a way of being wrought; but if his expedient should not succeed, and if new discoveries should arise, legislative authority may very well and justly interpose, even to compel the partners to some agreement, whereby the work may be carried on; for it is a justice due to the public at no time to suffer a few stock-jobbing citizens to stand in the way of any national advantage, the fraud and corruption of which sort of men have hurt England in more than one particular.

If these mines come but any thing near the value Mr. William Waller * has put upon them, and with reasons very probable, they are a fit object of the state's care; and upon inspection into their true worth, if private purses cannot raise a stock sufficient to set them going, it were better done upon some public fund, to be repaid out of the profits, than to lose what is represented as so immense a treasure. But should it prove less, it is not to be neglected, for nations (like private men) who will thrive, must look into small things as well as great; and for this we have the examples of France and Holland, whose ministers examine

* Vide Essay on the Value of the Mines, &c.

x Sir Herbert Mackworth

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into the minutest matters, where the public may possibly reap any advantage; and it is a very commendable piece of wisdom, were it but for this single reason, that to do so constantly begets a habit of care and diligence in things of higher importance.

The fishery should be here treated of as being the product of the people's labour, but this point we have elsewhere handled *. However, it falls naturally into our present subject to observe, that to recover the fishery, and to bring us to the height and perfection our coast and situation are capable of, would encrease the numbers of our people (for men always multiply where they have conveniencies of living); it would find employment for poor; it would raise rents, and give a higher value to all that land produces; it would set us right in several nations where we are believed to deal at loss, and particularly in those places where our exportations bear no proportion, at least in bulk, with our importations, which might be supplied by fish. We cannot therefore but earnestly recommend the serious thoughts of this matter, and by what methods it may be retrieved, to all such as love their country, and who wish to see us every year more and more gainers in the Balance of Trade.

Having touched upon these heads, we shall proceed to say something of wool, which is a main article in the produce of land.

Mr. King computes the value of the wool shorn, to be about 2,000,000 *l.* per ann.

And in the Discourses upon the Revenue and Trade, (Part II. p. 147) we compute by a gene-

* Vide Discourses on the Public Revenues and Trade, Vol. I. Part II. p. 426.

ral medium, that the material is improved, one with another, fourfold in the workmanship; so that the value of the woollen manufacture made here, may amount to 8,000,000*l.* per ann.

Perhaps neither of us are much out of the way in these two calculations; but suppose us a little under or over the mark, all people will agree with us, that this branch of our product is very large, and of the highest importance.

The Writer of these papers has an account from a person, upon whose judgment and experience in these matters there is great reason to rely, that our exports of all kinds in the woollen manufacture, amount to above two millions per ann. which is so large a part of our general exportation, that it must maim the whole body of our Trade, to receive any hurt in so principal a member.

Whatever goods we make up of foreign materials, and sell in the markets abroad, all above the cost of the materials is clear gain to England; in the same manner all our clear returns from the plantations which we export are neat profit.

But where the materials and manufactures too are both our own, as in this instance of the woollen goods, two millions carried out, when the general Balance of Trade is considered, must be esteemed as two millions gained to the kingdom; for the return of this exportation supplies our consumption of foreign goods (which would otherwise be bought with money) with some overplus, which overplus is what must incline the scale to turn of our side.

Some people have been apt to fear that we sink in the woollen manufacture, because the accounts of the draperies exported, have been heretofore larger than of late years; but such do not contemplate, that though the old may have lessened,

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what is commonly called the new draperies have encreased, consisting in bays, ferges and stuffs: So that upon the whole, infinitely more of the material of wool has of late years been wrought up for foreign use than in former times; and herein our merchants have been only forced to follow the modes and humour of those people with whom they deal, and the course they have pursued has hitherto not been detrimental to the public.

Nor is there any cause to apprehend, but that we may increase from time to time in the general manufacture of wool, though the exportation of particular commodities may now and then vary; for, upon the whole, our material is better and fitter for all uses than that of most countries.

It were better indeed that the call from abroad were only for the fine draperies, because then we should be in a manner without a rival; no country but England and Ireland, having a soard or turf that will rear sheep, producing the wool of which most of our draperies are made. It is true, the wool of Spain is fine above all others, but it is the wear only of the richer sort; and of Spanish cloths not above 9000 pieces are sent abroad *communibus annis*. And even in the working up of this wool, perhaps it may be made out, that our very climate gives us an advantage over other countries.

The learned prelate * who has obliged England with that noble work his History of the Reformation, discoursing once upon these matters with the Writer of this Essay, did urge a thing of which the philosophy seemed very sound and right, and upon which we have since reflected often; he said, that nature had adapted different countries for dif-

* Bishop Burnet.

ferent manufactures; that cold and moister climates are fitter for the working up of wool, because there the sun does not exhaust its natural moisture, nor make it brittle, which would render it ill to work, and bad to wear; that hot climates are best for the working up of silk, because the matter is there more disposed to imbibe the dye, and to take a more durable impression of it, the sun helping, at the same time, both to preserve and to give it lustre.

That we have many natural advantages over all foreign nations, who shall pretend to set up looms, is beyond all dispute; but it is a very great question, whether there are not weighty reasons to apprehend neighbours of another sort, we mean the people of Ireland.

The country is very large, it abounds in convenient ports; it is excellently situate for Trade, capable of great improvements of all kinds, and able to nourish more than treble its present number of inhabitants.

Its soil, soard and turf, are in a manner the same with ours, and proper to rear sheep; all which considerations beget a reasonable fear, that in time they may come to rival us in our darling most important manufacture.

That they should encrease in people, that their land should be drained and meliorated, that they should have Trade, and grow wealthy by it, may not peradventure be dangerous to England; for it is granted, their riches will center at last here in their mother kingdom.

And colonies that enjoy not only protection, but who are at their ease, and flourish, will, in all likelihood, be less inclinable to innovate, or to receive a foreign yoke, than if they are harassed and compelled to poverty, through the hard usage

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of the people from whom they are derived. For though there are now and then instances of countries that rebel wantonly, yet most commonly great defections proceed from great oppression.

It seems therefore a point of the highest wisdom to give the planters of Ireland all encouragements that can possibly consist with the welfare of England; for it is an outwork to the seat of empire here; if it should be gained by any neighbouring power, the sum of affairs would be put in danger. It is to be preserved but by a numerous army, or by its own proper strength. How far the first way may affect our liberties is not difficult to determine, it follows then that the safest course must be to let them thrive by husbandry, and some Trade, whereby the natives and inhabitants will not only have the means, but an interest to defend themselves.

If through a mistaken fear and jealousy of their future strength and greatness, we should either permit or contrive to let them be dispeopled, poor, weak and dispirited, or if we should render them so uneasy as to incline the people to a desire of change, it may invite strangers to look that way; and if brought to be naked and defenceless, they must be a prey to the first invader.

This will be avoided if they are suffered to prosper, and not only so, but strength thus added to one member will make the body politic much the stronger.

For as all the blood with a swift motion passes frequently through the heart, so whatever wealth our countries acquire, circulates about, coming into the chief seat of empire, from whence it is dispersed into all its parts; and ever since Ireland did improve, it can be made appear England has had no small proportion of its gains.

What

What made Rome so immensely rich? Her citizens but little minded arts or handicraft, war was their chief employment. It was counted ignoble in a senator to exercise merchandize, nor indeed was the genius of the people addicted to it, but being the head of that large dominion, the fountain of law, and the spring from whence all power, honours, and magistracies were derived, thither all men resorted; some for pleasure, others upon business; so that what was got by the Sicilians, Rhodians, Cretans, and by the trading cities, not only of Greece but Asia, came at last to center there.

But this holds more strongly where the seat of dominion is in a great emporium, for such a city will not only be the head of power but of Trade, governing all its branches, and giving the rules and price; so that all parts thereon depending, can deal but subordinately to it, till at last it is found that provinces work but to enrich the superior kingdom.

That what has been here said is true, in our present case appears manifestly from this, that all people agree there is not in Ireland above 500,000*l.* in current cash, notwithstanding their large exportations for many years, which could not be, if they had not some constant drain, whereby they are exhausted. It is true, improving countries lay out a great stock in foreign materials for building, &c. So that they seldom abound much at first in the species of money; but allowing for this, yet in the natural course of things they ought to have more species, if what they got elsewhere had not been spent here, and returned hither by bills of exchange from Holland, France, Spain, the West-Indies, and other places.

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But though we are ready to agree, that hitherto their gains both at home and abroad have chiefly centered here; yet, in process of time, it is possible that in the management of their product and foreign traffic, they may come to interfere with, and bring prejudice to their mother nation. And remote fears being allowable where the whole safety of state is concerned, they should not wonder to see England so much alarmed at the progress they make in the woollen manufacture.

As has been said before, it is so great a part of our exportation, that any considerable failure and interruption therein must set the Balance of Trade against us with a witness; it falls therefore naturally into our present subject to say something of this matter.

Last session of parliament a bill passed the House of Commons, and was committed in the House of Lords, for prohibiting the exportation of the woollen manufactures of Ireland to foreign parts.

This point has of late been much debated, and the general subject of men's discourses; the Writer of these papers was then inclined to the milder side, being indeed in his judgment against prohibitions, because most of such as are come within his observation, seem to have been pushed on (without doors) rather for private ends, and to serve some particular turn, than calculated to produce any public benefit.

But having now more maturely considered this nice controversy, he begins to lean to their opinion, who think such a bill necessary, and more especially if the promoters of it can make out the suggestions upon which it was founded.

Where the commonwealth is truly concerned, and where her safety is in question, they have very narrow minds, who let their compassion be too

too much extended to private objects; our chief tenderness should be towards her, and rough examples in the infancy of a mischief are rather merciful than cruel, because fewer people suffer then, than would otherwise do, if the evil were permitted to take deeper root.

If their manufactures interfere with ours, so as to hurt England, it must be undoubtedly advisable to intercept their growth by some effectual law betimes, before such an error in government grow too big for our correction; before too many families have turned their stock that way; before they have encreased their stock of sheep, or bred up too great a number of artists (all which circumstances would make their case yet harder); for we should preserve ourselves with as little hurt to them as possible.

But it seems some people make a doubt, whether or no we have power thus to intermeddle in their matters; questioning whether laws made here are binding upon them, till they have received a sanction in their own parliament. And Mr. Molyneux counts it a very extravagant notion, that has not the least colour from reason or record, to term them a colony from England. But we must beg leave to differ with him in opinion. For we take them so far to be a colony in the sense (by the interpretation both of law and reason) as renders them still dependant upon their mother kingdom.

Nor is this at all impugned by the concessions made to the ancient Irish by Henry II. King John, and Henry III. but to set this in a better light, the posture of Ireland in those times must be considered.

The first adventurers that went over thither, namely, Richard the son of Strongbow, and Robert

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bert Fitz-Stephen, who stipulated under certain conditions to assist Dermot Fitz Murchard, had not a strength sufficient to reduce the country, and little was done towards it of any consequence, till the expedition of Henry II. anno 1172, with a royal army, to whom the clergy, nobility, gentry and people, made an absolute surrender of the kingdom; and, by the description historians give of it, it seems to have been that sort of yielding which the Romans called *Deditio*, which was *se dare in Manus Potestatem & Arbitrium*. And their giving themselves up to Henry II. without a battle or bloodshed, gave him yet a stronger title, because the act was less constrained, and more flowing from the will. It is true, so wild and numerous a people were not to be kept in order by a handful of new inhabitants; the King therefore gave them a constitution, by which they were to govern themselves, as a free country under him their lord. After this, the dominion thereof was settled upon John his youngest son, and 22 years after in him re-united to the crown of England. From King John, Henry III. and their successors, the ancient Irish and the first adventurers (of whom many as Mr. Spencer* has observed, have taken the names, manners and humours of the natives) derive several franchises and immunities, and among the rest to hold a parliament. The story of those times is itself dark, but the reason of their councils is yet darker. From Mathew Paris, and Giraldus Cambrensis it appears, that these concessions were made to the body of the old Irish, though but few in practice submitted to them; for to use Mr. Spencer's own words, " To whom

* Edmund Spencer's View of the state of Ireland, p. 222.

“ did King Henry II. impose those laws? Not
 “ to the Irish, for the most of them fled
 “ from his power into deserts and mountains,
 “ leaving the wide country to the conqueror,
 “ who in their stead eftsoons placed Englishmen,
 “ who possessed all their lands, and did quite shut
 “ out the Irish, or the most part of them. And
 “ to those new inhabitants and colonies he gave his
 “ laws, to wit, the same laws under which they were
 “ born and bred, the which it was no difficulty to
 “ place among them, being formerly well enured
 “ thereunto; unto whom afterwards there repaired
 “ divers of the poor distressed people of the Irish,
 “ for succour and relief of whom, such as they
 “ thought fit for labour, and industriously disposed,
 “ as the most part of their baser sort are, they re-
 “ ceived unto them as their vassals, but scarcely
 “ vouchsafed to impart unto them the benefit of
 “ those laws under which themselves lived, but
 “ every one made his will and commandment a law
 “ unto his own vassal. Thus was not the law of
 “ England ever properly applied unto the Irish
 “ nation, as by a purposed plot of government,
 “ but as they could insinuate and steal themselves
 “ under the same, by their humble carriage and
 “ submission.”

But after this, during the wars between the
 House of York and Lancaster, they shook off
 both the rule and laws of England, repossessing
 their ancient seats, driving us by degrees to that
 which was properly called the English pale.

In truth, it does not appear, that they embraced
 our form of government for a great while; so
 that the models of it given heretofore, from hence
 seem chiefly to have been intended for the better
 rule of our own people, not but they were like-

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wise meant as a benefit to the Irish, if they would be contented to become a more civilized nation.

If their ancient parliament rolls were extant, it would more plainly appear what use they made of their constitution, and thereby it would be seen whether or no both their House of Lords and Commons did not chiefly consist of the English planters.

If, as Mr. Molyneux asserts, "Ireland, though annexed to the crown of England, has always been looked upon to be a kingdom complete within itself, and to have all jurisdiction to an absolute kingdom belonging, and subordinate to no legislative authority upon earth;" these immunities must be derived from the concessions granted at Cashal by Henry II. But with whom was this compact made? With the native Irish; and their claim to it would be very just, if they had performed the conditions of the stipulation; but their title seems weakened by 52 rebellions which they have made against the government of England. We would not be thought here to insinuate, that a people may lose their natural rights by an insurrection against their prince, but certain privileges not fundamental, they may forfeit by nonuse or misuse. Besides, the case between a prince and his native subjects, and between a government and the people of a conquered country, is quite different. In the first instance, the relation is the same as betwixt a father and a son, the child may err, and the parent will forgive; but in the other case, the tie is not the same, they are not so near a kin. It is true, the prince is father of the people, in one place as well as in the other, but in his politic capacity he is at the head of another commonwealth, with whose blood and treasure the stranger country was perhaps conquered.

quered. And if a foreign people thus subdued, rebel, they without doubt forfeit several privileges, which were not any natural rights of their own, but forms of living prescribed, and concessions granted by the conquerors. And the Romans, in the best and purest times of the commonwealth, did frequently deprive subject cities and countries rebelling, of their land, and of their immunities: To be a state not subordinate to any legislative authority upon earth, is a privilege that may be forfeited by a subject country, and yet leave to the people their natural rights unhurt; the Irish were once a subject country appears from the entire resignation of themselves to Henry II. as head of the commonwealth of England. To reduce a wild nation, it was expedient to put their liberties upon a good foot. He restored them therefore to be a free people, and so they and their descendents might have been. They might have continued an independent kingdom, and the old Irish might have preserved both their land, and the immunities thereon depending, if they had not themselves altered their own constitution.

But by rebelling frequently, and by being as often vanquished, they changed their own form of government. They were heretofore proprietors of the land, and therefore had right to be the two estates in Parliament of Lords and Commons, but this was by degrees lost, and became vested in the new inhabitants; insomuch that, to use Mr. Molyneux's own words, "Now it is manifest, " that the great body of the present people of " Ireland, are the progeny of the English and " Britons, that from time to time have come " over into this kingdom; and there remains but

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"a mere handful of the ancient Irish at this day,
"I may say, not one in a thousand."

Are the concessions granted by King Henry now vested in this thousandth part? And are they the body politic of Ireland, of which not one in a thousand sits in parliament; and of which very few have voices in choosing those who are to sit there: If any, these certainly are to be the distinct state, and "To have all jurisdiction to an absolute kingdom belonging," for with their ancestors those stipulations were made, under which Mr. Molyneux pretends to claim.

But the old inhabitants having lost the greatest part of their property, have lost so much of their share in the constitution, which is now devolved upon those colonies which England has from time to time sent to conquer and possess the land, who are now properly the body politic of that kingdom.

These we allow have forfeited nothing by any rebellion the natives have made, they are purchasers, and at a dear rate, with the frequent hazard of their lives and fortunes: We must therefore see how far the ancient rights of the Irish are devolved upon them, and whether under that claim the new inhabitants may justly term themselves an independent nation.

Whoever conquers, conquers in the right of that country at whose expence the war was made; and though the property of the land be often granted to the adventurers, the dominion thereof is always reserved to the nation that sends her people out. It is true, where a part of the people divides itself from the rest to seek new seats at their own cost, as they did among the Scythians, Goths and Vandals, there the case was otherwise,

for they rambled so far as no more to communicate with their mother country.

But it does not appear that Fitz-Stephen, or Richard Strongbow, went out upon such terms as those northern nations did. On the contrary, their endeavours had little success till seconded by the power of England, at whose expence all the succeeding conquests of Ireland have been either made or secured; so that if the ancient Irish had any rights of dominion, and if those rights are forfeited, the forfeiture devolves upon England, and not upon the adventurers, nor their successors.

Nor is it indeed consistent with the principles of government, that a part of the people should separate from the rest, and be (especially so near at hand) an independent dominion, for that were to have protection where they owe no duty, which is an absurdity in politics.

When a part of the people divides from the rest to seek more territory, if they are at their own cost, and strong enough to eradicate or keep under the natives, they become a new empire, and may be justly termed a distinct nation: But if not at their own expence, and if they are weak, and always stand in need of being protected by their mother country, they are in all appearance to be accounted but as a colony.

Nor are names to alter the nature of things. It is granted Ireland has been very anciently called a kingdom, though our Princes did not take the stile of Kings thereof till the reign of Henry VIII. It is likewise apparent, that they have many distinct jurisdictions; that they are a state within themselves; that they have an undoubted right to hold Parliaments; but all this does not hinder them from being still a colony, nor can it make them an independent people.

Almost

* Almost every colony that the Romans planted was a model of their own republic, and framed according to it, by those whom the Senate had deputed for its settlement. They had an annual Duumviratus, in imitation of the consular authority. They had likewise Censors, Ædiles, and Quæstors; and which comes strongest to our present case, every colony had its particular Senate: But will any one pretend to argue from thence, that all these were distinct and independent commonwealths?

These branches and scions from the great trunk of the republic, had all of them the face of formal governments; they had magistracies and councils, power of life and death, and to raise money for their common safety, and to make laws for their better rule; but this is no argument that they had all the parts of sovereign empire.

It is true, the inhabitants of Ireland, from ancient concessions, have a privilege perhaps above the Roman colonies, namely to tax themselves by their own suffrages, within their own limits; but this is no more than what is claimed by several provinces of France, which nevertheless account themselves subordinate to the sovereign power of the whole state.

There is a part of empire not communicable, and which must reside sovereignly somewhere; for there would be such a perpetual clashing of power and jurisdictions, as were inconsistent with the very being of communities, unless this last resort were somewhere lodged. Now this incommunicable power we take to be the supreme judgment of what is best and most expedient for the whole; and in all reason of government this ought to be

* Sigonii Commentaria.

there trusted and lodged, from whence protection is expected.

That Ireland should judge of what is best for itself, this is just and fair; but in determinations that are to reach the whole, as namely what is most expedient for England and Ireland both, there, without all doubt, the supreme judgment ought to rest in the King, Lords, and Commons of England, by whose arms and treasure Ireland ever was, and must always be defended.

Nor is this any claiming the same empire over Scotland, as Mr. Molyneux would suggest*, for there is no parity of reason in the cases: Scotland to England (as Arragon to Spain) is a distinct state, governing itself by different laws, though under the same Prince, and is truly but a kingdom confederated with the realm of England, though subject to our King. The land thereof was not acquired to the present inhabitants by the arms of England. Protect them we do, as the strongest allies always are to defend the weaker, but this puts them not in the degree of subordination we are treating of. They are not our descendents, and they are but politically our brethren; whereas the English-Irish, who are now chief lords of that soil, are naturally our offspring.

Their inferior rule and jurisdictions are not disputed, but that supereminent dominion and supreme and uncontrollable regiment over themselves, which they pretend to, is neither safe for England to grant, nor for them to ask.

Such a power would be dangerous, because by some accident it may come to be so exercised, as to be their and our ruin.

* Case of Ireland, p. 84.

We have had bad Kings, and those Kings have had evil counsellors: Suppose us then, in some future age, under such circumstances, as to have a Prince and his council so angry with the people, as to desire their destruction, which was our case once with King John*, who would have sold us to the Moors to wreak his own discontents. And suppose this Prince willing to set up Ireland in opposition to this kingdom, may not a Prince, so disposed, give the royal assent to laws in Ireland, that would utterly destroy England? And what remedy would Poining's act be in such a juncture? In a case like this, what way have the people of England to preserve themselves, but to represent their grievances to the Prince? Who, when he sees the error of his council, may be induced to join in some supreme exercise of the legislature here, coercive, and such as may keep Ireland in the degree of subordination, that seems requisite to the well-being of both nations.

Suppose a Prince bent to hurt England, should give his assent to a law there, that the Irish may transport all their wool to foreign countries, would not this, as they say, cut the turf from under our feet, and at one blow, in a manner, ruin all our woollen manufactures? There are many other instances, in which, if they were indulged, the greatest part of our traffic would be carried to their ports.

In matters of trade, even the best of kings may be surprised, of which we have a late example; and the ill consequences the Scotch act will probably have, ought to make us very watchful over what our neighbours do, especially where they depend upon us.

* Mat. Paris.

That

That the greatest part of the present inhabitants of Ireland, chiefly those who claim the land property, are a colony from England, has been here peradventure sufficiently made out; and we take it to be their best hold, to be always so accounted, because it gives them a lasting title to be protected and defended by us. And if they are a colony, it would be a strange defect in our constitution, if we wanted any of the powers requisite to pursue the ends of government, of which the principal is to take care that no one part of the people be permitted to hurt the other; but if the legislature of England cannot, in important matters, restrain that of Ireland, Ireland is at least in a capacity to ruin England, which would make our form of government at one and the same time ridiculous and dangerous.

But to be thus out of our jurisdiction, would in the conclusion be as fatal to them as to us; for though they should grow rich at our expence, and though a large part of our Trade were diverted thither, they would not yet be able to subsist alone and by themselves. And if we, by loss of our Trade, become weakened, how can we give them that assistance which from time to time they have always wanted? So that this division of strength would be destructive to both countries. It must therefore be their interest as well as ours, that the supreme power, and the chief wealth, should be ever preserved to center here in the seat of empire.

Upon the whole matter, it seems the right of England, and as well for the benefit of Ireland, its best and noblest colony, that the legislative authority here should, upon all emergencies, make such regulations and restrictions, relating to Trade especially,

especially, as shall be thought for the weal-public of both countries.

And having premised these things, we shall proceed to handle more closely the subject of our question; namely, Whether it is necessary to prohibit by law, the exportation of woollen manufacture from Ireland to foreign parts?

To put an early stop to their turning their stock and industry this way, appears requisite for many reasons.

1st, Ireland contains near a half as much territory as England, and the soil being of the same nature, may be brought to produce near half as much wool as England yields; and this material being the basis upon which our Trade is built, they who can come near us in it, will come just so near us in our Trade abroad.

2dly, Countries thinly peopled, can sooner improve in the breed of cattle than any other way, because it is a work which a few hands may manage.

3dly, Where there is plenty of a material, which, manufactured, yields a good price, hands will soon be invited over to work it up.

4thly, But this holds more strongly, where not only the material, but all sorts of provisions are cheap; and in countries which have not been yet improved, where every new comer hopes to make a sudden fortune.

From which positions it follows, if Ireland be permitted to proceed in the exportation of woollen goods,

1st, That in no long course of time they may come to carry out to the value of a million per annum.

2dly, That

2dly, That the cheapness of provisions will enable them to afford their commodities cheaper than England can do in foreign markets.

All that have either writ or spoke upon this subject agree, that the whole controversy turns upon this single point, whether they can make the same woollen goods cheaper there than here.

To set this in a true light, we must consider the first material, and those who work it up.

As to the first material, beyond all doubt, wool is a third cheaper there than in England.

As to the workmanship, the clothiers affirm spinning to be one half of it, and that of all hands is agreed to be cheaper there than here. And for the combing and weaving, the price of course must abate, as workmen encrease; for handycraft in countries where living is cheap, can be dear no longer than till artists are bred up. And a great many artists will be instructed before the multitude of inhabitants can render provisions dear in such a place as Ireland. But to judge rightly of these matters, we must contemplate the body of the people in each country.

Sir William Petty affirms*, that the inferior rank of people in Ireland (through whose hands spinning must pass) do not expend, one with another, above 2*l.* 12*s.* per head. The expence of the same rank cannot be less here than 5*l.* per head.

It is an undeniable truth, that the common provisions for life are one half cheaper there than here: It is likewise as plain, that meat and drink are one half of mankind's expence, reckoned in a mass together. And these advantages of living must enable them to afford the same commodity

* Political Anatomy of Ireland, p. 76.

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cheaper than we can do, where not only our numbers make provisions dear, but where new excises give all things of our home consumption yet a higher price.

Mr. Clement's (for we take him to be the Author of * that fine discourse upon this subject, inscribed to the Marquis of Normanby) makes this judicious observation, "That if any one offers his goods cheaper than the usual price, that will then become the market price; and every one else must sell at the same, or keep his goods."

The cheapness of living, and all other circumstances considered, it seems very probable, that if they should come to have the necessary complement of workmen, and to flourish in this manufacture, they will be able to sell it one-third cheaper than we can do.

If they can make for a million, and afford it by one-third cheaper than we, it follows, that at least one-half of our exportations in that commodity must immediately determine.

And the consequence of this would be, that rents must every where fall. The purchase of land must sink. The poor must want employment, and grow upon us; half our Foreign Trade must forthwith cease, and in the other half we must be losers in the balance, which is chiefly kept on our side by the woollen manufactures.

Not only a third, but an abatement of 10 per cent. forced upon us, by the rivalry in Trade of another country, would throw us into more disorders, than the most knowing man in England can readily describe.

And to ask where will be the stocks of money to set up so large a manufacture? is but an evasive

* Interest of England with relation to the Trade of Ireland.

way of arguing; for where the prospect of gain is certain, money never fails to come. And if it should ever be determined, that England cannot restrain that country in this exportation, foreigners will carry stocks to an improving place, where they may reasonably expect many more advantages than what shall arise from this manufacture. As for example, to lay out money upon good securities, at 10 per cent. interest, to buy land capable of great melioration at 10 years purchase; and to have almost all the necessaries of life half as cheap again as in other parts; are not all these circumstances sufficient to invite thither, not only foreign stocks, but very much of our own money, and a great number of our workmen, where their industry will turn to a better account than it does here.

No wise state, if it has the means of preventing the mischief, will leave its ruin in the power of another country. And if wars have been thought not only prudent, but just, which have been made to interrupt the too sudden growth of any neighbour nation, much more justifiable may a mother kingdom exercise the civil authority in relation to her own children; who from her had their being, and still have their protection, especially when her own safety is so much concerned.

Nor can this be thought rigour; it is but a reasonable jealousy of state, and only severe wisdom, which governments should shew in all their councils; it is a preventing remedy which operates gently in the beginning of the disease, before there are many, and those inveterate humours to contend with. And if a timely stop be put to these exportations from Ireland, it will hurt but a very few, (which is never to be regarded, where the good of the whole public is in question) and even

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that few, without any great difficulty, may have their industry turned to safer objects.

For these and several other reasons, which will occur to such as think seriously of this subject, it seems for the public good, that the Legislature of England should, by some restrictions, keep Ireland from interfering with us in this principal foundation of our whole traffic. And to do it by a positive law here, and not to leave it to the administration there, as some propose, appears to be the rather requisite; because when this step is made, and when they are rendered incapable of exporting woollen goods, there will lie a necessity upon the governing part and landed men, of doing their utmost to promote other improvements, of which their soil is capable.

Nor is it fair to urge, that we may proceed from one prohibition to another, till we leave them nothing, and till they are quite undone. They can fundamentally hurt us no other way; their rivalry is dangerous in none but the woollen manufacture, where all *Lucrum Cessans* is *Damnum Emergens* to England, since all our affairs abroad turn and depend upon it; nor can we suffer any competitors in it, if we mean to flourish and be gainers in the general Balance of Trade.

To think this kingdom will either peevishly or covetously hurt that colony, is an absurd imagination. It is obvious enough, that too much depends upon the possession of such an island, to render its inhabitants desperate, and desirous of a change; if they have a large trade, and flowing riches, the benefit thereof will redound to us at last: And the wiser a government is, the more it will desire to see them prosper, except in this single instance, where their wealth would be built upon our destruction.

But

But such a prohibition as we have been treating of will have very little effect, unless they can be likewise hindered from carrying out their wool; to prevent which, their situation considered, will be a very hard matter; but there are no difficulties of the like nature which are not to be overcome, if the administration be strict and steady.

They, who would prohibit the exportation of woollen goods from Ireland to foreign parts, have hitherto proposed setting up there the linen manufacture, but this design is likewise not without its dangers: The setting up the linen manufacture will be less hurtful than to set up the woollen, but we are to consider, that Ireland will be always able to supply itself with draperies at home, and that there will be no market for their linen but England, and its dependences. Now it is evident, that our woollen goods are sold in several countries, namely Holland, Hamburgh, Germany, the Hans Towns, and all the East country; many of which places will not be able to take off our woollen goods, unless we deal for their linens: And in fact, and by experience it has been seen, in the case of the East India Trade, since there has been imported from thence vast quantities of linens, such as callicoes, muslins, romals for handkerchiefs, which answered the end of lawns, cambricks, and other linen cloth, we have not exported that vast quantity of draperies to those northern parts, of which Sir Walter Raleigh makes mention. As our call for their linens has diminished, their call for our draperies has proportionably decreased; and not only so, but these people have been compelled by necessity to fall upon making coarse woollen cloth, by which they supply themselves and other places, which heretofore we were wont to furnish. So that it deserves

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a very serious consideration, what future effect it may have upon our woollen goods, to promote a considerable linen manufacture in Ireland.

Upon the whole matter, it ought to be carefully examined, whether or no a better expedient may not be thought on to stop their progress in the new draperies, than to introduce the linen manufacture there? and whether it would not be the best for both kingdoms to take off the prohibition that now lies upon Irish cattle?

This point has been formerly much debated, and it remains yet very doubtful, when this prohibition was set on foot, which was most consulted, public good, or private interest; the numbers of the breeding were without doubt stronger at that time, than those of the feeding lands; but it is to be feared, in the making that act, that the general interest of England was not sufficiently considered.

If the people of Ireland are permitted to bring their cattle hither, it will lower the price of flesh in England; a matter very important to a country that subsists so much by manufactures. It is true, the breeding counties will be thereby somewhat hurt, but it will encourage improvements and melioration of barren land, in order to feed, which will be advantageous to the whole public of the nation. It will divert those of Ireland from thinking to extend their trade too much abroad; a point not to be slighted. And it will in a manner confine the principal part of their dealings to this kingdom; which, for many reasons of state, will be best and safest for England.

It is therefore submitted to better judgments, whether or no to open the way hither for their cattle will not be most advisable, and the truest method to hinder their progress in manufactures,

without doing any thing that may look like injury or oppression.

It is no true objection to say, That the people of Ireland will not fall readily into this sort of trade, which has been now so long intermitted; for, as we are informed, the payments are very ill made, for that flesh, tallow, and hides, that are exported to foreign parts: That the merchant makes the butcher stay sometimes two or three years, upon pretence of bills of exchange, and returns expected from the West-Indies, Spain, and other parts; and if the butcher be ill dealt with, it must follow, that the landlord cannot be paid his rent: Whereas, when the trade was open for England, the gentlemen of Ireland received ready money, or if they gave credit, it was answered by the next return; and England was to them as Smithfield is to Lancashire, Lincolnshire, or any other English feeding county; besides, it would keep down the Exchange, which would be another encouragement to the Irish nobility and gentry, who spend so large a part of their estates in London.

So that in all likelihood, the people of that kingdom, if the said prohibition were taken off, would cheerfully submit to a law here, binding them not to export to foreign parts their woollen goods; nor would they perhaps think of setting up the linen manufacture, which is likewise not without consequences very pernicious; and for these reasons the expedient here proposed is now offered to public consideration.

Before we quit our present subject of Land and its Product, we shall offer another hint. The coarse draperies is that part of our woollen manufacture in which we are in greatest danger to be rivalled by other countries; it stands therefore in need of
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most encouragement. There are many parts of the world whose poverty disables them from buying our woollen goods; because of their high price. As Russia, Poland, Tartary, &c. and therefore they are supplied by the Germans, or some other neighbours, with a sort of cloth very contemptible, in comparison of what we could make to answer the same ends and uses. Suppose then, instead of paying five per cent. custom outward bound, that such coarse cloths not exceeding such a certain value, should, for a term of years, receive upon the exportation ten per cent. bounty money by way of encouragement from the state, for so much as the exporters can make appear was carried out, to countries with whom we had no dealings of that kind before, and that such their exportation are in order to enlarge our trade. A recompence of this nature would in all probability encrease the woollen manufacture of England, in not many years, at least $\frac{1}{3}$ d.

We have the more largely handled the Irish prohibitions, because in all appearance the Balance of Trade will very much depend upon the measures England shall take in relation to that colony; since we should proceed very heavily in all our foreign traffic, if Ireland is left in a capacity to disturb us abroad in the vent of our woollen manufactures.

And having treated of the Numbers of the People, and of Land, and its Product, we shall proceed to say something of our Payments to the Public, and in what manner the Balance of Trade may be thereby affected.

S E C T. IV.

Of our Payments to the Public, and in what manner the Balance of Trade may be thereby affected.

WHETHER it be under a commonwealth, an absolute monarchy, or in a mixed government, the affairs of a country can never go on prosperously, unless the Public Revenues are well and wisely ordered. Richlieu says *, *C'est le Point d'Archimede qui estant fermement etabli, donne moyen de mouvoir tout le monde.*

Commonwealths are seldom to blame in this part of polity, and when they quit it, suffering their treasure to be embezzled by the men in power, they seldom fail of falling soon after into the hands of a single person. In absolute monarchies, where it is neglected, the Prince is compelled by his want to flea and rack his subjects, and to wink at all sorts of rapine in those whose business it is to contrive ways of supplying his necessities, till at last he becomes tyrannical and odious to the whole people.

Profusion has the same ill effects in constitutions where the regal authority is limited by laws. Richlieu says †, “ A necessitous Prince can never undertake a glorious action; and necessity inducing contempt, he can never be reduced to that condition without being exposed to the attempts of his enemies, and of those who are envious of his greatness.” Besides, when the crown is brought very low, it alters the due balance of power, which should be kept even and

* Testament Politique, Part 2. §. 7.

† Ibid.

well poised, to preserve such forms of government; for it either inclines the people who hold the purse to entrench upon such prerogatives as are necessary for the Prince's safety, and to keep the kingdom's peace, or it gives bad men an opportunity of suggesting to him that wicked counsel (which was given to King Charles I.) of making himself easy, by subverting his people's rights.

This able statesman lays down *, " That good order in the revenue depends more on those who have the administration than on laws and regulations, which remain useless, unless such as are employed to see them observed be willing to perform their duty."

The legislative part of the constitution gives the money, but it principally belongs to the ministerial part to take care that what is granted be not wasted, diverted, or misapplied; and if such as are trusted fail to do this, it is incumbent on the Legislature to interpose, and call them to a strict account.

The wealth of a country is finite, as well as the substance of any private man; and when a ministry set themselves industriously about it, they can as well ruin a whole people, as the Duke of Buckingham could see an end of his great estate.

Henry III. of France, for want of order, and by being ill served, in a few years consumed an immense sum, and anticipated all the crown revenue. His successor Henry IV. with a very little care of his own, but by the infinite application, prudence, and honesty of the Duke of Sully, his treasurer, paid most of those debts off, and left behind him, at his death, five millions sterling in his coffers. And at this day, for want of conduct in the mi-

* Testament Politique, Part I. c. 4. § 1.

nistry, Spain is not the richer for the silver mines of Potosi. So that the wealth or poverty of the Public does, in a manner, wholly depend upon the good or bad administration of its affairs.

Machiavel does not seem to think liberality a necessary virtue in a Prince, because, to support it, there must go so much oppression of the people. "And that a frugal Prince shall be accounted noble to all from whom he takes nothing away, which are an infinite number: And that he shall be esteemed near and parsimonious only by those few to whom he gives but little." And he says, "That a Prince ought not so much to concern himself (so he exacts not upon his subjects, so he be able to defend himself, so he becomes not despicable, and commits no rapine upon his people) though he be accounted covetous, for that it is one of those vices which fortifies his dominion." And he observes, "That Pope Julius II. was liberal till he came to the papacy, but frugal afterwards, which enabled him to do such great things against the power of France."

That the business of most kingdoms has been ill managed, proceeds from this: It imports the lower rank of men only and the people (whose cries seldom reach the Prince till it is too late, and till all is past remedy) that matters should be frugally ordered, because taxes must arise from their sweat and labour. But the great ones, who heretofore have had the Prince's ear and favour, or who hoped to have him in their possession, were swayed by another sort of interest; they like profusion, as having had a prospect to be gainers by it: They can easily set their account ever with the state, a small charge upon their land; more than balanced by a great place, or a large pension. At the same time the people who are to pay all, and expect
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to receive nothing, are glad to see a frugal court; which, though it be not so good for its followers, never fails to enrich a nation.

It is true, Galba is an instance that the virtues of a closehanded Prince may be unsuccessful in countries governed by the sword, and where the soldier is riotous, and in long possession of a slack discipline. And perhaps in all absolute monarchies, he who governs should rather lean towards munificence than thrift. But frugality in the state can never be dangerous in a trading nation, ruled by laws of its own making; and it is not only necessary in itself, but profitable in the example, teaching private men that good husbandry in their domestic affairs, which never fails to enrich the whole body politic.

Much nobler it is to enjoy the praises of an universal people, living in plenty and at their ease, not burthened by taxes and duties, than to have the good words of a few flatterers, or those harpies which commonly haunt a court to gripe all they can; who, when they are gorged themselves, pollute all the remainder with their foul and obscene claws, so that no body else desires to touch it. Besides, we have hardly an instance of any Prince, that in time of need, was truly assisted and defended by his minions, and the creatures of his bounty and favour; but a King beloved for wise, just, and careful government, has been very seldom deserted by his people.

But suppose a Prince should desire to exercise in a very ample manner the inbred magnificence of his mind; if he will discharge the trust committed to him by the King of Kings; if he will not make what he counts virtue destructive to his people, he must find matter to supply his liberal inclinations; which he only can do who sees

that his ministers look well after his income and expences.

Some persons have a strange notion, that large payments to the state are not hurtful to the public; that taxes make money circulate; that it imports not what A pays, when B is to receive it: But we hope to shew, that they who argue in this manner are very much mistaken.

We have formerly touched upon this matter in the Discourses on the Revenues and Trade of England *, to which we refer the reader; but the necessity of our present argument compels us here to handle this point something more at large.

All nations have a certain annual income upon which the people live and subsist, out of which taxes of all kinds arise; which income we take to be since the war,

			<i>l. per ann.</i>
In England,	—	—	— 43,000,000
In France,	—	—	— 81,000,000
In Holland,	—	—	— 18,250,000

And we must beg leave to repeat, in this place, something which we have laid down in those tracts †: “ That to nourish the mass of mankind, “ as to their annual expence, in the way and form “ of living practised in each of the three coun- “ tries, such an annual income is necessary as is “ set down in the foregoing scheme. By annual “ income we mean the whole that arises in any “ country, from land and its product, from fo- “ reign trade and domestic business, as arts, ma- “ nufactures, &c. and by annual expence we un- “ derstand what is of necessity consumed to clothe “ and feed the people, or what is requisite for

* Vol. I. Part I. p. 252, 253.

† P. 251.

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“ their defence in time of war, or for their orna-
“ ment in time of peace. And where the annual
“ income exceeds the expence, there is a super-
“ lucration arising which may be called wealth or
“ national stock. The revenue of the govern-
“ ment is a part of this annual income, as like-
“ wise a part of its expence; and where it bears
“ too large a proportion with the whole, as in
“ France, the common people must be miserable,
“ and burthened with heavy taxes. That part of
“ the Prince’s revenue that nourishes his own
“ person is very little; but in great monarchies,
“ where numerous armies, large fleets, and pom-
“ pous courts are maintained, there the expence
“ swells high, insomuch that to the maintenance
“ of the governing part, viz. the Prince, his of-
“ ficers of state, military power, &c. which are
“ not in time of peace above $\frac{1}{28}$ th of the whole,
“ there is required near the ninth penny of the
“ annual income. And in such countries the
“ governing part are rich or at their ease, but the
“ other 25 parts, who are the body of the people,
“ must be oppressed with taxes, as may be ob-
“ served in the French dominions. And this
“ holds more strongly, where the public debts
“ make the payment of $\frac{1}{8}$ th part of the annual in-
“ come necessary, which, for some time, is like
“ to be the case of France.”

To explain these assertions shall be the subject
of this section, whereby it will appear how much
the Balance of Trade may be affected by our Pay-
ments to the Public.

We shall endeavour to shew, in the last section,
that the wealth of a country does in a great mea-
sure proceed from a right administration of its af-
fairs: However, it may happen sometimes to en-
crease in riches where things are in the main ill
admi-

administered, as England did to the year 1688, in the two reigns that preceded this; but whoever looks carefully into the true reason why we grew so fast in wealth during those 28 years, will find it was because we paid all that time but small taxes and duties to the government, comparatively with other nations.

For in 1688, our gross payments to the public, in which charge of management was included, did not exceed — 2,300,000 *l.* per ann.
Which was but little above $\frac{1}{20}$ th part of the then 44,000,000 *l.* an. ^eincome

But our case is very much altered; now, and since that year, a great many new revenues have been erected. We still pay the old excise, the customs, and post-money; besides which, there is laid additional duties upon beer, ale, and other liquids; additional customs, the continued acts and joint stocks, duty on marriages, &c. double duty on stamped paper, duty on hackney coaches, on malt. The double tonnage, the former and last duties upon salt. The duty on windows, upon leather, paper, and coals.

The old and new impositions of all kinds reckoned together, and including the new poll, and the 3 *s.* aid, it will be found that there was collected from the people about — — 5,500,000 *l.* last year.
Which is above $\frac{1}{4}$ th part ^eof our present — 43,000,000 *l.* an. income
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During all the war, there has been levied here great sums every year, and many of the forementioned funds are to continue so long, that it will be several years before our annual payments can be considerably diminished. And there is such a difference between $\frac{1}{20}$ th and $\frac{1}{8}$ th, or indeed $\frac{1}{10}$ th, or $\frac{1}{12}$ th part, (which yet we shall not come at in some time) as must inevitably affect the nation's trade, and the whole body of its people.

When there was raised no more than about $\frac{1}{20}$ th part, there were great sums of money to circulate in foreign traffic, and to employ in enlarging our home manufactures, which two fountains of our wealth must be dry, when the springs that heretofore fed them are diverted, and let into another channel.

There is scarce any of these new revenues which do not give trade some desperate wound. The additional duties on beer and ale, and the tax upon malt, are apparently a burthen upon the woollen manufactures, affecting the carder, spinner, weaver, and the dyer, who all of them must be raised in their wages, when the necessaries of life are raised to them. The consequence of which will be, that our woollen goods must come at a heavy and disadvantageous price into the foreign markets.

There is no man will pretend that high customs are not pernicious to our commerce abroad. A nation is not gainer in the general Balance of Trade, by the dealing of a few, who are able to employ in it great stocks; such may make to themselves an immense gain, but they go but a little towards enriching the whole Public, which seldom thrives, but when, in a manner, the universal people bend their thoughts to this sort of business; when every one is ready with his small stock,

stock, and little sum, to venture and rove about the world: Of these some prosper, and others are undone; however, in the way of merchandize, men who do not thrive themselves, may yet contribute very much to make their country rich, which gets by the dealings of all, and does not suffer by the unfortunate conduct of here and there a merchant. But when the customs are high, all these under-dealers, who all along in England have made up the chief bulk of our trading men, must hold their hands, though in skill, industry, and inventive parts and wit, they may exceed merchants of more wealth, and of a higher rank. Nor is it indeed practicable for men of but a moderate fortune to deal at all, when more than treble that sum is necessary to have ready now to pay the King, which formerly would set up a substantial trader, and maintain him in sufficient business.

But of all the new impositions, none are so dangerous to the very being of trade, nor so hurtful to all its parts and members, as the high duties lately laid upon salt. 1st, They affect the common people in the whole course of their living, whose chief nourishment is bacon, and other salted flesh, so that this excise has an universal influence upon all our manufactures whatsoever. But the general prejudice it may bring to navigation, is yet of much a higher consequence.

Mr. King, in his computations of the naval trade of England, anno 1688, and the national profit then arising thereby, reckoning what proportion was navigated by ourselves at that time, and what by foreigners, is of opinion, That with relation to the value of our whole trade here at home, our own navigation was somewhat more than $\frac{3}{4}$ ths, and the foreign navigation near $\frac{1}{4}$ th; but

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but reckoning the value of the foreign navigation at the market here, and of our own at the markets abroad, then the foreign navigation seems to have been at that time in proportion to our own, as one to two and three fourths, and with respect to the tonnage of ships, our own navigation seems to have been at that time $\frac{2}{3}$ ds, and the foreign navigation $\frac{1}{3}$ d, according to the following scheme :

A SCHEME of the Naval Trade of England, and the national Profit arising thereby, calculated for the Year 1688.

Exported,	Value here.	Value abroad.	Value upon the balance.	Gain by freight, &c.
By ourselves,	3,310,000	4,120,000	Value abroad, 4,120,000	To ourselves, 810,000
By foreigners,	1,000,000	1,250,000	Value here, 1,000,000	To foreigners, 250,000
	<u>£. 4,310,000</u>	<u>5,370,000</u>	<u>£. 5,120,000</u>	<u>£. 1,060,000</u>
Imported,				
By ourselves,	5,570,000	2,870,000	Value abroad, 2,870,000	To ourselves, 12,700,000
By foreigners,	1,550,000	1,150,000	Value here, 1,550,000	To foreigners, 400,000
Gross imports,	7,120,000	4,020,000	Gross imports, 4,420,000	Gross imports, 3,100,000
Gross exports,	4,310,000	5,370,000	Gross exports, 5,120,000	Gross exports, 1,060,000
In all,	<u>11,430,000</u>	<u>9,390,000</u>	<u>9,540,000</u>	<u>4,160,000</u>
			Value abroad.	Value abroad.
So the exports by our own shipping being	—	—	4,120,000	In all, —
Imports by our own shipping,	—	—	2,870,000	—
National gain by our shipping in the Balance of Trade,			<u>1,250,000</u>	
			Value here.	
And the imports by foreign shipping being	—	—	1,550,000	In all, —
Exports by foreign shipping,	—	—	1,000,000	—
National loss by foreign shipping in the Balance of Trade,			<u>550,000</u>	<u>9,540,000</u>

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Of our Payments to the Public. 271

From whence he concludes, *l.*

That our gain upon the balance by our own shipping, being	— —	1,250,000
And our loss upon the balance by fo- reign shipping, being	— —	550,000

The encrease of money, or adequate treasure, by the Balance of Trade in general, might be, anno 1688,	—	700,000
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And that the advantage to foreigners trading to England in their own ships, might be at that time in general thus :

By freight, or advance of the price of our commodities exported by them, above the value here,	— —	250,000
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By freight, or advance of the price of their own commodities imported here, above their value abroad,	— —	400,000
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Besides, the encrease of goods imported to their own countries, over and above their own exports, according to the value of them in their own countries,		100,000

In all,	750,000

Upon the whole he concludes,

1st, That the general encrease of our money, or adequate treasure, and of wares and commodities, over and above the value of our gross exports, was, anno 1688	— — —	2,810,000
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And the gain made by foreign nations with England, in their own ship- ping, was	— — —	750,000
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So that the naval trade of England was at that time, generally profitable to ourselves and foreigners, in all	— — —	3,560,000
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2dly, That the national profit to Eng-
land, by foreign trade, was then at
least — — — — l. 1,700,000

Whereof in money, or	}	1,700,000
adequate treasure, — 700,000		
And in wares or commodities treasured up, or applied to the encrease of the national stock, besides what we consumed ourselves, — 1,000,000		

Whoever considers these computations, will find them very judiciously made, and that Mr. King has done as much as could be performed merely by the strength of numbers.

To come to an exact knowledge in this matter, and such as would be almost beyond contradiction, the books of the customs should be looked into; and from thence might be drawn an account of all the exportations from London, and the out-ports, to every distinct country; and also of all the importations to London, and the out-ports, from every distinct country, and what might at that time be the value of those goods, being computed by able merchants: And this to be done for some competent number of years by reasonable mediums, it may be very nearly guessed from such a view, how the Balance of Trade stood from time to time.

But where a thing so much within their reach (and which the French ministers are said to do in their exports and imports) has not been done by the men of business here; there is no way of knowing how the balance stands, but by consider-

ing

ing the numbers of the people, and their probable consumption of our home product, and of foreign materials, from whence a judgment may be formed, not indeed perfectly demonstrable, but very near the truth.

Mr. King observes, that by how much the nation does not consume of its imports, but either lays up, or encreases the stock of gold or silver, or other adequate treasure, or of durable commodities in specie; by so much, at least, does the nation gain by Foreign Trade, besides all other advantages of navigation.

It is difficult to know how our navigation has proceeded for these ten years last past, but it is to be feared, that the gain which foreigners have made, by fetching and carrying in their own bottoms, has been much greater of late, than it was heretofore; which must be a very considerable prejudice to England, and highly tend to set the Balance of Trade against us.

Reckoning long and short voyages together, the principal expence of fitting out a trading vessel is drink and meat. The excises and duty upon malt, without doubt, make drink sufficiently dear to the freighter: And the duty upon salt makes victualling a very heavy burthen upon him, all which must end in lessening our navigation from time to time; for undoubtedly foreigners observing how dear freight is with us, will trade in their own ships as much as possible.

In barrelling up beef and pork, we heretofore made use of St. Martin's, &c. or Oleron and English salt mixed together; and with these materials the flesh was best prepared, both for wholiomeness and long keeping; our own salt, without foreign mixture, being fiery, corrosive, and very scor-

butic. As we are informed, the St. Martins, and worser sort of French salt, from 1676 to 1688, was delivered in London at about 2*l.* 5*s.* per tun, and 40 bushels to the tun; and that from Oleron from 2*l.* 10*s.* to 2*l.* 15*s.* per tun: But now the very duty for 40 bushels of Oleron salt amounts to 13*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* besides the 25 per cent. *ad valorem*, of which formerly the prime cost came to but 2*l.* 15*s.* at highest: The duty likewise upon 40 bushels of Lisbon salt comes to 13*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* of which the prime cost was formerly, at highest, but 3*l.* 10*s.* And as to our Newcastle and Lymington salt, which is now generally made use of in salting beef and pork for trading vessels; the very duty for 40 bushels amounts to 6*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* of which, before the war, the prime cost came but to 3*l.* at the dearest market: Infomuch, that we are credibly informed, a merchant can store himself in Ireland, for a long voyage, with salt beef and pork, ready packed up, almost as cheap as he can buy the salt in England.

So that for long voyages, the merchant will either victual in Ireland, or salt his beef and pork on some foreign coast, as he sails along, where provisions shall be cheap, which must bring a great damage to the landed interest here; or if he does not do so, victualling will be so expensive to him, as to make freight much dearer than it ought to be in a country that expects to thrive by trade.

The consequence of all which will be, that the body of our merchants must lie under a general discouragement; they will neglect looking after national gain, which English merchants have perhaps heretofore as much considered in their dealings, as any trading men in the whole commercial

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mercian world: They will have an eye to nothing but their own temporary profit, and suffer strangers to go away with those gains which England was wont to make by freight; from whence it will follow, that we must decay in our stock of shipping, and decrease every year in the breed of seamen; and when this happens, we must no more pretend to such a naval strength as has hitherto made us terrible to all our neighbours.

Trade, without doubt, is in its nature a pernicious thing; it brings in that wealth which introduces luxury; it gives a rise to fraud and avarice, and extinguishes virtue and simplicity of manners; it depraves a people, and makes way for that corruption which never fails to end in slavery, foreign or domestic. Lycurgus, in the most perfect model of government that was ever framed, did banish it from his commonwealth. But, the posture and condition of other countries considered, it is become with us a necessary evil. We shall be continually exposed to insults and invasions, without such a naval force as is not to be had naturally but where there is an extended traffic. However, if trade cannot be made subservient to the nation's safety, it ought to be no more encouraged here than it was in Sparta: And it can never tend to make us safe, unless it be so managed as to make us encrease in shipping and in the breed of seamen.

Freight is not only the most politic, but the most national and most certain profit a country can possibly make by trade; therefore all duties must be pernicious that burthen it, and make it dear. And we have dwelt the longer upon this article of the Salt Duty, because it seems to have more dangerous consequences, in relation to our

commerce abroad, than all the other impositions put together.

The late tax upon coals is a heavy burthen on all handicrafts working on iron, a manufacture in which we are now come to a great perfection. And the skill and neatness of our workmen is such in locks, keys, hinges, and other curiosities of this kind, that our exportations of these commodities may in time grow very considerable, if this new duty does not interrupt their industry.

We have shewn, in several instances, how the excises lately set a foot may affect us in the general Balance of Trade: And we have done it with a design of making it appear how much it is for the common good to endeavour to get out of those debts, for which these revenues are the security and fund.

Mr. King, in a scheme of his, of the yearly increase and decrease of the actual stock of England, from the year 1600 to 1698, and what it may probably amount to by the year 1710, if the present peace continue, (and none of those accidents of plague, war, fires, and civil discords intercede, which more or less do certainly diminish or hinder the encrease of the nation's wealth, whenever they happen) computes, that anno 1600, the said actual stock was but about 25 millions, making a yearly encrease of about four or 500,000 *l.* That anno 1630, it was about 37 millions, making a yearly encrease of about one million: That in 1664, (the year before the last great plague) it was about 64 millions, making a yearly encrease of about 1,200,000 *l.* and that anno 1688, it was about 86 millions, making a yearly encrease of 2,400,000 *l.*

And concludes,

1st, That

1st, That the last plague, the fire of London, and the Dutch war, did actually diminish the said stock at least nine or ten millions, and hindered the encrease of 18 or 20 millions more.

2dly, That the last war with France, with the other circumstances of the revolution, and the re-coining the money, has actually diminished the said stock about 12 millions, and hindered the encrease of about 28 millions besides.

3dly, That the nation will not arrive to the same degree of actual stock which it had anno 1688, till about the year 1705, nor make an encrease of 2,400,000*l.* per ann. as it did in 1688, till about the year 1706, nor then neither, unless the taxes be considerably diminished; that thereby our navigation and commerce may be fully restored, to what it was before the late war.

We do not pretend to give any account of the present posture of our foreign trade, nor how it stood during all the last war, for it would be launching into a very wide sea; but without doubt, the immense sums that have been raised every year, and the variety of new duties that have been lately levied, are a heavy burthen upon it.

And in order to give some little light into this matter, and to shew how the balance has been, and may be thereby affected, we shall briefly state what money has been annually granted since the war.

l. s. d.

For anno 1689, granted for the war, and to pay 60,000*l.* to King Charles's servants, and to pay 600,000*l.* to the Dutch, in all, that year,

1,844,786 16 4
For

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	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
Brought over,	1,844,786	16	4
For anno 1690, granted for the war, — —	2,535,452	1	2
For anno 1691, granted for the war, and for building ships, — —	4,794,861	7	0 $\frac{1}{4}$
For anno 1692, granted (besides what was paid out of the revenue of the crown towards the war) — —	3,337,268	8	9 $\frac{3}{4}$
For anno 1693, granted for the war, — —	3,471,482	16	1
For anno 1694, granted for the war, — —	5,030,581	9	9
For anno 1695, granted for the war, — —	4,883,120	0	6
For anno 1696, granted for the war, and to make good some deficiencies, and to make good the clipped money, and for the civil list, and French Protestants, — —	7,961,469	0	0
For anno 1697, there was granted for the war, and to make good the deficiencies of former funds, and for the civil list, and French Protestants, — —	11,887,160	0	9 $\frac{1}{4}$
For anno 1698, there were funds given, amounting to about — —	4,500,000	0	0
Ordinary revenue of the crown, reckoned at a million per ann. by a medium during 10 years, might produce in the whole about	10,000,000	0	0
In all,	60,246,182	0	5 $\frac{1}{4}$

l. s. d.
60,246,182 0 5 $\frac{1}{4}$

But in these articles several sums are twice reckoned; as for example, where one fund was taken away, and another given in its place; and where funds have been granted to sup- ply the deficien- cies of other funds, for which articles there may be de- ducted about	l.	}	12,000,000 0 0
7,000,000			
And the ordinary crown revenue might be charg- ed, during that time, towards the war, with about	l.	}	5,000,000
So that there has been actually granted but about			48,246,182 0 5 $\frac{1}{4}$

It is not pretended that the foregoing accounts are exact to a tittle; but according to the best information we are able to procure, they are as near the truth as is requisite in our present argument.

Having shewn what has been granted in funds, we shall now shew what was intended by the Par-
liament;

liament; and for five years, very little more demanded for the fleet and army.

			<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
For 1689,	—	—	3,295,628	4	5
1690,	—	—	4,010,760	6	7
1691,	—	—	4,172,393	9	7½
1692,	—	—	3,629,439	12	3
1693,	—	—	4,117,080	9	6
1694,	—	—	5,030,581	9	9
1695,	—	—	4,883,120	0	6
1696,	—	—	5,024,854	4	11
1697,	—	—	4,880,078	19	11
1698,	—	—	1,300,000	0	0
			40,343,936	17	5½

Note, that from anno 1693 inclusive, to anno 1697 inclusive, the difference between what was demanded by the ministers, and granted by the Parliament for the fleet and army during those five years, amounted in the whole time but to 1,465,623 *l.* 19 *s.* 9½ *d.*

Suppose the expence of the civil list from 1689 inclusive, to 1698 inclusive, to have been one year with another 600,000 *l.* per annum.

	<i>l.</i>
The expence of the civil list then in ten years may have been —	6,000,000
Towards which the ordinary revenue of the crown, besides what it has been charged with to the war, may yield about — — —	5,000,000
But in 1696, and in 1697, there was granted by the Parliament for the civil list per ann. 500,000 <i>l.</i> in the whole — — —	1,000,000
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So that in this computation the expence of the civil list is to be reckoned at but — — — 5,000,000

And the accounts of England may run thus:

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
Actually granted,	— 48,246,182	0	5 $\frac{1}{2}$
Expence of the war,	40,343,936	17	5 $\frac{1}{2}$
Expence of the civil list,	5,000,000	0	0
	} 45,343,936 17 5 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Remains	2,902,245	2	11 $\frac{3}{4}$

So that except in the articles of interest money, and except in the article of 1,465,623*l.* 19*s.* 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* in which the demands of the ministers for the state of the war exceeded what was granted by the Parliament, the expences of the government seem to have been fully supplied, and that there remains an overbalance of 2,902,245*l.* to be accounted for.

Now as to interest-money for the 5,000,000*l.* with which the crown revenue may have been charged towards the war, those funds, most of them, have and will answer the principal and all the interest allowed by Parliament: And other interest, which several funds fell short of satisfying, have been in a great measure made good by the supply of 7,000,000*l.* granted to answer the deficiencies,

And

And as to the state of the war having exceeded what was granted, in balancing the general account, this article ought to be considered, if during the whole war the muster-rolls have been full; and if all along we have had our complement of ships and seamen, according to that state of the war which was every year laid before the Parliament.

But upon the whole matter, considering what has been granted, and what may probably have been expended, there seems good reason to think that the public of England, if all accounts were narrowly inspected, cannot be much in arrear either to the fleet, army, or the civil list.

So that if there shall remain any great arrear, in all likelihood it must chiefly arise from exorbitant premiums, unwarrantable interest, and other ways of laying out money, hurtful to the King and destructive to the people.

The rough draught of our general accounts here given, which is as perfect as a bystander only could procure, may perhaps afford some little help to such as will think of these affairs; and this rude model may contribute towards the forming of a better scheme.

The 48 millions granted, as we have said, by Parliament for several years, from 1689 to 1698 inclusive, have not been actually levied. To state exactly how much of it has been already raised, and what proportion of it remains secured by remote funds, is not to be done without greater helps than the Writer of these papers can come at: But so far we know, and may affirm safely, that a great part of the product of land, our trade, and manufactures, remain still mortgaged for upwards of 20 millions.

Two

Two of the nine-pences on beer and ale are to be esteemed as a perpetuity, the third nine-pence is engaged for a long term of time; the first duty upon salt can be looked upon no better than as a perpetual fund; the new customs, continued acts, and joint-stocks, the duty on marriages, births, &c. the first duty on stamped paper, the duty on windows, half the duty on glass-ware, the new duties on whale-fins and Scotch linen, are continued to the first of August 1706. The last duties upon salt and stamped paper, are perpetuities; there is a further subsidy of tonnage and poundage granted from the last of January 1699, for his Majesty's lifetime; and the impositions upon malt, leather and pepper are not expired.

To imagine we can buy off and redeem, in any moderate time, all these perpetuities or long funds, is a vain hope; but this may be laid down for a certain truth, that England will never flourish in trade and manufactures till the greatest part of them are cleared, and till our affairs are brought to such a posture, that we may not pay to the government either for the support of the crown, or on account of funds, where the principal is sunk above 2,300,000 *l.* per ann. or about $\frac{1}{20}$ th part of the nation's general income, which was our condition before the war.

And unless this can be compassed, it will be found, that in no long course of time we shall languish and decay every year, by steps easy enough to be perceived by such as consider of these matters. Our gold and silver will be carried off by degrees, rents will fall, the purchase of land will decrease, wool will sink in its price, our stock of shipping will be diminished, farm-houses will go to ruin, industry will decay, and we shall have upon us all the visible marks of a declining people.

It

It may indeed be objected, That France for about forty, and Holland for above a hundred years, have thriven by trade, notwithstanding that all the while they have lain under the burthen of heavy taxes. To which may be answered, That where (as in France) the administration in other things is exact and right, the subjects, though poor, may enlarge their traffic, for general good order makes amends for a great deal of oppression; but they would yet have had more trade if their Prince had left them richer: Besides, arbitrary power has compelled them to that domestic thrift, which of itself goes very far to make a people succeed in foreign commerce, though their payments to the public are excessive. And as to the Dutch, they have been so long inured to this parsimony, that the more they are to pay the state, the more they save at home; and they always take care not to clog their importations; and from this polity it comes that high taxes are not hurtful to their trade.

But in countries where the administration of affairs is loose, partly through the mildness of the laws, and partly through the bad execution of them, where the people have been in a long possession of ease and plenty, and where they think it an essential part of freedom to be as expensive and luxurious as they please, and where no man retrenches upon any public account whatsoever: Among such a people, high taxes, duties, and impositions, must inevitably occasion a decay of trade; and though their dealings seem large, and not to be interrupted, they shall carry on such a sort of traffic as will bring along with it at last their certain ruin.

A variety of new impositions and remote funds do not only hurt us in the Balance of Trade, as

we

we have shewn, but they are dangerous to liberty, without which trade can never truly flourish, and without which it is indeed of no importance; for to what end should men acquire wealth which they cannot call their own? And accordingly under despotic governments (except in some places where the administration of the tyranny is very wisely carried on) but few trouble themselves with the thoughts of foreign traffic.

Whoever considers the vast number of duties now afoot, will find that it is not impossible to make them the engines wherewith bad men, some time or other, may endeavour to undermine our civil rights. It is true, in this reign we have no reason to entertain such a fear, but a country that will preserve its constitution must provide against remote dangers.

At present we pay to the government, besides the three shillings aid and poll-money, so many duties, old and new, as amount to about 3,500,000*l.* *supa 266*
+ vol 1: 257 per ann. Some of them, it is true, expire shortly. But suppose necessity or bad management (and there is nothing which ill husbandry cannot devour) should compel us to continue what is now expiring for a longer time; and admit that for present subsistence, and to pay old debts, these funds of 3,500,000 *l.* per ann. should be settled as a security to lenders, for some certain time to come.

Suppose then a government in the possession of such a large revenue at first legally granted, put into a method of collection, and to the payment of which the people shall be accustomed.

And suppose, in some future reign, the ministers should be either weary or afraid of Parliaments, and desire to govern by the sword, and without law. That this may happen is not impossible,

possible, because we have heretofore seen statemen so disposed.

It is to be hoped this is a danger very remote indeed; but when a ministry shall be so madly inclined, the symptoms of their approaching frenzy will be evident enough; for at such a season we shall see them choose rather to be supplied by distant funds, than with what will produce ready money: And they will take care that revenues granted may not be well managed nor improved to the height, with this design, that the people may be kept in the dark, both as to what they give, and as to what each branch is like to yield.

Suppose then an ambitious and desperate set of men, with all these thoughts about them, and resolved to make their master absolute, may they not, with the help of such an ample revenue, quite overthrow our constitution? Arbitrary ministers have heretofore stopped the exchequer; and if we should ever see men of the same stamp upon the stage of business, it is not impossible but that they may run into the same wicked measures, especially if they should be backed with the support of a standing army.

The liberties of a people are but in a very precarious condition, when they can be subverted by one pernicious counsel: It should therefore be the care of such as love their country, to render this fatal advice as dangerous and impracticable as laws can make it.

At a time when there is such an immense revenue collected every year, it seems a fault in our constitution that sufficient provision is not made against diverting and misapplying the public treasure, and against breaking into appropriated funds. And to speak in plain words, there is reason to
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fear that the laws have not made it criminal enough to stop payments in the exchequer.

When a town that apprehends a siege finds itself weak by nature in one place, the first care of the defenders is to fortify that post as well as ever they can. In the same manner a constitution that is attackable one way, should strengthen that part with severe laws. The exchequer therefore should be fenced about with all possible skill, that it may never be invaded by bold and designing ministers.

A stop there would at once pull down all our civil rights. Nay, to stop the principal only, though the payments of the interest should be continued, would be fatal to our constitution, for there would yet remain an income large enough to make parliaments useless; and if wicked men should thus set up for themselves, they would still have a revenue sufficient to bear their expences, and to keep up an army to awe such as their conduct shall displease.

Some indeed will argue, that a corrupted ministry will as soon make new levies of money, as venture thus to divert what has been already granted and appropriated: But this objection has no weight in it. The people more willingly submit to a tax once lawful, than to pay a new duty against law. The tonnage and poundage illegally levied in the former part of King Charles I.'s reign, did not occasion half the clamour as the new imposition of ship-money. In the beginning of King James II.'s reign, the tonnage and poundage, and temporary excise, determined by King Charles's death, was paid without opposition; but if King James had attempted to raise a new tax by regal authority, his subjects without doubt would not have paid it: Besides, when a tax is
lawful

lawful in its original, it is to be feared that the people will not much concern themselves who is to receive it, the court, or such as have trusted the exchequer; but they would be alarmed to some purpose if they should be called upon to make new payments not warranted by law. So that in all probability more danger may arise to our liberties from breaking into old funds appropriated, and stopping the exchequer, than from making new and forcible levies upon the subject.

And though there is no cause in this reign to fear such attempts, yet it must certainly be wisdom to provide against future evils, especially when it is possible that one desperate and wicked council may destroy that constitution for which we have been so long contending.

The true way to hinder such a disease from ever coming upon the body politic, will be to remove the cause, by lessening as soon as possible these Payments to the Public of 3,500,000 *l.* per ann. besides polls and land-taxes; which large issues may endanger liberty, and without doubt hurt us in the Balance of Trade.

The debts for which these funds are a security, by negligence will every year encrease, insomuch that in a very short time, and with a very little more carelessness, the raising more and more will grow unavoidable for our common defence, till at last we shall come to pay constantly between five and six millions per ann. And when this kingdom shall be arrived at that period of ill conduct, we may venture to pronounce, that the common people of England will in all circumstances be then as poor and miserable as the common people of France were before the war. And we desire all good patriots to carry this reflection in their minds.

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On the contrary, by good management, this debt may be lessened, so that the funds which are its security (instead of being continued) may be dropt every year, till at last we may come to pay to the government for its support and defence, such a sum as will not be dangerous to our freedoms, nor prejudicial to our foreign traffic.

He who proposes thrift may please the common people, but he shall be sure to disgust others: However, the Writer of these papers thinks it his duty to recommend frugality in the state; and he believes it is the wisest and honestest way of enriching the public, to make it rich out of its own revenues.

As to what improvements may be made in the revenues already granted, we refer the reader to what we have formerly said upon this subject in our Discourses on the Revenues and Trade of England*; we have laid down that several branches there specified may, by good management, and without oppression, be annually increased 736,075*l*.

Nor upon enquiry since, do we find any reason to recede from this opinion; on the contrary, we have good cause to think, that they are rather capable of greater improvements than we had then taken notice of.

The malt is indeed an article in that account; but it is an expiring duty which the people of England hope never to see continued, therefore an abatement is to be made upon that head: But the remaining branches, if well looked after, would ease us of very many burthens.

In that Discourse, we have shewn several reasons not yet answered, why the excise on beer

* Vol. I. Part I. p. 205.

and ale, single and double, is improvable in the whole 318,000*l.* per ann. but instead of rising, the excise is again fallen since the account was stated.

	<i>l.</i>
Single and double excise, year ending 24th June 1697, produced about	900,000
The said duties, year ending 24th June 1698, produced about	— — 860,000
The duties fallen, about	40,000

So that the excise now almost doubled produces but about the same sum which it yielded formerly with the single duty only upon it; for which we shall presume to say, the managers neither have given, nor can give, any well-grounded and solid reason.

When we consider how much the excise was advanced in six years by good management, we cannot but be of opinion, that a very great sum might be raised every year towards clearing the gross debt, by skill and careful conduct, in such as govern the respective branches.

But though it imports the state to a high degree to have the utmost of its legal dues, and just revenues fairly brought in, yet a great deal more depends upon having this revenue frugally and wisely laid out; for, as in private instances, he who lives with œconomy, shall be richer, though his gains are but small, than a prodigal, let his gettings be never so large; so governments which manage their affairs thriftily, shall have more wealth than states which have the way to obtain never so large contributions from their people.

What is to be got by good management in bringing in the revenues, is nothing in comparison

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son of what may be saved in laying out the public treasure; one way the profit is limited and narrow, and the other boundless; one way we can reckon but by hundreds, the other way by millions.

* A Venetian Ambassador once told Cardinal Richlieu, That there needed no more to make France happy, than wisely to lay out what was vainly dissipated. “*Qu’elle scut aussi bien des-
“ penser ce qu’elle dissipoit sans raison que la re-
“ publique scavoit bien n’employer pas un seul
“ quadrain sans besoin, et sans beaucoup de
“ menage.*”

A state must be plunged into endless debts and difficulties, unless it has a strict eye over all its expences, especially such as relate to a war, which is always a greedy monster, but devours much more when it is left to feed at random.

To come at such a future thrift as may bring us out of that debt which lies so heavy in the other scale, when we consider of the Balance of Trade, one way perhaps will be severe to enquire how the 48 millions already given have been expended: Besides, it will not peradventure be difficult to shew, that of the many millions still owing, a large sum might be saved, if the public accounts, from their very beginning, were overhauled.

A government that will get out of debt, must look nicely into every particular: It ought in prudence to examine into all grants made by the crown, when the people lay under the burthen of heavy taxes.

It is said that the forfeitures in Ireland, and the lands possessed by the crown in 1688, would

* Testament Politique, Part 2. c. 9. § 7.

satisfy a large part of what the public is now indebted.

It is alleged that gains unwarrantable in law, and not to be justified by any necessity whatsoever, have been made in several contracts with the crown; if all this were looked into, very probably something might be saved towards discharging the nation's debts.

There is one piece of management which the Writer of these papers is very much surprized at, and it relates to the Exchequer bills.

	<i>l.</i>	<i>l.</i>
The 1st subscription at 10 per cent. was for	400,000.	Premium 40,000
The 2d subscription at 10 per cent. was for	700,000.	Premium 70,000
The 3d subscription at 10 per cent. was for	500,000.	Premium 50,000
The 4th subscription at 8 per cent. was for	400,000.	Premium 32,000
The 5th subscription at 4 per cent. was for	1,000,000.	Premium 40,000
Total subscriptions,	— 3,000,000.	Tot. prems. 232,000

Besides these premiums, there is a current interest upon the bills of above $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. And it is likewise observable, that the whole struck into Exchequer bills is but 2,700,000*l.* to circulate which, there has been a subscription of three millions,

lions, than work is yet the ex notes lies, Th after while pany and to posal, or dec courag finess sonabl 62,500 payme contra Parlian It w lavishe more u make procee Wh der, h the beg ment v it goes concer be too fures. Wh virtues of the

lions, so that the engine which carries is heavier than the weight it bears, which seems but clumsy workmanship; besides, it is remarkable that there is yet sunk of these bills but 1,250,000*l.* and of the exchequer bills a vast sum are become specie notes at the current interest, though money now lies, or ought to lie, for their discharge.

There is likewise another piece of œconomy, after which, some time or other, it may be worth while to make enquiry. The old East-India Company offered to raise the two millions then wanted, and to deposit 200,000*l.* to make good their proposal, nor did they propose or expect any premium or deduction whatsoever; yet their offer was discouraged and rejected by some of our men of business; and the same persons have thought it reasonable to allow the new company a premium of 62,500*l.* which was defalked out of the first payment of 200,000*l.* part of which premium is contrary to the express direction of the act of Parliament.

It will cost England a large tax to raise the sums lavished in these two instances; but we shall say no more upon these particulars, leaving the reader to make his own comment upon such unaccountable proceedings.

When the affairs of a private man are in disorder, he sinks faster towards the latter end than in the beginning; the same thing holds in a government whose revenues are entangled, the further it goes the more the debt swells, unless such as are concerned in the administration resolve before it be too late, to enter upon wise and thrifty measures.

Where the King's person is beloved, where his virtues are revered, and where the government is of the people's own forming and election, the sub-

jects will seldom fail to exert themselves strongly, and are very willing to stretch their purses, in order to put the public revenues into such a posture that the administration may be easy, and that the kingdom may be protected; but they must be invited to this by seeing that what they give is frugally managed, and not profusely wasted, and by observing that their money goes to support the state, and not to enrich private persons.

Men, when they are worn out with diseases, aged, crazy, and when besides they have the *mala stamina vitæ*, may be patched up for a while, but they cannot hold out long; for life, though it is shortened by irregularities, is not to be extended by any care beyond such a period. But it is not so with the body politic, by wisdom and conduct that is to be made long-lived, if not immortal; its distempers are to be cured, nay its very youth is to be renewed, and a mixed government grows young and healthy again, whenever it returns to the principles upon which it was first founded.

The disorders we labour under are capable of a remedy, and our difficulties are not such but that they may be mastered: Those Payments to the Public, by good management, may be lessened, which inevitably must set the Balance of Trade against us.

While these immense debts remain, the necessities of the government will continue, interest must be high, and large premiums will be given. And what encouragement is there for men to think of Foreign Traffic (whose returns for those commodities that enrich England must bring no great profit to the private adventurers) when they can sit at home, and without any care or hazard get from the state by dealing with the exchequer, 15 and sometimes 20, 30, 40, and 50 per cent. ?

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there any commerce abroad so constantly advantageous? Will men who can safely, and without trouble, reap such gains, breed their children to be merchants? Will they venture great stocks to make discoveries, and employ their industry to enlarge and extend our dealings in distant parts? Will they think of building that multitude of trading vessels which alone can rear us up a sufficient breed of able seamen? And if that tide of wealth which was wont to flow in trade, be diverted to another channel, and if we mind no other traffic but that which just supplies our luxuries, must we not in a few years be losers in the general balance?

Where interest is high, the merchants care not to deal in any but rich commodities, whose freight is easy, and whose vent is certain in corrupted countries; and of these costly wares very many carry out money, and but few bring any back to the kingdom. It is the bulky goods, whose returns are not of so great profit, that breed most seamen, and that are most nationally gainful; but such goods cannot be very much dealt in where interest is high, nor can any laws in the world lower it where great sums are continually borrowed by the government. And by these instances it must sufficiently appear how much our Payments to the Public may affect the Balance of Trade.

And, treating upon this subject, we cannot but take notice, where the Prince is frequently absent from his own dominions, sojourning for a long space of time in a foreign country, in which he, his court, and his whole retinue are obliged to make great expences, that this is highly prejudicial to the Balance of Trade, and, without doubt,

must incline the scale to that nation's side where the money is spent.

Upon the whole matter, if the revenues already granted are well looked after, and improved; if the accounts of the fleet and army are carefully inspected; if the grants are strictly examined; if the state enters entirely upon frugal measures; and if we resolve to exert ourselves, so as not to let this dangerous burthen lie long upon us, this great debt may be cleared in some moderate time, and those large Payments to the Public will cease, which are like so many bloody issues that emaciate the body politic, and render it hectic and consumptive; and if this debt was paid, we should get rid of that variety of new excises and high customs which hurt Foreign Traffic, and interrupt us in our domestic business, and which are more especially a heavy weight upon the woollen manufacture.

Even in a commonwealth, it is dangerous for one part of the people to be very much indebted to the other; and in Rome it was the occasion of great seditions. When the state has borrowed large sums, and issued out securities by tallies upon different funds, it is commonly said the Public is so and so indebted; but in truth the case is otherwise, and more properly speaking, these sort of funds divide a country into two ranks of men, of which one are creditors and the other debtors; and this distinction does without doubt belong to all nations where the people pay taxes to one another, as it now happens to be our case in England. The creditors are the bank, such as deal with the public for stores, lenders of all kinds, besides a great many foreigners, whose money is lent to the state in English names. The debtors are the landed men, the 5th or 6th part

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of whose rents are pawned for the public service from year to year, by aids and land funds. All merchants likewise who pay customs, and all shopkeepers and retailers are, according to our distinction, to be accounted debtors. Thus almost all England may not be improperly divided into debtors and creditors, nor in a long and expensive war was this wholly to be avoided; but without doubt it cannot be wise nor safe to let this distinction long continue; for though such as receive may like their condition and think themselves at ease, yet such as are to pay cannot be so well contented. It is true, some modern politicians have run upon another notion; and several persons have thought that the more funds are erected, the more people are engaged to preserve the present government. This policy indeed of theirs would hold good, if they could make out that the lenders are stronger, and more in number than such as are concerned in Payments to the Public: But it rather seems to hold in sense and reason, that the throne of that Prince, in a free nation, must be the most firmly established, whose affairs permit him to ask the fewest taxes from his people.

France was once upon a right foot in relation to its liberties; and they who peruse their history with care will find, that arbitrary power did not so much bring in high taxes, as high taxes introduced arbitrary power; for when that golden idol of an immense revenue was once set up, all the nation bowed to it.

In the second and third sections we have shewn, that the probable methods to make a country gainers in the Balance of Trade, are to take care of encreasing and employing the people, and to improve land and its product. In this fourth section we have set forth how this Balance may be

be affected by our Payments to the Public: And in the last Discourse we shall endeavour to shew, that the wealth and prosperity of a state depend chiefly upon a wise, steady, and honest administration.

S E C T. V.

That a Country cannot encrease in Wealth and Power but by private Men doing their Duty to the Public, and but by a steady Course of Honesty and Wisdom, in such as are trusted with the Administration of Affairs.

*A*T Romæ ruere in servitium consules, patres, equites, quanto quis illustrior, tanto magis falsi ac festinantes. "But at Rome they all ran headlong into slavery, the consuls, the senate, the gentry; and the nobler the person was, the more false, and the greater haste he made." This was the condition of Rome when Tiberius assumed the empire; but God forbid it should be ever the case of England, for our constitution will be entirely lost when such a corruption happens; we may indeed preserve the name of liberty, and some of its outward forms, but no more than what will help to keep our chains the faster on: Tyrannies have been often subverted, where the Princes govern merely by their own will, without giving to their subjects the least appearance of being free; but those absolute monarchies are hardly to be shaken, and that servitude is lasting, where the people are left to make their own fetters.

It

It is a matter of great wonder, that from the time of Augustus downwards, the Romans, who were seldom without brave and virtuous men, should never make one attempt to restore the commonwealth, and to shake off that power which some of the Emperors exercised with such exorbitance; but in all likelihood it proceeded from this, that the soldiers and common people, without whom no great revolution can be made, believed themselves still free, because, in show, the commonwealth had the same form as in elder times: There was a senate, consuls, tribunes, and an appearance of all the ancient magistracies, though nothing remained of the ancient liberty: But this the common people did not feel, for the cruelty and fraud of Tiberius, the madness of Caligula, the stupidity of Claudius, the riots and lust of Nero, the gluttony and sordid mind of Vitellius, the vanities of Otho, and the enormous vices of Domitian, did little hurt to the inferior rank of men, who all the while had *panem & circences*, which was all they desired; but the mischiefs these monstrous Princes brought upon the world, fell chiefly upon nobler heads; who yet could not rescue their country, so much were the common people lulled asleep, with the opinion they entertain, that the laws still governed, because they saw every year consuls and a senate; but this senate being corrupted, made the tyranny boundless and safe: For the people could never be induced to oppose that power which still bore some resemblance to their ancient form of government.

In the same manner, if in future ages our Parliaments should be debauched in principles, and become willing to be the instruments of a Prince's will, and to act as he directs them, arbitrary power would be here settled upon a lasting foot; for the common

common people would never join with any who would attempt to redeem their country, because they will be deceived by names and forms, and think the laws governed, and that they are free, if the outward show of the constitution is still preserved.

When corruption has seized upon the representatives of a people, it is like a chronical disease, hardly to be rooted out. When servile compliance and flattery come to predominate, things proceed from bad to worse, till at last the government is quite dissolved. Absolute monarchies are in danger of great convulsions, when one man, their Prince, happens to be weak or wicked; but commonwealths, or mixed constitutions are safe, till the chief part of the leading men are debauched in principles. However, monarchy has this advantage, that the one man, their Prince, is mortal, and if bad, he may be succeeded by a better; but a people thoroughly corrupted never returns to right reason; and we see that the depravity of manners, which began in Rome presently after the second Punic war, among the nobility and gentry, became every year worse and worse, till at last Cæsar destroyed the commonwealth. And after his time, under the succeeding Emperors, every senate grew more abject and complying than the other, till in process of time the old Roman spirit was utterly extinguished, and then that empire by degrees became a prey to barbarous nations.

If all parts of the state do not with their utmost power promote the public good; if the Prince has other aims than the safety and welfare of his country; if such as represent the people do not preserve their courage and integrity; if the nation's treasure is wasted; if ministers are allowed

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to undermine the constitution with impunity; if judges are suffered to pervert justice and wrest the law, then is a mixed government the greatest tyranny in the world; it is tyranny established by a law, it is authorised by consent, and such a people are bound with fetters of their own making. A tyranny that governs by the sword, has few friends but men of the sword; but a legal tyranny (where the people are only called to confirm iniquity with their own voices) has of its side the rich, the fearful, the lazy, those that know the law, and get by it, ambitious churchmen, and all those whose livelihood depends upon the quiet posture of affairs; and the persons here described compose the influencing part of most nations; so that such a tyranny is hardly to be shaken off. Men may be said to be enslaved by law, or their own consent, under corrupt or degenerate republics, such as was the Roman commonwealth from the time of Cinna, till the attempts of Cæsar, and under degenerate mixed governments, such as Rome was, while the Emperors made a show of ruling by law, but with an awed and corrupted senate: To which form of government England was almost reduced, till the King came over to put our liberties upon a better foot.

But what has been may be, and though we are safe during his reign, yet in after ages, bad and designing ministers may think their conduct is no way to be maintained but by the sword, and that they cannot securely prey upon the commonwealth till they have made their Master absolute; upon which score, in these enquiries concerning the methods whereby England may be a gainer in the general Balance of Trade, we think it needful to lay down, that all that wealth and power which must defend this state upon any emergencies or
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invasions from abroad, depends upon our preserving inviolate the ancient constitution of this kingdom.

Men do as industriously contrive fallacies to deceive themselves, (when they have a mind to be deceived) as they study frauds whereby to deceive others; and if it leads to their ends, and gratifies their present ambition, they care not what they do, thinking it time enough to serve the Public when they have served themselves; and in this view very many betray their trusts, comply, give up people's right, and let fundamentals be invaded, flattering themselves, that when they are grown as great as they desire to be, it will be then time enough to make a stand, and redeem the commonwealth. The same notion led Pompey to join with those who intended to subvert the Roman liberties; but he found them too strong, and himself too weak, when he desired to save his country.

In the same manner, if there be any in this nation who desire to build their fortunes upon the public ruin, they ought to consider that their great estates, high honours and preferments, will avail them little when the subversion of liberty has weakened and impoverished us so, as to make way for the bringing in of foreign power.

It imports all degrees of men in their several posts, to endeavour at the preserving that form of government, under which we have prospered for near seven hundred years. It happens seldom that any country is totally subdued by foreign force; and civil war is indeed a raging fever; but it goes away of itself, when the humours that feed it are spent, and is often no more than the sign of a health too florid, and the effects only of too much blood in the body politic: But ill
conduct

conduct in a state long continued, wastes it by slow and certain degrees, and at last brings an incurable consumption upon all its parts and members.

If the affairs of this kingdom should ever happen to be ill conducted, which we hope is a remote fear, the legislative power must then interpose with its authority, and the united wisdom of the nation must rescue us out of weak and polluted hands, for such a ministry is a surer engine to destroy a state, than any its enemies can bring against it.

It is true, such as would correct errors, and watch that no invasion may be made on liberty, have been heretofore called a faction by the persons in power; but it is not properly their name, and ought to be given to another sort of men.

It is wrong to call them the faction, who by all dutiful and modest ways promote the cause of liberty, as the true means to endear a Prince to his subjects, and to lay upon them a stronger tie and obligation to preserve his government. For a people will certainly best love and defend that Prince, by whom the greatest immunities and most good laws have been granted.

They cannot properly be termed the faction, who desire a war should be managed upon such a foot of expence as the nation is able to bear; who would have the public treasure not wasted, the Prince not deceived in his grants and bargains, who would have the ministry watchful and industrious, and who, when they complain, are angry with things and not with persons.

The name of faction does more truly belong to them, who, though the body politic has all the signs of death upon it, yet say all is well; that the riches of the nation are not to be exhausted; that

there is no misgovernment in all its business; that it feels no decay; that its œconomy is perfect, and who, all the while, are as arrogant and assuming as if they had saved that very people, whom their folly and mad conduct has in a manner ruined.

They may be rather termed the faction, who were good patriots out of the court, but are better courtiers in it, and who pretended to fear excess of power while it was not communicated to them, but never think the monarchy can be high enough advanced, when they are in the administration.

In nations (where for a long time matters have not been placed upon a foot of honesty) their great assemblies consist commonly of two parties, in both of which sides there are many who have the same right intentions to the Public, and many who in all their councils consult only their private interest.

Of one side, some out of principle love their country, and are jealous of its liberties; and yet at the same time are careful of their Prince's honour and interest. In all their proceedings they have nothing in view but the public good, they study not so much how to blame the past, as which way the future is to be mended; they do not accuse the statesman, and yet let the fault continue, as well knowing, that impeachments of men, and not of crimes, produce new, but seldom better ministers.

They desire the necessities of the state should be well supplied, the person of the Prince revered, and his government maintained. When his ministers have made false steps, or when their councils have had unsuccessful events, they desire not to inflame the assembly where they sit, but

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are willing rather to assist with their superior knowledge, and to bring the minds of men to the temper and calmness that is proper in weighty deliberations.

Persons of this character are in most assemblies of a people, but they are often joined and followed by such as have quite another view and aim, and who, in all their actions, consult not the common welfare, but either wreak their own discontents, or pursue some ambitious hope, and upon such, or the like accounts, mix themselves with the wiser and better sort; however, the good and the bad being thus mingled and blended, compose altogether what in vicious times is called the country party.

On the other side, there are some very nice in what may intrench upon the regal authority, yet never forgetful of the people's rights. It is true, their post often compells them to excuse all faults, though guilty of none themselves: They are forced too frequently to move for money, but wish there was less occasion for it: They hate not such as differ from them in opinion, and secretly approve of the right course, which sometimes they must not follow; but with such as have been here described, there will too often join an ignorant, mercenary, and servile crew, who like all things, and examine nothing; unanimous in evil, diligent in mischief, variable in principles; constant to flattery, talkers for liberty, but slaves to power. Such as these will too frequently, in vicious times, mingle with the sound part of a court, styling themselves the court party, and the Prince's only friends.

In former reigns, by the artifice of designing statesmen, the representatives of the people were divided into those two parties: Besides, in most

assemblies which meet by authority of a single person, there are still some who are taught to have the secret, and they stile themselves the managers: The eyes of every one are bent upon them, their words are observed, and in most things they give the first turn. At court indeed they pretend to sway and govern every motion; but in matters esteemed indifferent, they carry with them many of the best sort, and are certainly followed by all such as are willing to be guided. These are believed to have weighed beforehand, and to know what is wisest, most safe, most expedient, or at least most grateful: And when they appear, it is imagined there has been put into their heads the whole extracted quintessence of all the ministerial wisdom. In the House they undertake for the Court, and at Court for the House, receiving singly the thanks of what proceeds from the joint affection of all the rest, and are thought alone to give what the whole nation pays.

To tell what time-designing men began to erect for themselves this new office, and when and how this imposition took its rise, would be too long a digression from the present matter; but we may truly affirm, things have never gone well with our Princes, nor their people, since it was first invented.

Good Kings, at all times, without any danger, may repose their entire concerns upon a House of Commons; the national interest will go on there without driving, and when difficulties arise, the ministers only make them; for when the King and people have but one interest, it goes on of its own accord, and such as pretend to be busy for the Prince in that place, are working for themselves, and not for him.

But if in after ages our disorders and corruptions should make this office necessary; if there must be managers; if some must lead and others follow, it is reasonable the guides should be well instructed.

Nothing therefore can more import the Prince, than that they who will assume such a province should be men of grave discretion and solid judgment; wise, and not subtle; cool, temperate, steady, discerning, and patient of contradiction: And indeed they cannot be proper for that post, unless they have in their heads an universal scheme of their own and the business of other countries.

When giddy young men, without experience, are relied upon and trusted in this station, they embroil the Prince's affairs; by their ignorance they give his enemies advantage, and by their insolence disoblige his friends.

A man can be no more born a statesman than a physician or a lawyer; and let the mind be never so happily disposed, time must ripen what is begot by nature.

Mr. Hobbes says *, "He that has most experience in any kind of business, has most signs to guess at the future time; and consequently is the most prudent; and so much more prudent than he that is new in that kind of business, as not to be equalled by any advantage of natural or extemporary wit."

The sanguine hopes conceived by young men are by no means proper in weighty and great deliberations; and they seldom make good statesmen: Elder years, where they produce not wis-

* Hobbes' *Leviathan*, p. 10.

dom, bring at least caution, which is something like it.

They who have seen much, are used to frequent disappointments, and therefore not inclined to venture; especially they rarely hazard the sum of affairs upon any single council.

Young men are good to execute the results of elder wisdom, but the same fire which makes them best for action, renders them unfit for council: Yet there is now and then a fortunate genius, in whom the prudence of age, and the warmth of youth meet together; but of such the examples are not common.

Pierce Gaveston, Hugh Spencer, and the Duke of Buckingham, are sufficient instances that the conduct of young ministers is seldom successful to themselves, nor to their masters: They do the less mischief if they meddle only in the pleasures of their Prince; but when warm heads, full of conceit, with slight wit, and no true wisdom, pretend to guide a whole state, and to have majority at their beck and rule, in a short time they occasion more disorders than can be remedied in many years.

When persons so described come to have a corrupt majority of their side, they diminish the nation's stock and its coin; they lose its trade; they anticipate all the Prince's revenues; they charge the subject for many years to come with a great number of new duties and impositions; they bring the state into an immense debt, and plunge it into such difficulties, that hardly any new revenues can be well erected; but it is hoped England will never fall into such destructive hands.

Our wealth and greatness depend absolutely upon keeping the legislative power to future ages untainted, vigilant for the public safety, jealous

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of the people's rights, watchful over the ministers, and to have the members not awed by armies, nor to be seduced by preferments, bribes or pensions: That we are safe at present is granted, and that we are not now under any dangers of the like kind, and that this important post is well secured, is allowed; but writing for posterity, to which these Papers may peradventure be transmitted, we think it needful to give these cautions.

While we preserve our constitution as we received it from our ancestors, bad men may have a short power to do mischief; however, their rage and folly will be at last corrected; but if we suffer our civil rights to be invaded, and if our ancient form of government should be lost, then ill ministers will proceed without controul; they will in a short time dissipate the nation's treasure, the people will have no stock for trade, they will lose their industry, they will grow inclinable to change, resty and indifferent in the cause of liberty, and perhaps willing to submit to any foreign force, like Spain, which has been both despotically and weakly governed.

Freedom and wealth proceed hand in hand together, and if one is lost, the other will not long continue: But this notion is not much regarded by those who can only be great, and have no ways of making their own fortunes but by the destruction of their country.

For such as propose to thrive by disorder and misgovernment, have a strong interest to beggar the people. The confusion which public wants and private necessities introduce, suits best with their designs: A wealthy nation may be jealous of its rights, and watch any invasions upon its freedom, and a rich gentry may be unmanageable;

and such bad men may think that the best course to keep us humble is to make us poor.

If any should be so wicked to have thoughts of enslaving England, they will endeavour to mangle and quell the stomachs of the common people, by reducing them to the misery and want which decay of trade, if it ever happens, must bring upon this nation; and they will try to distress the gentry in their estates to that degree, as to make them rely upon the court for a livelihood and subsistence; for which reasons they will wink at the loss of our foreign traffic, and perhaps contrive its destruction, knowing that upon the prosperity of trade, rents and land have for many years depended. Nor can ill ministers desire a better circumstance, than to have men of the best fortunes reduced by their necessities to come and cringe and sue to them for a small employment. Does not this bring all into their power? Must not such as shall have the distribution of these favours be courted and followed by the major part of the gentry? Would not so great a capacity of helping others add to their strength, make them rich and safe, and indeed set them in a manner above impeachments?

If bad men should ever get into power, they will not only contribute to ruin our foreign trade, but they will try to impoverish the kingdom by exorbitant taxes, thereby to bring the gentry and people yet more under their subjection; they will likewise plunge their Master into debts and necessities, to render their tricks and arts of more use, and to put a higher value upon the band they shall have in pay; for in former times we have seen that when a court wanted, they who procured money to be given, were thought to give it; by which means they obtained favour cheaply at the

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expence of others: And this single merit attoned for all their faults, it excused false steps and negligence, it sheltered their bribery, and covered their disability for the public service.

Besides, they will entangle their Master's affairs, because a Prince that does not need money, may come not to need them, whole talents, in all likelihood, will consist in procuring taxes, not in well laying out the sums granted: Therefore a wanting state, a troubled government, and an indebted exchequer, will be their region; large premiums, exorbitant interests, diverting appropriated funds, choice of funds on which to place their own money, preferring one debt and postponing another, will be always good matter for ill statesmen to work upon, but afford much a better harvest when the government stands in want of money; immense sums given every year will be a brave and ample field for their avarice to range in, which would be cramped and confined, if bound within the narrow limits of what a nation may be able to pay.

Of all things, they love a long and an expensive war, and fear peace; for peace produces order, and gives the Prince leisure to enquire into the abuses of the state; it lets him into a right knowledge of persons in the kingdom, and the dregs which float upwards when the liquor is stirred, must sink to the bottom in quiet times; peace restores liberty of speech, whereas in war all is silenced with the single word necessity; in peace there is no need to court factions, turbulent spirits are not so useful, thrift may be introduced, and such sudden fortunes cannot be raised out of the public. Grievances may be calmly debated, the management of the revenues inspected, the conduct of the ministers may be examined; and good laws

may be proposed, without the perpetual objection of, "Are you for bringing in the French and Popery?" But war will better answer their designs, who mean to thrive by the loose administration with which war is generally accompanied, and who propose to prosper by the calamities and misery of their country.

The business of Ireland, at the beginning of the Revolution, is a pregnant instance how much designing men love a long war. That kingdom might have been presently reduced, the nation was dispirited. He who held the government was ready to give up the marks and ensigns of his authority, with the strengths depending on it; they were struck with a panic fear, and had readily submitted, if in any reasonable time a small force had been sent thither. But one people does rarely yield so much to the fame of another, as to surrender without being asked or summoned. It was desired that a few troops might be carried over to confirm and countenance our friends, and to give our enemies a fair colour for pursuing that course to which they were enough persuaded by their true interest, though they could not modestly acquiesce, unless something had been done that might save appearances; for a great army could not with any decency disband, without so much as hearing of an opposite strength, to which (in the general fright that possessed their party) they might have yielded with some saving to their honour. But Ireland was for a long time slighted, and the natives were suffered to gather into a formidable power. That diversion gave our neighbour kingdom opportunity to take breath, and time to recover from the fright and amazement which so potent a league had brought upon them. The troops who perished so miserably at Dundalk and elsewhere,

elsewhere, would have been a great addition to the confederate force. The vigour that actuates the minds of men in their first proceedings should have been carried against France, and not have been let to consume itself, and slacken within our own dominions. If by good conduct the affairs of Ireland had been betimes appeased, the power of these three nations had been united, and we might have entered the lists with our strength entire, and a treasure unwasted, which probably would have wrought such effects, and begot such a terror as might have produced long ago as sound and honourable a peace as we enjoy at present, after the expence of so much blood and money.

This war stood England in 4,128,672*l.* 5*s.* 3 $\frac{1}{4}$ *d.* and both nations in 4,515,693*l.* 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ *d.* But if we come to reckon the burnings, waste, and depredation, and the irreparable loss of men, English and Irish, by sickness and in battle, and the Irish damage redounding to us at last, it may be safely affirmed, that we are the worse for that war by at least seven millions.

However, that fatal neglect did divert from the war against France above four millions, and did engage in civil broils those arms which were so needful in the beginning to make a strong impression upon our enemies abroad.

But a certain party of men were too busy themselves at home for to mind the nation's foreign concerns. They were dividing the spoil here; they were hunting after places, and sharing among one another the dignities and offices of the state, which took up all their time, and employed all their care. Besides, such an early coalition and union of the whole strength of the three kingdoms, might have terrified France too soon, and taken away their hopes of a succeeding war,
which

which is the crop and harvest of designing ministers, the field in which they fatten, and a spendthrift to whom they are stewards without account.

If not minding the affairs of Ireland did hinder the peace so long, then we owe to that fatal council the beginning of the debt, which now presses so hard upon us; for without the colour of such a war, those immense sums could not have been consumed, which for these last five years have been levied in this kingdom.

When King James went away, we were reduced to what Mr. Hobbes calls the state of nature, the original contract being dissolved, and the ligaments broken, which held us before together: The nation was then a blank, apt to receive any impression: The old building was pulled down, and the faults in it before might have been corrected, if the architects had been skilful, and such lovers of their country as they pretended to be. Never men had such an opportunity of doing good, as they who had the chiefest hand in making the Revolution. They had a Prince willing to consent to whatever might set us upon a right foot, if they had met his design of landing here with equal virtues. The gentry and people were at that time newly awakened from their lethargy in which they had been for many years; they saw how narrowly religion and their liberties had escaped; their fears had made them wise and sober; their eyes were universally opened; and they were wrought up to a temper (which seldom happens in a whole nation) of being capable to receive good and honest councils. It was in their power for ever to have banished flattery and corruption from the court, and from another place where those vices are yet more hurtful; and when

when they had changed persons, if they had taken care at the same instant to mend things, they had wrought a general reformation in our manners. It was in their hands to have given us a sound constitution; they had before them the errors of preceding reigns, by which they might have corrected their model: They should have entered upon a strict œconomy, neither plundering for themselves, nor suffering others to grow rich at the public cost. They should have been as careful in the state, as their master was active in the field; they should have begged less, and done more. They should have avoided bribery, than which nothing could be more unseemly in reformers of a state; and which was certain to keep out the best, and let the worst men into all their business. They ought to have known that a new settlement was to be maintained by severer rules and methods than perhaps are necessary in a court where the Prince is born in purple. And lastly, they should have made this reflection, that more than ordinary virtue of all kinds was needful to answer the people's expectations, and that more than common wisdom was requisite to maintain and justify so great a change.

The worst and most unhappy Kings that ever were would have ruled better, had it not been for the wrong suggestion and wicked incitements of the flatterers about them; but those pests and poisons of a court are yet more to blame, when things succeed not well with wise and virtuous Princes.

That declaration which the King sent to England before he came over, was the pole-star by which our state pilots were to steer their course. It was well known, that to keep the same Parliament sitting so many years, was what had chiefly debauched

debauched the gentry of this kingdom; it was therefore expected, that in the act for declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, some provision should have been made against that evil for the future. Several ministers, who betrayed their King and country, have gone on to the last with impunity, by keeping Parliaments quite off; but more have found a shelter for their crimes in houses, which they have held long together, and of which they have had the handling for many a sessions. Could men pretend to be patriots, and not take care of securing that post? Could our freedoms be any way certainly lost, but by laying aside the use of Parliaments, as was designed in the reign of King Charles I. or by keeping them so long sitting, till a majority of members should be under engagements with the court, as had almost happened in the reign of King Charles II.? Were we not both times upon the very brink of ruin, and in hazard of being no more a free people? Did it not therefore import that party which had heretofore made such high professions for liberty, to provide that England might be no more threatened with the same danger? Should not this have been a main article in our contract with their Majesties upon their accession to the throne, who readily consented to all things that might make us safe and happy, the King having promised in his declaration, "To do all things
 " which the two houses of Parliament should find
 " necessary for the peace, honour, and safety of
 " the nation, so that there may be no more dan-
 " ger of the nation's falling at any time hereafter
 " under arbitrary government."

It was certainly a great omission not to bring on in the very beginning of the Revolution, the act for triennial Parliaments, which our own corrup-

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tions produced at last: If the state had entered early into that wholesome counsel, it had made the King's entire reign more easy to himself, and less costly to his people. It had given a rise to that virtue and public honesty he came over to plant, and had answered all the ends of his declaration. They who were not well principled, must have pretended so to be, for the paths and road to preferment had been thereby quite altered: The ingredients which before composed a statesman, were skill to govern the house; ability now and then to make an important turn; knowledge of the members, that is, who were to be taken off, and what was their price; diligence in keeping that band together who were right or wrong to be unanimous. They who were thus qualified themselves, or who would blindly follow the professors of these pernicious arts, engrossed the whole business and employments of the nation: But by neglecting to put matters under a good settlement in the beginning, one and the same House of Commons came to continue sitting with short intervals for six years, and this wrong measure being taken, renewed all the former errors of our constitution, and for a time restored to men the same dishonest interest they had before; and if any were so wicked, gave them fresh opportunity and room to endeavour once more the subversion and ruin of this kingdom; not by the very ways practised in former times, but by the same corrupt inclinations and councils dressed in other shapes; and though, without doubt, none of them are chosen into this Parliament, yet it is to be feared, that in those sessions of six years continuance, there was reared up a new brood of men of business, as high flatterers, more false, designing, and rapacious than their

their predeceffors; but without the same skill and dexterity to support their malice.

However, it is hoped the act of triennial Parliaments may have given a check to this ulcer, which was growing in the body politic, and that it may hinder the gangreen from proceeding further; yet though the old venom may be restrained a while by remedies, it is to be feared it lurks still within us, ready to break out upon the first occasion.

If that party which once seemed so jealous of our rights, had not abandoned all their old principles, they might have formed us a lasting establishment, such as could not have been shaken by domestic rage or foreign power; whereas now we depend alone upon the reputation, merit, and virtues of the King, that bind and hold us together; but when he must yield to nature (which misfortune we hope is very distant from us) in all human probability nothing can be expected but confusion and civil war.

When the breaches made upon our constitution in the late reigns, had induced many of the best sort to judge a revolution needful, the people had reason to expect that in a new-modelled government all things should have been set upon the foot of honesty and virtue, and to see all that male-administration reformed, which some persons had been reasonably complaining of for 30 years. We thought to see a virtuous court, a watchful state, an industrious and frugal ministry. If all these our expectations had been answered, what disasters from without or within could have hurt England? Must not the change have been tacitly consented to (if not applauded) even by those that suffered in it? Had we not at home a discontented party, which was to be silenced by shewing them an honest,

honest, more steady, more disinterested, and a wiser conduct, than what they had known before, and still lingered after? Had we not abroad a potent enemy, against whom our strength was to be husbanded discreetly, that it might last the longer? And lastly, was not the best and most irreproachable management in the world necessary and hardly sufficient, to enable us to carry on that war, with which so great an alteration was certain to be followed?

But instead of building upon these foundations, and taking such measures as had rendered our proceedings safe in their consequences, and not obnoxious to any censure, some persons have given manifest proof that they were acted by no sort of principle, and that in their doings they were rather swayed by private interest, revenge, ambition, and their other appetites, than guided by any sense of the public good; for we no sooner had upon the throne a Prince feared and revered abroad, and idolized here, but some persons immediately forgot the cause for which they called him over.

If we had shewn any desire to assist and imitate his perfections, what a fair fame of ourselves had we transmitted to after ages?

If some men had considered wisely, they would have found that all things were not secure, because religion was out of danger, whose concerns are soon forgotten when we begin to be pressed with other fears: Besides, if matters are not so ordered, that Spain may not fall under the power of France, Popery, and universal monarchy are still to be apprehended.

Prosperity, a flowing trade, and great riches, may admit of prodigality, negligence in the state, and false steps in the ministry, but a people exhausted by long taxes, desire to see in those above them

them thrift for the public, vigilance, and as much good conduct as can be expected in human business. Power is seldom invidious to the common people when placed in virtuous hands, nor are calamities intolerable, which could not have been avoided by any care or caution. When the ministers do well, those under them suffer quietly; but on the contrary, if they observe themselves ruled in the subordinate parts of government, by such as make a prey of the commonwealth, and to that end only take upon them its administration; if they plainly perceive their miseries and misfortunes to proceed chiefly from the corrupt or weak councils of such statesmen, they become disheartened and lose that mettle and spirit, without which the high designs of their powerful neighbours are not to be resisted.

But though some errors might be committed in the beginning of the Revolution, it is hoped all things are now well; that peace has put an end to those disorders in government which war does commonly beget, and that our present management is not liable to any censure. And what is said here, and what may be observed hereafter of the like kind in the series of this discourse, is not at all the present case of England; it is hoped we are not a corrupt people, but in process of time we may grow so, and lose that virtue which is presumed to shine in this age. This Section is therefore directed to posterity, which alone is concerned in the ethics here advanced.

In future ages perhaps ambitious and designing men may desire to embroil their master's affairs only, to make him more dependent upon their arts; hereafter men of arbitrary principles may designedly neglect the concerns and care of foreign traffic, with a purpose to impoverish, and so to enslave

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enslave the people: In the next age likewise designing ministers may take advantage of the martial temper of a Prince, and instead of reigning in his high courage with grave councils, they may disguise from him the true state of his affairs, and push him on to a new war, without making right provisions, or without such previous leagues as may make it tolerable in the progress, or happy in the conclusion; and perhaps they may desire the semblance of a war, only to have a pretence for a standing army.

For the benefit therefore of future times, it may be proper to shew by what steps those vices and immoralities that affect the public first creep into a country, and what progress they come afterwards to make, and to shew what sort of men, and what kind of councils entangle a Prince's affairs.

But though this paper be directed to posterity, and though it is nothing but a caution to future times, yet probably it may offend some persons who are tender in these matters.

However we shall venture to affirm, that if this nation should ever be under any great disorder, the truest course to mend it, will be to plant in the minds of the better sort, morality, and the shame of doing ill to their country; and we shall presume to assert, that observing the rules and dictates of virtue, does not only lead to heaven and a blessed state hereafter, but is the best way of securing to a people in general prosperity, peace, safety, power, and happiness in this present world.

To trace those men who may design to change this constitution in all their dark and crooked ways, and to follow them in all their mazes will be difficult; however, we shall do our best to describe the persons, and to shew their councils, that

they may be narrowly watched by all such as love their country.

But to do this we must take a short view of things past, and a little consider the posture of affairs at the restoration of King Charles II. and how they stood during his reign and the reign of his successor.

When that Prince was recalled from exile, by the voice of the whole people, (who had been tired with the many changes in government that happened from Cromwel's death to the year 1660) it was almost impossible, but that we should run from one to the other extreme; and it was reasonable to fear that men should readily embrace servitude, who knew not how to make a right use of liberty. Upon which account many have wondered why our ancient form of government was not at that time altered, and how it came to pass we did not then embrace absolute monarchy.

But we are to consider that King Charles was a young Prince, more inclined to taste the pleasures of power, than willing to feel its weight: He had undergone many troubles, which he intended to recompence with great ease and luxury; so that the rugged work of subverting the laws suited neither with his age nor temper. Had he lived longer, as time and opposition began to sower his blood, what he might have attempted is very doubtful.

Besides the unactive genius of the King, there happened then another circumstance very fortunate for England, which was, that the services and merit of the chancellor Clarendon, and the treasurer Southampton, did strongly induce him to put the administration of his affairs into their hands. They were both persons of age and experience; they had known the former reign; they had seen
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the grounds and rise of the civil war; they understood the nature of our constitution; they saw what had deposed one King, and found that unlimited power was hard to compass, and difficult to keep; and having their Master's ear, and at first a large share in his affection, they kept him within bounds. The skill in the laws of one, the eloquence of the other, the general abilities of both, made them esteemed by the people, and awful to their very Prince, and this gave a weight to all their councils. They had authority enough in their persons to be listened to, when they spoke bold and necessary truths: Having superior knowledge and desert too to be heard, they did not stand in need of saying always what was pleasing, which is the miserable and servile condition of upstart, weak, and obscure statesmen; but less were they obliged to flatter every flatterer. Having a foundation of merit, they scorned the mean aid of parties, or to be the wretched journeymen of any dark cabal: Knowing what was their Master's and the nation's interest, and intending to promote both, they gave wholesome advice, without fear of offending either Prince or people. That kingly government was then kept within the limits of the law, that our constitution was not given up between the fears of one, and the hopes of the other party; and that our civil rights were still preserved, was chiefly owing to the wisdom, courage, and integrity of those two able statesmen.

But even then, and all along afterwards, there were still some among us impatient to make their Master absolute; they consisted principally of such as had large ambition, and slender merit, who are the best instruments for any tyranny. These were ever embroiling the King with his Parliament,

either to protect them, or to justify some of their illegal actions. Sometimes they got him to appear a violent churchman, and at other seasons to favour the dissenters, but at no time to take care of religion itself. They persuaded him to extend the regal power in every thing; they got him to seize all the charters, in order to influence elections. By their councils he raised an army, under colour of declaring war with France; by their instruments they made him absolute in Scotland, at the same time doing what they could to weaken the Protestant interest in Ireland: But their chief aim was to procure him so large a standing revenue, as might make Parliaments useless for the future. It is true, they proposed this revenue for his life only; but if that first step had been made, it had not been difficult afterwards to entail it on the crown: Besides, what has been granted to one Prince, has been always continued to his successor without any struggle.

That these things were done with a design to change the constitution is visible enough: And it is as evident that these councils were either promoted by persons, who wanted the sublime part of wisdom, necessary for the conduct of great affairs, and therefore were to form a government that might subsist by tricks and arts, or they were forged by a set of men, whose avarice and ambition no regular establishment could satisfy, whose crimes a free state would look into, and whose arbitrary proceedings a Parliament would not suffer: They were therefore to build their fortunes, gratify their high desires, and find impunity, by setting up the regal power above the laws.

In the next reign, yet more open invasions were made upon our liberties, not by the same men,

men, but by men acting upon the same principles. But they proceeded more cunningly before than afterwards: For in the former reign it was thought best to begin with altering the constitution, and that when this was done, religion might be changed of course: But the hot zeal of the Catholics would not permit them to go by slow and regular measures; they therefore made a strange and unpolitic attempt, never like to succeed, which was first to convert, and then to enslave the nation.

While these matters were transacting, there appeared all along persons, both in and out of the court, who did most virtuously oppose those designs, that, first secretly, and then openly, were forming against their country.

As some were contriving to subvert our civil rights, others did as carefully watch their preservation, which invading and defending, divided England into what was then called the court and country party.

Never was liberty more cunningly attacked, nor more nobly protected, than in that House of Commons which sat 18 years. It contained bold bad men, with hearts and heads fit to contrive the subversion of a state. But there were in it also persons of another character, very great indeed, with quite superior judgments, and with minds so rightly adapted for government, that the weight of the whole empire might be safely reposed upon their shoulders; in whom conversation with the dead wisdom of past ages, was joined with experience, and a perfect knowledge of this present world. These brave spirits from the beginning resisted that inundation of flattery and servile compliance, with which great revolutions in corrupt times are certain to be attended. They

vigorously opposed that unanimous band, which diligently promoted arbitrary power. Sometimes they saved us when we were within three or four votes of utter ruin; they hindered that encrease of the King's revenue, which alone would have put an end to Parliaments. These were the prime leaders of such whom the people for some years were pleased to term the Country Party; and by good patriots, so called, our constitution was for a while preserved.

But after the year 1679, on both sides the minds of men grew so inflamed, and such animosities did arise between them, that they could no longer call one another by the civil appellation of Court and Country Party, so that the different sides began to be distinguished by other sorts of names.

It is indeed below the gravity of a sober writer to use the common cant words of the town, but it is sometimes unavoidable, especially when that which was only mirth and cant at first, became at last a serious matter.

The accidental words of Guelf and Ghibelin, in process of time grew to be the names of powerful parties, into which several countries were divided, and in which Emperors, Kings, Popes, and Princes engaged, and these names of distinction continued for some ages, producing wars and actions of great importance.

In the same manner the words of Whig and Tory, intended at first as reciprocal reproaches, in a short time grew to be the names by which two great parties were contented to be called, and into which in a manner the whole nation was divided.

They were termed Whigs, and indeed they called themselves so, who under another name, had heretofore opposed the corrupt and illegal proceedings

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ceedings of the court, who foresaw the dangers that would arise from a Catholic King, who were for correcting the exorbitances of Westminster-Hall, and for putting a stop to extravagant fines, and who made a resolute stand, and would give no more money, till the Habeas Corpus act was passed, and till the new raised army was disbanded; and who did their utmost against the surrender and regulating of charters.

In the next reign the same men, or men acting upon the same principle, declared themselves against taking of the test and penal laws. They shewed an open dislike in Parliament of Catholics being put into offices of trust. They abhorred the cruel executions in the west. They opposed the violent prosecution of the seven Bishops: And lastly, they were ready and active with their councils and assistance to bring over the redeemer of England.

A man is but young at 19, but a party may be thought old that is of so long a standing. The persons just now described were the Old Whigs, whose principles will be revered in future ages by all such as love their country. It is true, some persons did join with these, and call themselves Whigs, who had all along other views than the nation's service, whom disappointments had soured, who opposed to be taken off, and who did not like a court, because a court did not like them. But they who swim against the tide, must make use of all helps, and in corrupt times, even the best patriots have refused no sort of men that could any ways assist the public: The good and bad of these altogether were called the Whig Party.

To what had been formerly stiled the Court Side, the people afterwards gave the name of Tories. And we shall give an account of what sort

of persons this party was composed. The bulk of them consisted of such as were descended from the Cavaliers, whose families had suffered very much by the civil war, and who by education were seasoned with an early love to kingly government. They were jealous that all motions tending to preserve liberty, favoured of the commonwealth, with whose weight their fathers had been crushed. A most unwise generation of men, to have any fears that a commonwealth could be restored in a country so corrupted! Many of them were much of that principle of which Tacitus describes Marcellus Epius to have been, who said in the senate, "Se meminisse temporum quibus natus sit, quam civitatis formam patres avique instituerint: ulteriora mirari, præsentia sequi, bonos imperatores voto expetere, qualescunque tolerare." Many of them were debauched by pomp and splendor, and in the heat of their youth, they liked the pleasures of a court, but the riots of it compelled many of them, at last, to depend upon its favours. Others embraced the regal power more warmly, because they saw many of the opposite side bitter against the church, not so desirous to correct any of its errors, as willing to lay the ax to its very root. Others linked themselves with this band out of a cautious temper, and through a fear that contending with the court might produce another war. Some came into this side out of gratitude to King Charles, and many through mere affection to his person; for without doubt he was a most engaging Prince. Others went into it from a real conviction of their minds, that the King was not safe without more power, to which opinion they were chiefly led, by observing the rash councils, unquiet spirits, and insolent behaviour of some of their oponents. But with those

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those who might act of this side upon a principle, there joined a great many who had no good intentions to the public, who were for enlarging the Prince's power, in order to augment their own, who were for robbing the people, that they might share in the plunder, who would have set the King above all the laws, that they might be never accountable to a Parliament for their proceedings; and, who pretending a great zeal for the church, were all the while making way for Popery; thus upon different motives, considerable numbers were listed on this side, and the good and the bad mingled together, composed what was called the Tory Party.

But human affairs are subject to such odd turns, that in the next reign many of both these parties traversed their ground, and mutually passed into that camp which some of their enemies had deserted. Not a few of the Whigs entered into the worst of King James's measures and councils; and the eyes of those who had been reckoned Tories, were in a manner universally opened, and they began to see the errors they had been committing so many years, insomuch that they were as eager as any others to promote the Revolution: So that the soundest part of these clashing factions shook hands together, and joined in that rescue of our liberties which could never have been brought about but by the concurrent endeavour of both parties.

Both sides had their faults, and of both sides bad men were listed, and of each side there were many who all along acted upon the principles of honesty and virtue, and who aimed at the common good, though as to the way to it, in their turns, each side might be now and then mistaken: It must indeed be granted, that the Whigs saw the diseases
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that were growing upon the body politic, before the Tories; but when the distemper began to rage, the Tories were not behind hand in seeking out the proper remedy.

But though such as the common people then called Tories, joined in the Revolution, and had without doubt the greatest hand in it, having on their side men of fortunes, power, and figure, and the main body of the church, which will always be found the strongest interest in England, yet it must be confessed that the change was made upon the old Whig principles, of making Parliaments awful to the ministers, and of keeping the regal authority within the limits of the law; for what this nation then did, was directly opposite to the church or tory maxims; but when Princes quit the old rules of right government, their subjects will be apt to forget the old rules prescribed for their obedience.

It is hoped these names of distinction are now quite abolished and forgotten; but the faction of Guelfs and Ghibelins, after having slept for some time, revived again, and continued upwards of 200 years, even when the derivation of the words was no more remembered; and the parties lasted so long, because the same principles upon which they had first differed, remained still deeply imprinted in their minds, and afforded continual matter for new dissention.

In the same manner perhaps some time hence the names of Whig and Tory may be again renewed here, to disturb this nation's peace; and if this should happen, we must implore the Whigs not to forget their old principles and ancient maxims.

The Tories, by taking arms to defend their civil rights, and by joining to depose that Prince
by

by whom those rights were violated, have in the most public manner in the world renounced their doctrine of *Jus Divinum*, passive obedience, and non-resistance.

But if the Whigs should hereafter take their stations, if they should go upon that ground which the Tories have quitted, if they should enter upon just such measures, if they should pursue the same councils, if they should suffer themselves to be imbibed with Tory notions, our constitution must be entirely lost.

For they may undermine it without suspicion: Who will be jealous of those who have been preaching up liberty, and accusing arbitrary ministers for thirty years? Who will suspect such profest patriots? They may change the form of our government, and have the people of their side, who can have no jealousy of them, for the Whigs are the favourites of the people, as having so often preserved England. No person could be popular enough in Rome to think of subverting its constitution, in the purity of the commonwealth, but Manlius who had saved the capitol.

It will hardly be surmised, that they can mean to enslave us, who (by their speeches, actions, and writings) for many years seemed rather inclined to a republic than to despotic government. But if they should come to change their minds, if they should throw off their former principles, we shall be undone by the very men whom we thought our surest friends.

If old Whigs should hunt after places as much as ever the Tories did, and if like them, upon preferment, they should become quite new men, in voting, thinking, and speaking, in a moment making a sudden turn from the whole course of their former lives; if old Whigs, as the Tories did,

did, should ever take bribes and pensions to betray their trust; if they should do any thing to break into the Habeas Corpus act, which is the chief guardian of our liberties; if they should oppose any good act for the frequent sitting of Parliaments, which want in the constitution produced all our former miseries; if they should openly oppose any reasonable provision for trials in treason, the want of which has lost many a noble life, and for which heretofore they had so loudly called; if, as the Tories did, they should send their emissaries about to influence or corrupt elections; if old Whigs, to whom *Meum* and *Tuum* was once so sacred, should come to ruin a society of trading men, and at one blow destroy many hundred families; but God forbid Englishmen should ever have such a thought! if old Whigs shall persuade any future Prince to closet members, as was done in the preceding reigns; if by their power they should get men turned out of employment, for pursuing the dictates of their conscience, and understanding; if like the ministers heretofore complained of, they should have a band of pensioners ready to give up any right, to grant any sum, and to excuse, nay even to vote their paymaster thanks for any male administration.

If the old Whigs should restore to men the same dishonest interest they had heretofore; if they should consume us in their ministerial, and sell us in their legislative capacity; if they should desire to have things governed rather by tricks and little arts, than according to the direction of the laws, or the bent of the people; if they, who, upon the virtuous principles of keeping England a free country, in former times, opposed all excises, should be brought to create so many new offices

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offices and officers, as may influence elections round the kingdom; if they, who heretofore thought the best way to preserve their civil rights, was to keep the purse, and to have always something to give, should be for settling such an immense revenue on the crown, as may make Parliaments unnecessary; if they who were so careful in King Charles's reign, not to burthen the nation with taxes, should give away the people's wealth, as if England were a mine of treasure never to be exhausted; if they who have ever asserted, that all rents and payments to the crown were the kingdom's revenues, and not alienable, but by authority of Parliament, should in a short space of time come to alienate all the crown land, and to leave the King hardly a turf of ground either in England or Ireland; if they who formerly thought it sufficient matter of impeachment for a Lord Treasurer, or any other intrusted by the King, to pass large grants from the crown to themselves, should give to their creatures, and share among one another, in a few years, of crown lands, near to the value of two millions.

If the very men who have * “ asserted and
“ claimed it to be their true, ancient, and in-
“ dubitable right, and that it ought to be esteem-
“ ed, allowed, adjudged, and deemed, that the
“ raising or keeping a standing army within the
“ kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with
“ the consent of Parliament, is against law;” if
they who once believed this eagle in the air frightened
all motions towards liberty; if they who heretofore
thought armies in time of peace and our free-

* Act declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, p. 197.
192.

doms inconsistent; if the same men should throw off a Whig principle so fundamental; if they should become the open advocates for standing forces; and even submit to troops composed of foreigners.

If in this manner the old Whigs, whose foresight and courage has hitherto preserved England, should quite change their minds, and go thus retrograde from all their former speeches, actions, and councils; if they should thus come to clothe themselves with the foul, ridiculous, and detested garments of the Tories, and give into the worst of their measures; and if all that has been here discoursed should happen, then would the constitution of this country be utterly subverted.

For men finding themselves thus forsaken by the ancient friends to liberty, would believe they were bought and sold; they would imagine that there was no such thing as virtue and honesty remaining in the kingdom; they would think all pretensions to the public good, to be nothing but designs of ambitious persons, to lift themselves up to high honours, upon the shoulders of the people; and when nations have before their eyes an armed power to fear, and none in whom they can put any trust, they seldom fail of submitting to the yoke.

Free states yield to slavery when the men best esteemed, and most in vogue, are generally thought to be corrupted. This was the condition of Rome under Augustus, as Tacitus finely describes it*:

“ Ubi militem donis, populum annona, cunctos
 “ dulcedine otii pellexit; insurgere paulatim, munia senatus magistratuum, legum in se trahere,
 “ nullo adversante: cum ferocissimi per acies aut

* Lib. i.

“ proſcriptione cecidiſſent. Cæteri nobilium,
“ quanto quis ſervitio promptior, opibus ac ho-
“ noribus extollerentur : ac novis ex rebus aucti,
“ tuta & præſentia, quam vetera ac periculofa
“ mallent, neque provinciæ illum ſtatum rerum
“ abnuebant, ſuſpecto ſenatus populique imperio,
“ ob certamina potentium, & avaritiam magiſtra-
“ tuum : invalido legum auxilio quæ vi, ambitu,
“ poſtremo pecunia turbabantur.” When the beſt
and nobleſt ſpirits were all extinct, and when it
was ſeen that the remainder were contented with
wealth, titles, and preferments, the price of their
ſubmiſſion, the Romans thought it their ſafeſt
courſe to commit all to the care and wiſdom of a
ſingle perſon.

In the ſame manner, if in times to come it
ſhould happen that our nobility and gentry ſhould
be more ſollicitous to get a ſmall employment,
than to keep a great eſtate ; if the perſons of note
and figure ſhould be ſwayed by their private in-
tereſt, without any regard to the public good ; if
it ſhould be viſible to the counties and boroughs,
that men covet to be choſen, not for their coun-
try’s ſervice, but in order to ſerve themſelves ; if
it ſhould grow apparent, that neither ſide is at
bottom better principled than the other ; that
Court and Country Party, Whigs and Church-
men, are nothing but the factions of thoſe who
have, and thoſe who deſire preferment ; if in this
manner the whole maſs of blood in the body po-
litic ſhould be corrupted, the nation will throw off
that reverence to Parliaments, which has hitherto
preſerved our liberties, and like the neighbouring
countries either terrified or allured, they will by
degrees ſubmit to unlimited monarchy ; and ſo
we ſhall loſe one of the beſt conſtitutions that was
ever ſet afoot for the well governing a people.

Handling

Handling as we do the methods whereby a nation may encrease in wealth and power, we thought it necessary to describe those parties and factions which probably hereafter may come to influence in its councils; and this has been done in order to incite good men to watch over their growth and progress, and such good men chiefly as design to engage on neither side, but to bend all their care that no side may be able to hurt the commonwealth.

And if it should be asked, Why the care of liberty and preserving our civil rights should be so much recommended in a paper relating to Trade? we answer, that herein we follow * Machiavel, who says, "That when a free state degenerates
" into a tyranny, the least mischief that it can
" expect, is to make no farther advancement in
" its empire; and no farther encrease either in
" riches or power, but for the most part it goes
" backward and declines."

This deep statesman has a saying in another place †, well worthy of eternal remembrance:
" That the Prince who aims at glory and reputa-
" tion in the world, should desire a government
" where the manners of his subjects are corrupted
" and depraved, not to subvert and destroy it like
" Cæsar, but to rectify and restore it like Romu-
" lus, than which the heavens cannot confer, nor
" man propose to himself a greater honour."

It may be objected, that in France, where all thoughts of liberty are extinguished, trade and riches have of late years very much encreased. But this admits of an easy answer. An absolute Prince, with great abilities and virtues, by care and wis-

* Machiavel's Discourses on Livy, lib. ii. c. 2.

† Lib. i. c. 10.

dom may make his country flourish for a time. However, if his successors are weak or wicked, all shall be soon unravelled and go backward, and poverty shall soon invade the same people which before began to thrive; for to make a nation very rich and powerful, there must be a long succession of good Princes, (which seldom happens) or a long succession of good laws and good government, which may be always had in countries that preserve their freedom: And without doubt it is on this account that Machiavel has asserted*, "That no cities have augmented their revenues or enlarged their territories, but whilst they were free and at liberty."

And if in future times the nobility and gentry of England (which God forbid) should traffic the people's rights for titles, bribes, or places, *vilia servitii pretia*, and if they should be induced fearfully, or which is worse, corruptly to give up this constitution, poverty will creep insensibly upon us. We shall, as Machiavel says, "go backwards and decline;" land will yield a great deal less than now, rents will be ill paid, and we shall not have a Foreign Traffic large and extended enough to produce such a naval strength as may make us safe at home and terrible abroad.

It is therefore upon the authority of this great Man that we have laid down, "That a country cannot encrease in wealth and power but by private Men doing their Duty to the Public, and but by a steady course of honesty and wisdom, in such as are trusted with the Administration."

However, if things should hereafter proceed amiss, it is hoped the strong constitution of this

* Lib. ii. c. 2.

government will in time throw off those diseases which may affect it for a season, and that the united wisdom of the nation can recover us from that decay of health to which we may be reduced by a few empirics of state: Their giddy management for a while may be supported and born out, by the great riches which peradventure may have been collected here by the industry and prudence of former ages; but if what has been gathering seven centuries, they should squander away in a few years, the cries of that people whom they so impoverish, will at last awaken the Parliament to enquire into, and animadvert upon their wild proceedings.

If the wealth and power of a country depend upon the good government and stability of its affairs, it must certainly import all the different ranks of men to contribute their utmost that things may be well-administered: And in mixed constitutions almost every man is able in some degree to help towards this; for if the people are honest and careful in the choice of their representatives, and if those representatives perform their duty, arbitrary power can never be settled here, and no male-administration that may hereafter happen can long continue.

That we are in no danger at present, and that matters proceed well, now is allowed; but for the security of future times it may not be amiss frequently to repeat this caution, that our whole depends upon keeping one post well defended.

The public virtue which must preserve a state is "A constant and perpetual will to do our country good;" and where this principle governs, though in the minds of but a few, yet if they persevere with undaunted courage, the small number may prevail at last to defeat the malice of the

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the corrupt part, especially when the endeavours of the few are assisted by a Prince disposed by interest and inclination to promote the common welfare.

If good men were but as active and vigilant as their opposites, it would not be so easy a matter to change the constitution of a country: When those who are concerned in honour and interest to have things well administered, do resolutely and firmly join together to oppose such as find their profit by a corrupt and loose administration, a stand may at least be made, and some stop put to the further progress of the evil.

But though Pompey, Cæsar, and Crassus, composed a fatal triumvirate, and united in a strict league to subvert the liberties of Rome, we do not read that there was the same union and good understanding between Lucullus, Cato, Cicero, and the rest, who endeavoured to save the commonwealth; for the luxury and laziness of some, the froward temper, or secret ambition of others, made them either neglect or obstruct the business of the public, which might be the reason that Cæsar at last prevailed.

In the same manner, if hereafter a cabal of men, in order to their own greatness, should design to change this constitution, to introduce a government by the sword, and to give away all the nation's wealth; and if to these ends they should form assemblies, and there propose what they intend to consent to in another place, they will succeed, and their attempts can never be withstood, unless such as mean England well, join in as firm a league for its preservation, as they shall enter into for its destruction.

If therefore, in future times, it shall be visible that some men, to build their own fortunes, are

pushing at their country's ruin, good patriots must then exert all their virtue, they must reassume the courage of their ancestors, they must lay aside their pleasures, but chiefly, they must sacrifice to the public all their ancient animosities; they must mutually forgive one another; it must be no more remembered of what party the man was, it being sufficient to enquire, whether or no he always acted upon the principles of honesty and honour. At such a time the best men of both sides, if the name of parties shall still remain, must shake hands together, with a resolution to withstand the unanimous, subtle, and diligent enemies of the King and kingdom.

In such a juncture both sides must contend, not which shall flatter highest, but which shall best contribute to the defence of their Prince's person, and to the maintenance of the established government.

If bad men shall have meetings to consult how they may destroy our civil rights, good patriots ought to meet calmly to communicate counsels which way those rights are to be preserved; for Machiavel says*, "There is not a better or more secure way to suppress the insolence, or cross-bite the designs of an ambitious citizen, than to take the same way to prevent, which he takes to advance them."

In such a juncture, not only the best of all parties must be taken in, but we must be angry with no sort of men that are willing to unite against the enemies of England; for in a nation which for a long time was, as all allow, upon a dishonest interest, it will be difficult to find persons whose characters shall be entirely without a blemish; nor

* Discourses on Livy, c. 52.

indeed

indeed was there ever any man perfect : At such a season therefore, men must place their hopes in such as have most abilities, and fewest faults, especially when they live in the dregs of Romulus, and not in the republic of Plato's institution.

If the nobility and gentry retain their wonted courage, and preserve their former wisdom, they will always rescue us out of weak and polluted hands, and will never endure that so noble a Prince as we have now upon the throne, esteemed by the whole world, and head of the Protestant interest, should at any time be distressed at home, or interrupted abroad, in the measures his high valour purposes for the good of Europe, by the ill conduct of any minister.

Particular men do often miscarry in the world ; notwithstanding that in their whole transactions they give continued proofs of a most perfect conduct : They shall not be the richer for their thrift, nor better esteemed for their integrity : Their industry shall avail them nothing : Their courage shall never bring them victory, and their wisest counsels shall have no success. Others in the mean time every way deficient, of no desert, and merely by the help of fortune, shall succeed in all they undertake. But though she may be said to govern thus in single events, and here and there to influence in the actions of private persons, great monarchies and commonwealths do not depend upon her. Politic institutions, prudently ordered in the beginning, and keeping on in a steady course of wisdom and virtue, are out of her power and rule, and can never fail to prosper ; and when disasters happen to a state, it is seldom the work of chance, but rather the effect of some misgovernment.

For in former reigns we have seen, that when the King's revenue was not well managed it proceeded from this, that the employments relating to it were not the rewards of skill, but the recompence of another merit, and that want of knowledge in the managers was winked at while they were giving money in another place. Heretofore if men betrayed their trust and sold the people, it was because they were largely invited to it. In former times, when the nation's trade impaired and went backward, the secret cause was that the ministers were servilely to promote the interest of some other country. And in the preceding reigns, if the King's treasure was wildly dissipated, and if exorbitant grants were made, it came from this, that the ministers could refuse no body, having a great deal to ask for themselves, and that they were not to put rubs in the way of others, that they might more smoothly carry on their own pretensions. These instances are only given, not but that by many others we could support this position, that when the public treasure is wasted, when a nation runs into immense debts, when the land of the crown is granted all away, when its revenues are ill managed, and when the people are corrupted, we are not altogether to blame fortune, the times or accidents of the war, but rather to attribute a great share of these evils to some error in the subordinate parts of the administration.

Tiberius, in a letter to the senate, has this expression *: "*Nescio an suafurus fuerim omittere
" potius prævalida & adulta vitia, quam hoc ad-
" sequi, ut palam fieret quibus flagitiis impares
" essemus.*" The scope of his epistle is to shew

* Tacit. l. 3. Ann.

how difficult it was for him to correct vices, with which the principal men of Rome were tainted, and that by the attempt he might draw envy upon himself. But though a cautious Prince might have reason to entertain such a fear, the whole legislative power of a country need never lie under apprehensions of the like nature. This strength can deal with the ambition, avarice, corruption, and rapine of the great ones : The legislative authority can correct men of arbitrary principles, and pull down the topping pride of insolent and undertaking ministers, who are by no means equal to their business, and whose heads are giddy, and turn round in the eminence, on which fortune, flattery, and their other vices, not their merit, has placed them.

And if our affairs here should ever happen to light into such hands, we must put our chief hopes in the King at the head of a Parliament.

While that place contains men of courage and public spirit, matters cannot long proceed amiss. Whoever therefore undertakes that trust, should continually have before their eyes how much the common welfare depends upon their virtues. But above all things, they should have disinterested and self-denying minds.

It can hardly be conceived, but by those who have seen it, what reverence is paid, even by his enemies, to a man of steady principles, the tenor of whose words and actions are always the same ; who is neither to be bought nor frightened : He is admired and followed ; all he says has its due weight, his honest hoary head is dear to all mankind. Whereas the whifling prolers after places, and little busy intriguers, are contemptible to the very men, of whom they are the wretched instruments. And let the ambitious think what

they please, that man has most real power in this country, who is believed to be of the most unshaken integrity towards the public, and he who has such a character, enjoys more true greatness than all the vain pomp and honours a court can give.

The employments of England are yet but few, and their profits but inconsiderable to what they are in several nations; however small as they seem to be, it is to be feared that some time or other they will be made engines wherewith bad men will endeavour to subvert this constitution.

It is true, at present we are out of such a danger, but if in future times we should chance to see all employments reserved for men in one certain station, if the road to preferment should lie but through one place and passage; when this happens, we shall have cause to be alarmed, and to look about us.

They who feel within themselves abilities to serve the public, are by no means blamable in desiring to be upon the stage of business. On the contrary, that sour philosophy which makes some persons at all seasons retire and abandon the state, is by no means to be commended. They do indeed but *nomine magnifico, segne otium velare**: If the posture of affairs will possibly admit it, good men should rather strive to be in power, that the commonwealth may not be ingrossed by corrupt and unskilful hands. A wise man can easily discern whether the ministers are such, that he may with honour and safety mix in councils with them. If the administration be sound and right, or if it has but a face looking that way, it is a proper season for men of probity, skill, and virtue, to

* Tacit. lib. iv. Hist.

produce their talents, and to push themselves forward, in order more fully to mend things. And at such a time they should be ready to assist the state with their true sense and right understanding; nor should they lazily suffer the perfections of their minds to be useless and unactive. And if among those there be any very eminent, strong in friends, versed in affairs of state, of a deep reach and foresight, who have eloquence to sway assemblies, and courage to resist and overcome popular fury, such ought not to despair of the public, but assist with their wisdom to redeem a people from their weak hands, who shall get into power by mere chance, when the nation perhaps has been in a high ferment, as in boiling liquors the scum will get uppermost. And there is such reverence paid to those who have a very great genius, that when they offer themselves to serve the commonwealth, the weight of the people will bear down all the upstart pretenders, and force them to give way, and make room for merit so superior.

But if it should ever happen that the administration should be entirely bad and wrong, then ought good men to have no share nor hand in it; they should withdraw from any participation in the negligence or guilt; they should quit what they cannot honourably hold; they should concern themselves no more in business, leaving such ministers to govern by themselves, who will not govern well, and be contented to serve their country by defending liberty in one post against any encroachment; they should not make so ill a use of that affection the people may bear them, and of the interest they may have in the nation, as to be a shelter for the crimes or folly of others; nor should they as it were lend their countenance,

nance, and be the screen behind which bad men may safely attempt to undermine the constitution.

If the times are good, silent merit will be sought after; but if they are bad, ill men will be lifted up to the offices and dignities of the state by the applause of their adherents, and the faction of their friends; but at such a season it is no shame not to be employed. Tacitus speaking of *Ælius Lamia*, says, “*Et non permiffa provincia dignationem addiderat*.*”

Great men are often liable to one unfortunate vanity: They believe their parts, dexterity, and wisdom, to be fuch, that they can mend things, give them a new complexion, correct all errors, and at least that they shall preserve themselves found, though every one else be tainted; and upon these presumptions, some of the men in best esteem have heretofore engaged with a foul and depraved ministry; but we could never see that they were able to make any converts: On the contrary, instead of changing the court, the court did alter them.

Courts are but slowly mended, and that not by the authority or example of any single person, except it be of the Prince himself, strongly bent to fet matters upon a right foot. And yet we have more instances of courts which have spoilt their Prince, than of Princes that have reformed their courts.

And if it be asked, When is the most proper time for persons of probity and virtue to undertake the management of affairs? it may be answered, It is then seasonable when things call loudly to be mended, when unskilful pilots have run the ship

* Tacit. lib. vi. Ann.

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aground, so that she sticks fast, ready to split at the next coming of the waves; when ignorant men are quite bewildered in their errors; when the whole people see and feel the effects of ill government; when the Prince grows ashamed of those whom his subjects hate and fear; when the commonwealth cannot emerge out of its debts and difficulties, without help from abler hands, then is the true time for the best men to offer themselves to the service of their country. At such a season honesty will not stand alone, weak, defenceless, and out of countenance at the sight of prosperous vice: Nor can courts be ever safe for honest men, till the circumstance and necessity of the times bring thither a party strong enough to maintain itself against those who are grown great by wicked arts.

If Englishmen will be continent in this single point, all must of course go well; if they who have noble commands in the country will scorn meanly to depend in town; if they who have brave seats of their own, will despise the crowded antichambers of the great ones here; if they who have plentiful estates, will slight a troublesome and precarious employment, they are more happy than a court can make them; if our nobility and gentry would consider how miserable the noblemen of France are with all their mighty places, they would at no time hereafter desire to wear the livery of bondage. And if they are truly seasoned with these notions, that their liberties are above all price, and (as Sir Benjamin Rudyard was wont to say) "That there is nothing worth being a knave," the head must be very skilful, and the heart very bold, that will undertake to invade our fundamental rights.

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It is true, what has been here advanced, and what shall be said anon, may seem needless at present, when all things are presumed to go well, but these notions may be of use to after-ages.

“The duty which private Persons owe to the Public,” lies in a very narrow compass, and when that is thoroughly performed, a country seldom fails to see “a steady course of wisdom and honesty in such as are trusted with the Administration.” This duty may chiefly consist in the following particulars:

I. That such as represent the people be uncorrupt, unbiassed, and disinterested.

II. That they diligently attend the nation's service.

III. That they carefully watch any innovation or encroachments upon the constitution.

IV. That they make provision against future evils.

V. That they look narrowly into the income and expence of the kingdom, and examine which way immense debts have been contracted, and how that money has been disposed of which the nation has already granted.

VI. That they hold a strong hand over the men of business, calling those to an account, who, either through folly, or upon some wicked design, pursue destructive measures.

I. “That such as represent the people be uncorrupt, unbiassed, and disinterested.” This point we have handled sufficiently in the series of this discourse. And to what has been already said upon that subject, we shall now only add, that Rome was once free; that France heretofore had the three estates, which were the guardians of its liberty;

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liberty; that Spain had formerly many rights and privileges, of which nothing now but the shadow remains; that Denmark and Sweden had once constitutions something like that of England; and that all these countries have been enslaved by their own corruptions.

2. "That they diligently attend the nation's service;" for otherwise they do not discharge their trust to which they are chosen. It has been formerly a matter of great wonder, that gentlemen should even waste their fortunes to be elected, and yet afterwards never mind that station which they seemed before so vehemently to covet. Cato had many virtues too big for practice, but he may be easily imitated in one good quality he had, of never failing to be present in the senate. Such should give way to others, and make room for men of more leisure, who cannot afford to employ all their time in the service of their country. But above all others, they are to blame who can be drawn from their duty by luxury, laziness, and pleasures. Liberty can be hardly wounded in a full house; the attempts made upon it in former reigns were made when such as had no dependence upon the court were absent about their country business. The ill ministers of those days took that opportunity to promote taxes, which would never pass in a full assembly; to pass dangerous laws; to set afoot new invented corporations which may be fatal in their consequences; and to form projects either destructive to the nation in general, or ruinous to particular men. All the ill things ever done have been compassed when the negligence of some had made one side strong and the other weak.

And if in after-ages any of the men of business should be so wicked as to proceed by the same council,

councils, and to go by the like measures, they will promote their dark designs in some such juncture, when the best patriots shall be gone away quite tired out by sessions artificially prolonged.

But it is the duty of all who love England, to defeat by unwearied patience such a conspiracy against the people, and to obviate such a mischief: If the ordinary rules cannot do it, extraordinary laws may be thought on to oblige the members to that attendance which they owe their country.

He who does not attend, injures the borough for which he serves; for it may so happen, that in his absence a thing may pass to their ruin who have sent him, and which his presence might have prevented; his electors therefore seem to have such a right to his service as in reason no others ought to dispense with, without their consent.

Deserting in this manner the Public, is a growing evil, upon which account it ought to have a timely remedy. Perhaps it might not be amiss, if a bill were brought in to make it highly penal for any member to be absent from the house above fourteen days, without express leave first had under the seal of the borough for which he serves.

A great many mischiefs both public and private would be prevented, if such as represent their country would be strict in this duty of attending.

3. "That they carefully watch any innovation or encroachments upon the constitution." There is nothing lulls a people more asleep than the reign of a good Prince, revered for his wisdom, feared for his high courage, beloved for his lenity, and admired for a number of other virtues; whereas under a bad reign, the subjects are jealous

and vigilant, though often to little purpose. However, it is agreed on by all writers, that the mild rule of Augustus, contributed more to confirm the slavery of Rome, than all the severity and cunning of Tiberius.

The best times likewise produce the worst presidents; for in good times the people let many things slip, being then at their ease, not suspicious, and consequently not watchful over the government; but where this supine temper prevails, mixed governments decline immediately into absolute power. The frequent contests that were of old between the senate and people of Rome, without doubt preserved their freedom; for where all are of one mind, ill use may be made of that unanimity, by some eloquent, subtle, and ambitious man, who may turn and rule it as he pleases. Therefore, to preserve constitutions that have a mixture in them of popular government, it is necessary there should be always some small division, just enough to keep the minds of men awake, that they may observe what advantages one part of the state gets over the other.

Bad Kings provoke enough to look into their actions; but when the people have a good Prince, they give a favourable interpretation to all he does.

And the best man that ever reigned may be ill served. It is a maxim of our law, "That the King can do no wrong, but if any ill be committed in matters of state, the council; if in matters of justice, the judges must answer for it *." But though the laws exempt our Kings from blame, they are not freed from the bad effects of ill conduct in their ministers.

* Declaration and Remonstrance of Lords and Commons, May 19, 1642.

He therefore who represents his country, cannot do the nation nor his Prince better service, than to see that those who sit at the helm do not run the ship upon dangerous rocks. Absolute dominion is a bait with which the greatest minds may be tempted; for they whose goodness is unlimited, may desire that their power should be so too. But no one man ought to think of being omnipotent, unless he could be omniscient and omnipresent. Besides, though Princes may desire great power, that they may be able to do great good, such as serve them rarely proceed upon this principle. They often desire their masters should be arbitrary, in order to their own impunity, and to build a large fortune for themselves, for which reason they should be watched in all their windings, and followed in all their dark and subtle mazes.

It seldom happens that the liberties of a country are invaded all at once. The steps of power are leisurely and slow. Ministers who have it in their thoughts to change the nature of a government, go to work by degrees. At first they make use of the most popular hands they can possibly procure, ordering it so, that the people may not perceive who it is that puts their fetters on, but these popular men they shove out at the first convenient season, that all may be of a piece. Their next business is to corrupt such persons as have the clearest fame, whom they discard when sufficiently tainted, and this they do that the people may think all mankind alike, which naturally drives them to follow those only who are in power, and who can do them good. Afterwards they get from the nation all the money they can, the collecting of which erects new employments, and creates them a number of dependents, who, in one certain place, are their chief strength and best support:

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By the distribution of these sums, they likewise make more friends. But being never out of fear of accounting for all at last, their principal aim is to procure their Master such a standing revenue, as may make him subsist without the people's help. If they find this impossible or difficult, then by accusations, by exorbitant proceedings without any precedent, and by harassing private persons, either in their fame or fortune, they endeavour to make all the different ranks of the people out of love with their ancient constitution.

But when they have done all this, they will not yet think themselves quite out of danger. "Senatus & populus nunquam obscura nomina, et si aliquando obumbrentur*." They will still lie under apprehensions of being reached at last by the guardians of liberty. Therefore, to damp all thoughts of freedom, to influence the better sort, and to awe the vulgar, their last work is to procure a standing army.

By manifest original contract, an armed force cannot be raised nor kept within this kingdom, without consent of Parliament, so that if hereafter we should be ever enslaved that way, it is our own proper fault.

Where armies are powerful, there grows a necessity upon Princes, rather to please them than the people. And yet no mercenaries are sufficient to help a Prince against a powerful foreign force, if the subjects are disobliged at home. Machiavel says †, "That a Prince who founds the duration of his government upon mercenary troops, shall never be firm nor secure." But he counts foreign forces yet more dangerous,

* Tacit. lib. ii. Hist.

† Prince, ch. xii.

because "they are always unanimous, and at the
"command of other people*."

If hereafter any ministers should be so wicked to attempt the subversion of our fundamental rights, we have here shewn some of the steps which they will probably make to compass their designs. It therefore imports all good men to watch their first invasions and encroachments, and betimes to intercept them in their course.

4. "That they make provision against future
"evils." The virtues requisite for such as will handle matters of government, have their foundation in wisdom and courage. He whose endowments of the mind are not sufficient to foresee a long while before what may be the event of a council, cannot consult safely for his Prince; and he who at every turn is afraid of popular anger, shall never give any sound advice.

Virtue and wisdom, in some sense, are terms synonymous, and different words, signifying the same thing; for no man can be virtuous with any effect conducive to the public good, without a rich talent of the mind, and strong wisdom; nor can a man be truly wise, without such public virtue as warmly embraces the liberty, honour, and interest of his country. And when a genius of this kind appears in any nation, he has a natural right to the offices and dignities of the state: But if ever courts shall happen to be depraved, they will like quite another sort of men: Wanting true wisdom, they must set up something in the room of it; that is to say, momentary shifts, and short remedies; raw and unskilful meddlers in business are their darlings, that will venture at all, and yet know nothing; upon

* Chap. xiii.

which

which principle they make open war with desert of any kind, and reckon it a great conquest, when they can get rid of a wary and knowing statesman.

They count it supreme wisdom to answer any single necessity, never regarding whether the manner of doing it be safe, just, or honourable. They not only trust providence, (as all men should do) but are content to rest wholly upon it; believing foresight, and thoughts of the future, to bring more anxiety than profit. They are wise, as some men subsist from hand to mouth; they think it sufficient to live to-day, and to make provision for the present moment. All this perhaps may be good philosophy in private cases; but for the whole body of a state to go by such rules, must needs be very dangerous.

Machiavel says*, “The Romans could never relish the saying that is so frequent in the mouths of our politicians; to enjoy the present benefits of time.” They either provided against, or fronted a danger; and seldom let themselves be overtaken by it: He says likewise, “That things which are discovered at a distance (which is done only by prudent men) produce little mischief, but what is easily averted: But when, through ignorance or inadvertency, they come to that height that every one discerns them, there is no room for any remedy, and the disease is incurable.”

Cardinal Richlieu says†, “It is the duty of ministers of state to represent to their masters, that it is more necessary to consider the future, than the present; and that distempers are like

* Prince, cap. iii.

† Testament Politique du Cardinal Richlieu, p. ii. c. 4.

“ the enemies of a state, against whom prudence
 “ obliges to march, rather than tarry till they are
 “ come to drive them out again ; that those who
 “ do not follow this method, will fall into great
 “ confusions, which it will be very difficult to re-
 “ medy afterwards.” But he lays down, “ That
 “ it is a common thing among weak men to drive
 “ off time, and to chuse the preserving their ease
 “ for a month, rather than to deprive themselves
 “ of it for a while to avoid the trouble of many
 “ years ; which they do not consider, because
 “ they see only what is present, and do not anti-
 “ cipate time by a wise providence.” He farther
 adds, “ That ministers, who never consider to-
 “ morrow, live happily for themselves ; but
 “ others live unhappily under them.”

We have here cited the authorities of two very
 able men, both in the theory and practice of state
 affairs ; to shew how dangerous their measures are,
 who consult nothing but their present ease, who
 love palliating remedies, and who are for remov-
 ing from them the evil day at as great a distance
 as they can.

If we should ever fall into such hands, they will
 not care with what debts and payments they load
 future times, so they may come at a little ready
 money. They will give large premiums and in-
 terest, never considering who must pay the rec-
 koning at last. They will set afoot high duties,
 never weighing how the people's trade and ma-
 nufactures are thereby affected. They will not
 mind how profusely they waste the nation's trea-
 sure ; negligence and prodigality being pleasant
 and easy for the present time, though afterwards
 the parents of infinite care and trouble.

Constancy in denying unreasonable suits ; thrift
 for the public ; promoting foreign traffic ; im-
 proving

proving the revenues granted; keeping the ships of war in good repair; laying up stores; making schemes for better government; retrenching all needless expences; providing against wars to come; making good leagues abroad; allaying heats and animosities at home; and putting impediments in the way of any power that grows too fast; are so many seeds which great and able statesmen are always sowing, without a prospect to reap in many years; but the harvest comes at last; and under the conduct of such ministers nations thrive and flourish: Whereas, such as proceed upon that narrow notion of "enjoying the present benefits of time," though they may thereby do their own work, and make their own fortunes, yet without doubt they will ruin whatever government they undertake to guide.

If, in after-ages, they who are trusted with the administration here, should be thus careless and unforeseeing, it will be the duty of such as represent the people, by frequent and serious enquiries into the state of the nation, and by plain speeches, to rouse up the men of business from a lethargy that may prove so fatal; for undoubtedly any part of the legislative authority may call upon the executive power to make provision against future evils.

5. "That they look narrowly into the income and expence of the kingdom, and examine which way immense debts have been contracted, and how that money has been disposed of which the nation has already granted."

The last Duke of Buckingham had many designs to put the affairs of his estate in order; and to this end he consulted several sorts of men: His wife and true friends laid before him, that no ways would be so effectual as to look into his accounts,

to employ honest stewards, and to live within compass. But there was another set of people in whom he more delighted, who made him believe they would put his business into such a posture, that no negligence or profusion should do him any hurt. In short, they told him directly, that they would procure for him the philosophers stone. He hearkened to them, minded none of his affairs, he let his servants do what they pleased, and would put no limits to his expences. But the consequence and conclusion of all was, that his Grace's evil counsellors became rich, and he grew poor.

In the same manner, if in some future reign we should fall into the hands of bad ministers, they will tell the Prince, that they can get for him the *magisterium*, (and indeed it would prove a kind of philosophers stone, if they can so concert matters, as to obtain all the supplies they shall insist on) they will persuade him they can maintain his crown and dignity out of a mine of new projects never to be exhausted, and upon this view they will advise him, first, to give them very large sums to buy limbecks, crucibles, and charcoal; for utensils must be had, and workmen must be paid; they will promote the making exorbitant grants, and giving away the crown lands upon this notion, that it is sowing a little to reap much. They will conceal pernicious pensions under the dark veil of Secret Service: An article that hides all. "But the estimates of the charge of the war" will be the best shelter they can possibly have for their profusions of any kind, where they may insert Items never to be disproved, and never to be understood. Finding how much it turns to their own account to have an ample revenue to range in, they will persuade their Prince to ask all things, and to spare nothing: And if such bad men as have
been

been here described should ever come to be trusted, they will make the body politic faint and look pale with continual opening of its veins; they will leave the crown bare, the exchequer empty, and all the revenues anticipated; they will distress the gentry, and beggar the common people; and having thus enriched themselves, and impoverished all other degrees of men, they will reduce the nation to be naked and defenceless, hardly able to support itself at home, much less in a condition to undergo another foreign war.

If at any time herereafter, such men as have been here pointed out, should be suffered to entangle our matters, to dissipate our treasures, and to waste the commonwealth, where will be the money, the fleet, and arms, that may be necessary in case the French should ever break the peace, and attempt to possess themselves of Spain and the West-Indies?

If by the giddy, or rather frantic conduct of beardless politicians, lifted perhaps up from the meanest obscurity, and set in a manner to hold the reins, our affairs should hereafter be brought so low, (which God forbid) as that we must sit still, while those dominions fall into a power already but too dreadful, how can universal monarchy be avoided? And if Spain should happen to be thus lost, we are not only hurt in a point of empire, the most important of all, but the whole trade of England will be cut up by the very roots.

It may be laid down for a certain truth, that no man of a great fortune was ever undone in a few years, but he was cheated of much more than he was able to spend: And this is yet more true, if the man had parts, and a good understanding. Private men are ruined, when those about them

are unfaithful, and are to profit by their destruction; and if they have no trusty servant that will put them in mind of their condition.

The same holds in the affairs of a whole nation. When a Public, that was once clear and easy, is overwhelmed with debts; when this happens among a people that have been always willing to give, and in a ministry that has never been backward to ask, when all occasions have been supplied to their full demand; when the Prince is wise and without any expensive pleasures; when such a country does labour under difficulties almost insuperable, and when in some future reign all this shall be our case, mankind will entertain an opinion that the administration is not right, the world will be inclined to think, that such as shall then govern in the revenue, want either fidelity or skill; it will be thought that they have not at any time laid before their Master a true state of his affairs; it will be believed that they have never contrived his expences with care and wisdom, and that they have not endeavoured by grave and wholesome councils to moderate his bounties.

The liberality of a Prince, the most extended we can imagine, will yet oblige but a very few; and to give it a constant supply, vast numbers must be harassed. Besides, among the vulgar, frugality in a court does in some measure commute for high taxes. Liberality is noble in rich and quiet times, but it will hardly be thought just when what is given is to be in a manner the last drop of blood in the subjects veins. Not to value their treasure has been always the fault of great and heroic minds, of which many had been ruined every moment, but that they had grave and honest ministers ready to keep them within bounds by wholesome advices, rugged truths, and severe virtue.

virtue. And so the Duke of Sully proceeded with his Master Henry IV. When a Prince is in his nature too bountiful, it is a duty incumbent upon such as serve him, with all humility to beg, that in his high wisdom he would consider how hardly that is gathered, which they shall see so lightly given: They ought rather to quit their posts, than to sign or fix the seal to immoderate gifts. But those hands must be very clean themselves, which are held up to Kings with humble prayers, that they would have compassion on their people.

It is true, war is a devouring monster, and to feed it will very much disorder the revenues of a country; and yet we see France has been able for nine years to engage all the strongest part of Europe, to have all the while land armies, consisting of above 300,000 men, and to maintain a fleet as numerous, and more expensive than that of England: And after all this, they have been in a condition to make larger expences of all kinds, (as is said) than in any two years during the war; and we see them now in a posture to meditate higher designs than ever. That they did bear up so long against the confederate strength; that they have been able annually to expend such an immense treasure for upwards now of ten years, and that they are not at present quite exhausted and impoverished, must without doubt proceed from the good conduct of those to whom the management of their affairs has been entrusted. No man is endured, under that monarchy, to perform the functions and offices of the state in an ignorant and careless manner. The ministers there are more frugal for their master than in their own concerns; they do not make too much haste to be rich; they are contented that a great fortune should be the recompence of many services, and
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of long merit. They have not let the crown lands of France be as it were a derelict, *et primi occupantis*: We do not observe it has been so ordered in that kingdom, that both the body of the people and the public too are poor at one and the same instant there; ministers have not suffered the commonwealth to be consumed by usurious contracts with the common lenders; and by their care and wisdom they have obtained such credit, even under a despotic power, that they have not been forced all along to pay above seven per cent. interest for money lent the Kings, whereas forty per cent. has been paid for mighty sums in one free government; so that upon the whole matter it is evident enough, that "this devouring monster" war is to be fed" where the men of business are honest, foreseeing, and frugal for the state.

Mixed governments, among many other excellencies, have this advantage, that a good administration may be obtained by any one part of the constitution, that will set itself strongly to so good a work: Kings can all times set things right, if the business of their wars do not compel them to be often absent. Either of the houses, when they have set themselves to enquire into, and correct disorders, have been terrible to the most bold, subtle, and most powerful statesmen that ever went about to undo a people, or to mislead a Prince.

If in any future reign the treasure of this kingdom should be mismanaged, and profusely wasted; and if debts, hardly to be waded through, should be contracted, the representatives of the people may, by looking strictly into all these matters, perhaps immediately lessen the public engagements, at least they may put some stop to the farther progress of the mischief.

In such juncture, good men will think it their duty to see whether this debt is not to be lessened, by reviewing former accounts, they will examine whether the sums already granted were not sufficient to pay off all the forces we have had at land and sea: They will enquire from whence such a high article of arrears proceeds; they will see how so many funds come to be deficient, and whether such deficiencies have not been occasioned by some ill conduct in those who have managed the respective branches; they will inform themselves which way the many millions are gone which the people have paid; they will desire to know what necessities could compel men of business to give such large premiums and high interest; and whether the promoters of a council so pernicious did not lend their own money; and whether they have not been parties deeply concerned themselves in all usurious contracts: They will enquire upon what consideration, and for what services, immoderate grants of lands and money have been made, and they will do it the more strictly, if, when such grants were passed, it should happen that the nation was indebted, and paid heavy taxes.

The representatives of the people can look into all these things; and, no doubt, it is a duty which they owe their country, that has trusted them with so unlimited a disposal of their fortunes.

To prevent mismanagement in the revenue of this kingdom, it seems necessary that a law should be made to put the lords of the treasury under such an oath as the lord high treasurer of England takes; for it appears an absurdity in our government, that the meanest officer concerned in the King's revenue should be sworn to a true and faithful discharge of his trust; and that the treasury,

fury, who are trusted with the whole, whose authority is so boundless, and who have it so much in their power to hurt the nation, should be under no oath at all. Some objections there are against this; but he who considers them well, will find them of no weight, and that those necessities which have broken into, and overruled the ancient course of the exchequer, might have been avoided by care and conduct.

If in future times England should have any grounds to doubt that the treasure of the public has been embezzled; if prodigious fortunes, raised in ten years by obscure men, who have had no dealings but with the court, should minister occasion of suspicion; if resumptions should be thought fit, we mean in cases where persons of no merit have been enriched with the kingdom's spoils; if it should be thought reasonable to see whether any thing is to be saved in an immense debt, out of the unwarrantable gains which the lenders have made; if it should be judged expedient to enquire into any male-administration in those through whose hands the revenue passes; if it should be deemed necessary thrift to look into all pensions; if it should be thought reasonable fairly and impartially to state the account of so many millions given and expended, so great and difficult a work as a strict enquiry into all these matters will prove, cannot be entered upon, and brought to a good conclusion, but by the united wisdom of the nation.

No other power can face that strong league which will be made between fellow-criminals to save one another. Ordinary remedies prevail but little against stubborn and inveterate diseases: If therefore our affairs should be ever in disorder, the legislative

legislative authority can bring the most effectual helps to set us right.

And in such a case, peradventure, it may be thought advisable to promote a bill, that such sort of abuses as have been here described, and all other male-administration of the like kind, may be enquired into by committees of both houses, to sit in the interval of Parliament, with all requisite powers, without salaries, and to be chosen by ballot. And supposing past errors to be too big for correction, yet so awful an authority, and the fear that will from time to time be renewed, may, for the future, be some check to the growing corruptions of the age.

All the premises considered, we submit it to better judgments, whether it is not the duty of such as represent their country, “to look narrowly into
“the income and expence of the kingdom, and
“to examine which way immense debts have been
“contracted, and how that money has been dis-
“posed of, which the nation has already granted.”

6. “That they should hold a strong hand over
“the men of business, calling those to an account,
“who either through folly, or upon some wicked
“design, pursue destructive measures.” Helvidius Priscus, after the example of his father-in-law Petus Thrasea, in the philosophy he made use of to fit himself for the service of his commonwealth, followed the opinion of the stoicks, who placed all good and evil in honesty or dishonesty, accounting the gift of fortune, such as high birth, power, and wealth, to be but things indifferent towards the constituting of happiness, which they define to be internal, only in the mind.

But though Aristides, Socrates, Phocion, Publicola, Cincinnatus, Attilius, Regulus, and many others, have been great men under a constant and
willing

willing poverty ; yet, without doubt, nobility and riches help good spirits on in their way, and set them forward : He that is high born, his perfections may be sooner taken notice of, as standing upon an eminence ; and he that has wealth need not be troubled with private and domestic cares, and may devote all his time and thoughts to the service of his country.

Machiavel says *, that a Prince who intends to invade the constitution of a free people, takes this course : “ To subvert all, to turn every thing
“ topsie-turvie, and make all things new : To alter magistracy, create new titles, elect new persons, confer new authorities, advance the poor, and impoverish the rich. That what is said of David may be said of him ; he filled the hungry with good things, and the rich he has sent empty away. Besides, it is his interest to build new cities, to shift the inhabitants from one place to another ; in a word, so to toss and transpose every thing, that there be no honour, wealth, nor preferment in the whole province, but what is ownable to him.”

Some of these courses were taken by Henry III. in France ; but his chief aim was to introduce new persons into such offices and dignities of the state, as were filled before with the nobility and princes of the blood. He raised out of the dust obscure persons, who might owe to him only their wealth and honour, and who might look upon him as their second creator : These paid him a blind obedience ; they never considered what was for the public good, what was reasonable, safe, expedient, just, or honest, but in all things did as they were commanded ; with such a set of men

* Discourses on Livy, lib. i. c. 26.

this dark Prince gave the first mortal wound to the liberties of France; he placed them so high as to overlook the old gentry, who, being weakened and depressed, had neither the interest nor the courage to preserve their ancient form of government.

He has been followed in these steps by all the French Kings his successors; so that under that monarchy, in every reign since, we have hardly seen any but the creatures merely of the Prince's favour, and quite new men upon the stage of business; and such have in a manner engrossed all the employments of profit, trust, and honour.

We grant, that in a well constituted government, which is upon a right foot indeed, neither wealth nor titles, and nothing but virtue and abilities, should prefer a man to the honours and employments of his country. But when the times are too corrupt to admit of such measures, the question will be, Who with most safety are to be relied on, they whose fortunes are made, or they who are to make their fortunes? They who have a satiety of titles, or they whose ambition may prompt them to attempt any thing to advance themselves?

In all likelihood countries (whose depraved manners will not allow them to lift up virtue in distress, and which in truth cannot find such men to serve them as were Aristides, Socrates, and those other heroes whom we newly mentioned) should desire to see themselves ruled in the subordinate parts of government, by the best hands that can be possibly got: If it is to be come at, they should endeavour to have places of great honour and high trust, filled with persons whose birth, estates, and other circumstances, seem in human proba-

probability to set them at least above the common temptations of the world.

He who has a good stake will be afraid to engage in desperate councils; he who has a large estate will not consent to have the laws subverted, which are his firmest security; for where the sword governs, lands at best are held but under a precarious title. They who are well born will desire to preserve that constitution of which they and their ancestors have always been a part: Instead of governing and making a figure in their country, in all appearance they will be loth to become the contemptible clients and dependents of some favourite or minister, whom chance or partiality shall set above his betters.

But they who come into a government with a design to build a family, and make a fortune; who are to get all, and can lose nothing; who are chiefly recommended by their boldness to undertake, and readiness to comply, whom no councils fright, and whom no measures shock; such men are indeed the proper instruments for introducing arbitrary power, but can hardly be thought fit ministers in any nation that is desirous to preserve its freedom.

Whoever looks over our histories will find, that all the attempts which were heretofore made upon the liberties of England, have been formed by such persons as have been here described.

Most of our former Princes having had designs of absolute dominion, and finding that the men of fortune and figure would rather obstruct than promote their intentions, thought it more conducing to their ends to be served by another sort of people, and did therefore bring into the management of their affairs all along a set of ministers, weak, ambitious, light, designing, rash, unskilful
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in the arts of wise administration, and versed in nothing but craft and tricks; but at the head of these they had always some one that was to be the forlorn hope, and who would venture to go greater lengths than any of his companions: And for this post they generally chose a pushing man of a bold spirit, a ready wit, a fluent tongue, obscure and low in the world, and such a one whom fortune could hardly leave in a worse condition than she found him. Nor was it difficult to find persons of this character, who would hazard their heads to compass power, wealth, and greatness. And though they could not arrive at unlimited monarchy, the philosophers stone, our former statesmen have so much hunted after, yet in the search of it they found several other good things; we mean good for themselves, that is to say, titles and great estates. It is true, many of them have been interrupted in their course, and the weight of the people has borne them down at last. But a man of a wretched beginning, never heard of before, when he sees himself lifted up high, seldom thinks of the laws, impeachments, and the ax. He hopes to elude justice; that the power which set him on will bring him off, and that he may be defended by his numbers, and a corrupted majority devoted to him; or as his predecessors have done, that he may at last retire full of wealth and crimes, and that his guilt will be covered in the fresher offences of those who are to succeed him: Or men of this stamp, when they have got all they can, may think to be forgiven by changing sides; and that it will be time enough to become good patriots when they are no longer suffered to hurt the commonwealth; for the arms of the public have

been but too open to embrace such a sort of penitents.

Upon these, or the like hopes, the Cethegi and Catilines of former times have presumed to attack the liberties of England. It must therefore be a duty incumbent upon such as represent their country, "to hold a strong hand over the men of "business."

It would be endless to enumerate all the dangers that may befall a free government, if it should have at the head of its affairs a minister of a bold and enterprising spirit, who, from a low degree, aspires to the highest greatness, and whose ambition is not restrained by any private or public considerations.

If in some future reigns it should be our case to have such a man in a station, and with the power of doing much hurt, all such as desire to preserve their civil rights, should with undaunted courage set themselves to stop him in his career, and to intercept him in his growth.

Machiavel says *, "There is one rule infallible "to Princes in the election of such as are to serve "them. When you observe your officer more "careful of himself than of you, and all his actions and designs pointing at his own interest "and advantage, that man will never be a good "minister."

We shall beg the reader's pardon for one short digression in this place, and it is to take notice of another fine remark of the same author †, who says, "The actions of a new Prince are liable to "a stricter observation than if he were hereditary; "and when they are known to be virtuous, gain "more upon people, and oblige them farther

* Prince, c. xxii.

† Ibid, c. xxii.

" than

“ than antiquity of blood, because men are more
“ affected with present than past things.” But to
return to our matter.

The Spaniards were in a flourishing condition in Richlieu's time*: And in the beginning of his ministry the affairs of France were in great disorder: He wholly attributes the prosperity of Spain to this principle (running through all their councils at that time, and prevailing with all their ministers) of preferring the public good to private interest; and the contrary obtaining in France, he says, was the cause of all their disorders: So that we may justly think the present greatness of the French has taken its rise from this noble principle, having gotten there deeper footing now than it had heretofore.

Ministers, whose chief aim, in all they do, is their own greatness, can neither be good for prince nor people. And when they consult their private interest more than the public good, it is, in many instances, apparent to all the world; as for example:

1st, When they take no care of their Master's revenue. For in all countries, and in all ages, bad statesmen have thriven best under Princes plunged in debts and difficulties.

2dly, When they have made a false step, and do not own it, and recede, but rather call in the Prince's authority, and all his more immediate dependents, to help them out, and to countenance their errors, it is a sign they have more regard to themselves than to his honour.

3dly, When they enter upon new and desperate counsels, which if they succeed well, will redound to their proper glory; and if they should have a

* Testament Politique du Cardinal Richlieu, p. 2. c. iii.

bad event, may hazard his ruin; it is a plain mark that they are ready to sacrifice his safety to their own vanity or ambition.

4thly, When they conceal from him truths which he ought to know; when they do not acquaint him with the state of his affairs, nor with the true condition of the nation; when they do not endeavour to moderate his expences; and when they do not quit, when sound counsels cannot prevail, it is an evident proof that they prefer keeping up their interest, as they call it, and holding their post and employments, to all other considerations whatsoever.

5thly, When they are ready to do any thing, let it be never so hurtful to their Master, provided it square with the interest and measures of the party of which they are at the head, and by whom they are boyed up, it is a mark that they aim at being independent even of the Prince himself, and that they think to subsist more by the strength of their own faction than by his favour.

6thly, When man to man, and singly, they are willing to own any errors, but say at the same time that they were against this and that, accusing their brethren of the state for every miscarriage, it is a sign that provided they themselves are well thought on, they do not care what opinion the people entertain of the whole government.

7thly, When they are for proposing dishonourable and unjust shifts to raise money, rather than to take the pains of forming beforehand better schemes for ways and means, it is a sign that they prefer the momentary arts of recommending themselves to all thoughts whatsoever, and that they consult more their own ease than the public good. It is likewise an evidence that they are not of

Richlieu's mind, who says*, "That public administration takes up the thoughts of judicious ministers, insomuch that the perpetual meditations they are obliged to make, to foresee and prevent the evils that may happen, deprives them of all manner of rest and contentment, excepting that which they receive in seeing many sleep quietly, relying on their watchings, and live happy by their misery."

8thly, When, contrary to the constitution of the land, they promote counsels which tend to the keeping up an armed force, it is a sign that not daring to trust the laws, they would have their proceedings maintained another way; that they desire such an impunity as the sword has seldom failed to give bad ministers in other countries. It is a mark that their own safety is their principal object, and that they had rather the nation should be burthened with taxes, and have the form of government altered, and that the Prince should lose his subjects hearts, than venture themselves before a free and angry people.

We have given some of the marks which selfish and designing statesmen may be known by hereafter. And if in future times it should be our case to see persons of this character upon the stage of business, we must rouse up the vigour of our ancient constitution, we must awaken all the laws, and direct them boldly to the heads of such a dangerous sort of men.

Machiavel says†, "That they who governed the state of Florence from anno 1434 to 1494, were wont to say, that it was necessary every five years to review the state, for otherwise it

* Testament Politique, p. 2. c. iv.

† Discourses on Livy, lib. ii. c. i.

“ would be very hard to maintain it: They called
“ reviewing the state, reducing the people to the
“ same terror and awe as they had upon them of
“ old, when every man was punished according to
“ his crime, let his quality be what it would.”

He lays down likewise, “ That kingdoms as
“ well as commonwealths, have often occasion to
“ be reduced to their first principles:” Which,
he says, “ was done in France by the parliaments,
“ who revived the ancient government as often as
“ they opposed the King in his arrests, and as
“ often as they called great delinquents to ac-
“ count, whose crimes, if they are suffered to
“ grow, cannot be reformed but with disorder, if
“ not the dissolution of the whole government.”

For want of pursuing some such like courses,
the French have lost their old constitution, and
are now under the absolute sway of a single per-
son; and that we in England continue still to be
a free people, is without doubt chiefly owing to
that power which our ancestors have from time
to time exerted, of impeaching such of the
great ones as they saw entering upon measures
which plainly tended to introduce unlimited do-
minion.

We have been hitherto preserved by pulling
down such men as were setting themselves and
their Master above the laws; and we shall trans-
mit to posterity our civil rights untouched and un-
tainted, if we do not lose our wonted courage.

If therefore, in any future reign, it should be
seen that the ministers waste the kingdom's trea-
sure; that they misgovern or misapply it; that
they break into appropriated funds; that they
give advices which invade property, and which,
in their consequences, tend to disaffect the people:
And lastly, that to secure themselves they pro-
mote

mote one counsel which must end in the subversion of all the laws; if these things should come to appear, they who represent their country will not be afraid to attack these bold and high crimes with complaints, addresses, and impeachments; for if this be omitted, the impunity such men have found, will engage so many new offenders, that at last, by their number, they grow safe, and above correction; and when this happens, (as it has appeared in the instance of France) the liberties of a country are entirely lost.

When matters are become unquiet by ill conduct, discerning Princes, like wise men who have a law suit, desire to piece things up as soon as possible, and to remove the bone of dissention, as seeing full well, that troubles make the common people inquisitive; that enquiry gives them knowledge; and that when they have knowledge, they are very hard to govern.

But ill ministers often think that the best course to save themselves is yet farther to embroil their Master's business, not considering that the more things grow disturbed, the greater necessity there will be of sacrificing them to appease the people's anger.

Statesmen should take great care how they contract public hatred: For both good and bad Kings desert them at last, and with just reason; for he who has not judgment, conduct, and wisdom enough to avoid being odious, deserves not to be protected by his Prince, to his own hurt and danger.

Is there any instance of a wise, just, and good King (reigning so long as to have virtues known) who had not the hearts and affection of his subjects? When plots are formed against such Princes, are they not presently defeated? And does not all

mankind detest the conspirators? And let some flatterers say what they will, the vulgar are not impatient of any rule that is tolerably fair and easy; at bottom they love the splendor of a court, and are fond of regal power; so that Kings, who will but stoop the least to be popular, are doated upon, and idolized in every country.

The same thing holds in relation to ministers, if they are honest, if they have a superior genius, if they do not make too much haste to be rich, if they are notoriously seen to prefer the common welfare before their own private interest, if they are affable and industrious in doing good offices, if by their actions it is known that they do not desire to hold their stations upon any ignoble terms, if they are not haughty, arrogant, and insolent, they may rule the state without clamours, they may grow grey in their dignities and offices; the best part of mankind will be constantly of their side. And if they are at any time attacked by private malice upon some disobligations or disappointment, their enemies will not be able to do them any hurt: Clouded they may be for a while, but they will soon shine out with fresher lustre: If by inadvertency, and through the frailty of human nature, they have made false steps, and committed small faults, the general voice will be ready to excuse them, and their perfections shall be put in the balance, and outweigh their errors.

But here it may be objected, that Richlieu, who was undoubtedly one of the greatest men that ever undertook the guidance of a state, and who had very near all the good qualities necessary for one to whom the reins of empire are committed, did, notwithstanding, lie under continual accusations, popular anger, and conspiracies against his person. To which we answer, that this cardinal was
a good

a good minister for the French King, but not for France. He had all along designs to make his Master absolute. It is true, he endeavoured, by his sagacity, care, and deep foresight, to make the French as great and happy as a country can possibly be under an unlimited dominion: However, his foundation was not sound at bottom, nor honest to human kind: He was therefore, from time to time, harassed, interrupted, and perplexed by the few good patriots that remained, who had still an eye towards their ancient constitution: Some indeed joined with these to oppose him, who did not act upon so right a principle.

But when the ministers in the measures they take to promote their Master's greatness, consider their country's freedom, when at one and the same time they are trusty and impartial servants to Prince and country both, when they duly contemplate how unwise and wrong it is ever to let them have a divided interest; such statesmen as do all this, stand like rocks, against whom the waves, stirred and moved forward by vulgar breath, beat in vain. They are safe, revered by the best sort, and the darlings of the people; such need not fear the scanning of their actions, popular anger, nor the secret machinations of discontented persons; their innocence is their sure guard, armed with which, they are not apprehensive of impeachments.

From what has been here said, peradventure it will appear, that mixed governments are not to be long preserved under their old form, unless such as represent their country "do hold a strong hand
"over the men of business, calling those to an
"account, who either through folly, or upon some
"wicked design, pursue destructive measures."

But this high cordial is not to be used upon every slight occasion; it was never intended by our
ancestors

ancestors to encounter distempers better cured another way, and to be then only administered when the body politic was sick at heart. Nothing can be admired and awful, that at every turn is exposed to common view: Impeachments are the laws of the supreme sword, which should be drawn only to cut off great offences; it should hang high, with the scabbard on, over the heads, and in the view of such as meddle in matters of state; and when it is unsheathed, be in a way and manner so very terrible, as to make all offenders tremble.

If in times to come, our affairs should happen to be under an ill administration, the calamities that must thereby fall upon all degrees of men, (those excepted who shall have enriched themselves by the public spoils) will stir up the legislative authority to interpose in looking after our future safety.

And at such a season perhaps it will be thought the sublimest wisdom of all, not to be angry with persons, but to mend things; and that it will not import much though the criminal escape unpunished, so the fault can be corrected. The remorse and shame of having, it may be, in a few years ruined a rich and flourishing people (for so the case may happen) will be punishment enough to those who have left in them any seeds of honour.

Such therefore as mean their country well in an unhappy juncture of this nature, when they go to give affairs a better complexion, should in all likelihood begin their work by determining and pronouncing "What councils have been directly
" against the law, what advices have tended to
" impoverish the crown and kingdom, and what
" practices have wasted the nation's treasure."
And when in this solemn manner they have condemned

demned the offences, if they think fit, the offenders may be reached with ease.

If we should ever have a set of statesmen whose offences will compel the nation to accuse them, they will endeavour to cover their own faults by recriminating upon the proceedings of former times. If they are charged with wasting the public treasure, and giving away the crown lands, with aiming at arbitrary power, and to govern by the sword, they will be so audacious to think they stand justified by answering, "The same things were heretofore done." But they ought to make this reflection, that King Charles was in danger to lose his crown; and that King James actually lost it, because his ministers pursued measures destructive to the kingdom.

And now in a few words to recapitulate the whole matter of this long section; if such as represent the people are uncorrupt, unbiaſſed, and diſinterested; if they diligently attend the nation's ſervice; if they carefully watch encroachments upon the conſtitution; if they make provision againſt future evils; if they look narrowly into the debts and expences of the nation; if they hold a ſtrong hand over the men of buſineſs; and if in this manner "private perſons perform their Duty to the Public," we ſhall not fail in all ſucceeding times, to ſee "a ſteady courſe of honeſty and wiſdom in ſuch as are truſted with the Adminiſtration of Affairs." For it may be laid down for a certain maxim, that ſtateſmen will hardly be negligent, corrupt, or arbitrary, when they are overlooked with careful eyes by ſo conſiderable a part of the conſtitution.

And where things are well adminiſtered, "that country will always encrease in wealth and power." Have we not before our eyes the example

ample of Spain, labouring under public and private wants, occasioned by nothing but a long series of misgovernment? What has preserved the Venetians for thirteen centuries against such potent leagues as have been frequently formed against them, but that the goodness of their constitution has enabled them to do great things with a very little? Would people under a tyranny, or indeed under a better form of government ill managed, have defended themselves with such courage as Venice and Holland have done? Did ever countries fight so bravely for their oppressors, as nations that have contended in the defence of their own liberties? Where matters are in a tottering condition, do not the people grow sullen and loth to venture their stocks out of their sight? Is it not seen that at such a time men hoard their money up which should circulate in trade? When the subjects are under apprehensions that ill conduct at home will at last produce wars, dangers, and invasions from abroad, have they not in all ages at such a season intermitted their foreign traffic, manufactures, and other business? What begets general industry, but hopes to have property preserved? Is it not evident that though here and there a private man accumulates great riches under an absolute monarchy, yet that the whole body of the people is always poor and miserable in countries so governed? What encourages men with infinite care, labour, and hazard, to gather private wealth, which enriches the public at last, but the hopes that stability of affairs, prudent conduct, and just administration, may produce peace, security, and lasting empire? Where men have a prospect of all this, strangers resort thither with their wealth and stocks, whereas merchants and other cautious persons abandon countries,

tries, whose follies and corruptions subject them to continual changes and frequent revolutions, so that peradventure, upon solid reasons and very just grounds, we may lay down, that nothing more contributes to make a Nation Gainers in the General Balance of Trade, than good laws well observed, and a constant course of honest and steady government.

As trade and riches have their principal foundation in the liberty and laws of a country, so when those great springs go right, they set in motion the engine of a commonwealth, though some other wheels may happen to be out of order.

To have the course of law and courts of judicature proceed uncorruptly, is such a remainder of strength and health, as may in time help to recover the other sickly parts of a constitution.

So that a nation is not depraved beyond all hope of cure, which has in the chief seats of judgment men of deep learning, probity, moderation, and integrity.

We shall conclude this last section with some advices which Richlieu directs to Lewis XIII *.

“ Unless Princes use their utmost endeavours to
“ regulate the divers orders of their state ; if they
“ are negligent in the choice of a good council ;
“ if they despise their wholesome advice, unless
“ they take a particular care to become such that
“ their example may prove a speaking voice ; if
“ they are negligent in establishing the reign of
“ God, that of reason, and that of justice together ; if they fail to protect innocence, to recompence signal services to the public, and to
“ punish disobedience, and the crimes which
“ trouble the order, the discipline, and safety of

* Testament Politique, part ii. chap. x.

“ states ;

“ states ; unless they apply themselves to foresee
“ and prevent the evils that may happen, and to
“ divert by careful negotiations the storms which
“ clouds drive before them from a greater di-
“ stance than is thought ; if favour hinders them
“ from making a good choice of those they ho-
“ nour with great employments, and with the
“ principal offices of the kingdom ; if on all oc-
“ casions they do not prefer public interest to
“ private advantages, though otherwise never so
“ good livers, they will be found more guilty than
“ those who actually transgress the commands and
“ laws of God ; it being certain, that to omit
“ what we are obliged to do, and to commit what
“ we ought not to do, is the same thing.”



END OF VOLUME II.

